Package	Details	CIR + Accreditation Wind Example*	Transitional Cost to Load	Considerations
Package D	 Wind and solar generators with an ISA are granted higher CIRs to maintain their UCAP without having to get back into the interconnection queue. Load pays for transmission baseline upgrades associated with Fast Track projects (\$0.7 B) and Transition Cycle 1 projects (\$1.3 B) totaling \$2.0 B. A 2023/2024 BRA sensitivity simulation showed incremental cost to load of replacing this UCAP would be on the order of \$139 M for one year (five-year total of \$695 M during transition period). Active wind and solar queue units must get back into the queue if they would like higher CIRs. Eligible wind and solar queue units are allowed to use excess transmission headroom for Base Residual Auction (BRA) during transition period. 	ISA CIR = 39% MFO Non-ISA CIR = 13% MFO ISA AUCAP = 13% MFO 9% ≤ Non-ISA AUCAP ≤ 13% MFO	\$2.0 B transmission costs	 Maintains AUCAP for ISA resources Potential complications with queue reform transition period if FERC delays or rejects Interconnection Queue Reform since solution is tied specifically to Fast Track (FT) and Transition Cycle 1 (TC1) Addresses capacity market impact (estimated five-year transition period) by conducting annual transmission headroom allocation study prior to each BRA, ensuring accreditation is not artificially lowered when transmission headroom is available Complex to implement (pseudo baseline upgrades)
Package H (NEW)	 Same as Package D, but load pays only for transmission baseline upgrades associated with Fast Track projects totaling \$0.7 B. 	ISA CIR = 39% MFO Non-ISA CIR = 13% MFO ISA AUCAP = 13% MFO 9% ≤ Non-ISA AUCAP ≤ 13% MFO	\$0.7 B transmission costs	 Same considerations as in Package D Achieves better balance of cost allocation between generation and load compared to Package D since changes are implemented as part of Interconnection Queue Reform TC1 instead of TC2 Risk that FERC may not accept PJM modifying TC1 assumptions impacting queue reform Risk that TC1 base case will be needed before RTEP can be completed under proposal Challenges for PJM to create case in advance of TC1 and implement Interconnection Queue Reform and ELCC/CIR simultaneously
Package F	• Same as Package D except limited-duration resources in the queue that requested CIRs based on the 10-hour rule will have a one-time opportunity upon implementation of the new procedures to increase their CIR request amount at their existing queue position.	ISA CIR = 39% MFO Non-ISA CIR = 13% MFO ISA AUCAP = 13% MFO 9% ≤ Non-ISA AUCAP ≤ 13% MFO	\$2.0 B transmission costs	 Same considerations as in Package D Provides batteries one-time opportunity to increase CIRs at their current queue position

. pjm

Package	Details	CIR + Accreditation Wind Example*	Transitional Cost to Load	Considerations
Package E	 Requires all generators, including those with an ISA, to get back into the queue if they would like higher CIRs 	ISA CIR = 13% MFO Non-ISA CIR = 13% MFO	\$0.695 B capacity costs	 Appears consistent with cost causation principles
	 Load does not have to pay for transmission baseline upgrades associated with higher CIRs. 	ISA AUCAP = 9% MFO		 Would not introduce delays in queue transition and is straightforward to implement
	 No transmission headroom capability study prior to BRAs during the transition period 			 Potentially viewed as not accounting for ISA holder claims to existing headroom
	 A 2023/2024 BRA sensitivity simulation showed incremental cost to load of replacing this UCAP would be on the order of \$139 M for one year (five-year total of \$695 M during transition period). 			 Immediate reduction in AUCAP for wind and solar resources that are deliverable and eligible to participate in RPM for an approximate five- year period
Package I	Same as Package E but with annual transmission capability		\$0.695 B	Similar considerations as in Package E
(NEW)	transition period	$9\% \le ISA UCAP \le 13\% MFO$ $9\% \le Non-ISA AUCAP \le 13\% MFO$		 Addresses capacity market impact (estimated five-year transition period) by conducting annual transmission headroom allocation study prior to each BRA, ensuring accreditation is not artificially lowered when transmission headroom is available
Package G	 Same as Package E but allows Fast Track wind and solar resources to request additional CIRs prior to the start of that Transition Cycle 1 	ISA CIR = 13% MFO Non-ISA CIR = 13% MFO	\$0.695 B capacity costs	 Provides Fast Track wind and solar resources opportunity to increase CIRs at the start of Transition Cycle 1
		ISA AUCAP = 9% MFO Non-ISA AUCAP = 9% MFO		Could introduce delays in queue
				 Potentially viewed as not accounting for ISA holder claims to existing headroom
				 Immediate reduction in AUCAP for wind and solar resources that are deliverable and eligible to participate in RPM for an approximate five- year period

1. *"ISA CIR" pertains to a resource that has an ISA as of the effective date of the proposal and "Non-ISA CIR" pertains to a resource that does not have an ISA as of the effective date of the proposal.

2. "MFO" = Maximum Facility Output

3. "AUCAP" = Accredited UCAP