

## **6.4 Offer Price Caps.**

### **6.4.1 Applicability.**

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped as specified below. For such generation resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, if the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped for the entire commitment period, and such offer prices will be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and committed at the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest overall system production cost. For such generation resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market such offer prices shall be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and dispatched on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost in accordance with 6.4.1(g) until the earlier of: (i) the resource is released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection; (ii) the end of the Operating Day; or (iii) the start of the generation resource's next pre-existing commitment.

The offer on which a resource is committed shall initially be determined at the time of the commitment. If any of the resource's Incremental Energy Offer, No-load Cost or Start-Up Cost are updated for any portion of the offer capped hours subsequent to commitment, the Office of the Interconnection will redetermine the level of the offer cap using the updated offer values. The Office of the Interconnection will dispatch the resource on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

Resources that are self-scheduled to run in either the Day-ahead Energy Market or in the Real-time Energy Market are subject to the provisions of this section 6.4. The offer on which a resource is dispatched shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A.

In accordance with section 6.4.1(h), a generation resource that is offer capped in the Real-time Energy Market but released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection will be subject to the three pivotal supplier test and further offer capping, as applicable, if the resource is committed for a period later in the same Operating Day.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified in Section 6.4.2 of this Schedule. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. Energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.

(d) [Reserved for Future Use]

(e) Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any period in which a generation resource is committed by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day or any period for which the generation resource has been self-scheduled where (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the Market Seller of the generation resource, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal (“three pivotal supplier test”). In the event the Office of the Interconnection system is unable to perform the three pivotal supplier test for a Market Seller, generation resources of that Market Seller that are dispatched to control transmission constraints will be dispatched on the resource’s market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

(f) For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

- (i) All megawatts of available incremental supply, including available self-scheduled supply for which the power distribution factor (“dfax”) has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection’s system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint (“effective megawatts”) will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax (“effective costs”). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.
- (ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.
- (iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test with respect to any hour in the relevant period will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.

A generation supplier's units, including self-scheduled units, are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

- (iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

(g) In the Real-time Energy Market, the schedule on which offer capped resources will be placed shall be determined using dispatch cost, where dispatch cost is calculated pursuant to the following formulas:

Dispatch cost for the applicable hour = ((Incremental Energy Offer @ Economic Minimum for the hour [\$/MWh] \* Economic Minimum for the hour [MW]) + No-load Cost for the hour [\$/H])

- (i) For resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market, the resource is committed on the offer with the lowest Total Dispatch cost at the time of commitment,

where:

Total Dispatch cost = Sum of hourly dispatch cost over a resource's minimum run time [\$] + Start-Up Cost [\$]

- (ii) For resources operating in real-time pursuant to a day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose offers are updated after commitment, the resource is dispatched on the offer with the lowest dispatch cost for the each of the updated hours.
- (iii) However, once the resource is dispatched on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the determination of the cheapest schedule.

(h) A generation resource that was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, is operating in real time, and may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, will be offer price capped, subject to the outcome of a three pivotal supplier test, for each hour the resource operates beyond its committed hours or Minimum Run Time, whichever is greater, or in the case of resources self-scheduled in the Real-time Energy Market, for each hour the resource operates beyond its first hour of operation, in accordance with the following provisions.

- (i) If the resource is operating on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the results of the three pivotal supplier test.

- (ii) If the resource is operating on a market-based offer and the Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test then the resource will be dispatched on the cheaper of its market-based offer or the cost-based offer representing the offer cap as determined by section 6.4.2, whichever results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined under section 6.4.1(g).
- (iii) If the Market Seller passes the three pivotal supplier test and the resource is currently operating on a market-based offer then the resource will remain on that offer, unless the Market Seller elects to not have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only the cost-based offer that represents the offer cap level as determined under section 6.4.2 considered for dispatch in which case the resource will be dispatched on its cost-based offer for the remainder of the Operating Day.

#### **6.4.2 Level.**

- (a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:
  - (i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;
  - (ii) For offers of \$2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals (“incremental cost”), plus up to the lesser of 10% of such costs or \$100 MWh, the sum of which shall not exceed \$2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than \$2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;
  - (iii) For units that are frequently offer capped (“Frequently Mitigated Unit” or “FMU”), and for which the unit’s market-based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:
    - (a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus \$20 per megawatt-hour;
    - (b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours, but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater

of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus \$30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus \$40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a “Frequently Mitigated Unit” because it meets all of the following criteria:

- (i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.
- (ii) The unit’s Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit’s PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit’s MW of installed capacity (in \$/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in \$/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in \$/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)
- (iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.
- (iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an “Associated Unit” upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;
2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;
3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the

preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU's average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

### 6.4.3 Verification of Cost-Based Offers Over \$1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based energy offer for a generation resource that includes an Incremental Energy Offer greater than \$1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the Incremental Energy Offer component of such cost-based offer. For each Incremental Energy Offer segment greater than \$1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether such offer segment exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that generation resource by determining the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost for each segment in accordance with the following formula:

Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost (\$/MWh segment in accordance with the following formula: @ MW) =  

$$[ ( \text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate}_i ) - ( \text{Bid Production Cost}_{i-1} ) ] / ( \text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1} )$$

where

$i$  = an offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer, which is comprised of a pairing of price (\$/MWh) and a megawatt quantity

Maximum Allowable Operating Rate (\$/hour @ MW) =  

$$[ ( \text{Heat Input}_i @ \text{MW}_i ) \times ( \text{Performance Factor} ) \times ( \text{Fuel Cost} ) ] \times ( 1 + A )$$

where

Heat Input = a point on the heat input curve (in MMBtu/hr), determined in accordance with PJM Manual 15, describing the resource's operational

characteristics for converting the applicable fuel input (MMBtu) into energy (MWh) specified in the Incremental Energy Offer;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource's actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent; and

A = Cost adder, in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(ii) of this Schedule.

$$\text{Bid Production Cost (\$/hour @ MW)} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i) - \frac{1}{2} \times \text{UBS} \times (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i - P_{i-1}) \right] + \text{No-Load Cost}$$

where

MW = the MW quantity per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

P = the price (in dollars per megawatt-hour) per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

UBS = Uses Bid-Slope = 0 for block-offer resources (i.e., a resource with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a step function curve); and 1 for all other resources (i.e., resources with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a sloped offer curve); and

If the price submitted for the offer segment is less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost then that offer segment shall be deemed verified and is eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price. If the price submitted for the offer segment is greater than the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost, then the Market Seller's cost-based offer for that segment and all segments at an equal or greater price are deemed not verified and are not eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price and such offer shall be price capped at the greater of \$1,000/megawatt-hour or the offer price of the most expensive verified segment on the Incremental Energy Offer for the purpose of setting Locational Marginal Prices; provided however, such Market Seller shall be allowed to submit a challenge to a non-verification determination, including supporting documentation, to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. Upon review of such documentation, the Office of the Interconnection may determine that the Market Seller's cost-based offer is verified and eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described above.

- (i) For the first incremental segment ( $i=1$ ), when the MW in the segment is greater than zero, the first segment shall be screened as a block-loaded segment ( $UBS=0$ ) as if there was a preceding  $MW_{i-1}$  of zero. The Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost calculation for the first incremental would use a preceding Bid Production Cost  $i-1$  (at zero MW) equal to the energy No-Load Cost.
- (ii) For the first incremental segment ( $i=1$ ), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and is the only bid-in segment to be verified, then the segment shall be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.
- (iii) For the first incremental segment ( $i=1$ ), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and there are additional segments to be verified, then the first segment shall be deemed verified only if the second segment is deemed verified. If the second segment is deemed not verified, then the first segment shall also be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(b) If an Economic Load Response Participant a cost-based demand reduction offer that includes incremental costs greater than or equal to \$1,000/megawatt-hour, in order for that offer to be eligible to determine the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate the incremental costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer's costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than \$1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer's incremental costs; and
- (ii) The end use customer's incremental costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection, and may not include shutdown costs.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant's, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental costs greater than or equal to \$1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

### 6.4.3A Verification of Fast-Start Resource Composite Energy Offers Over \$1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based offer for a generation resource that is a Fast-Start Resource that results in a Composite Energy Offer that is greater than \$1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the offer components:

Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost components of each offer segment shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the test described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3.

Start-Up Cost component shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the following formula:

$$\text{Start-Up Cost (\$)} = [ [ (\text{Performance Factor}) \times (\text{Start Fuel}) \times (\text{Fuel Cost}) ] + \text{Start Maintenance Adder} + \text{Additional Start Labor} + \text{Station Service Cost} ] \times (1 + A)$$

Where:

Start Fuel =

For units without a soak process, "Start Fuel" is fuel consumed from first fire of the start process to first breaker closing plus fuel expended from last breaker opening to shutdown.

For units with soak process, "Start Fuel" is fuel consumed from first fire of start process (initial reactor criticality for nuclear units) to the level at which the unit can follow PJM's dispatch (including auxiliary boiler fuel) plus fuel expended from last breaker opening to shutdown, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements, fuel consumed from first fire of start process to breaker closing plus fuel expended from breaker opening of the previous shutdown to initialization of the (hot) unit start-up, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements;

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy under Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource's actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Start Maintenance Adder = an adder based on all available maintenance expense history for the defined Maintenance Period regardless of unit ownership. Only expenses incurred as a result of electric production qualify for inclusion. Only Maintenance Adders specified as \$/Start, \$/MMBtu, or \$/equivalent operating hour can be included in the Start Maintenance Adder;

~~Start Additional Labor = additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels; and~~

Station Service Cost = station service usage (MWh) during start-up multiplied by the 12-month rolling average off-peak energy prices as updated quarterly by the Office of the Interconnection.

A = cost adder, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.2(a)(ii).

(b) Should the submitted Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above for any segment, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices):

- (i) the Incremental Energy Offer for each segment shall be capped at the lesser of the cap described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3 or the submitted Incremental Energy Offer; and
- (ii) the amortized No-load cost shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(c) Should the submitted Start-Up Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Start-Up Costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(d) If an Economic Load Response Participant submits an offer to reduce demand for a Fast-Start Resource where the maximum segment of the resulting Composite Energy Offer exceeds \$1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate such costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer's costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than \$1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer's incremental costs and shutdown costs; and

(ii) The end use customer's incremental and shutdown costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant's, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental and shutdown costs greater than or equal to \$1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

Should the submitted shutdown cost exceed the reasonably supported costs for that resource, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the shutdown costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

## **Definitions – R - S**

### **Ramping Capability:**

“Ramping Capability” shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

### **Real-time Congestion Price:**

“Real-time Congestion Price” shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

### **Real-time Loss Price:**

“Real-time Loss Price” shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

### **Real-time Energy Market:**

“Real-time Energy Market” shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

### **Real-time Offer:**

“Real-time Offer” shall mean a new offer or an update to a Market Seller’s existing cost-based or market-based offer for a clock hour, submitted for use after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market.

### **Real-time Prices:**

“Real-time Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

### **Real-time Settlement Interval:**

“Real-time Settlement Interval” shall mean the interval used by settlements, which shall be every five minutes.

### **Real-time System Energy Price:**

“Real-time System Energy Price” shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

### **Reasonable Efforts:**

“Reasonable Efforts” shall mean, with respect to any action required to be made, attempted, or taken by an Interconnection Party or by a Construction Party under Tariff, Part IV or Part VI, an Interconnection Service Agreement, or a Construction Service Agreement, such efforts as are timely and consistent with Good Utility Practice and with efforts that such party would undertake for the protection of its own interests.

**Receiving Party:**

“Receiving Party” shall mean the entity receiving the capacity and energy transmitted by the Transmission Provider to Point(s) of Delivery.

**Referral:**

“Referral” shall mean a formal report of the Market Monitoring Unit to the Commission for investigation of behavior of a Market Participant, of behavior of PJM, or of a market design flaw, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M, section IV.I.

**Reference Resource:**

“Reference Resource” shall mean a combustion turbine generating station, configured with a single General Electric Frame 7HA turbine with evaporative cooling, Selective Catalytic Reduction technology all CONE Areas, dual fuel capability, and a heat rate of 9.134 Mmbtu/MWh.

**Regional Entity:**

“Regional Entity” shall have the same meaning specified in the Operating Agreement.

**Regional Transmission Expansion Plan:**

“Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” shall mean the plan prepared by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 for the enhancement and expansion of the Transmission System in order to meet the demands for firm transmission service in the PJM Region.

**Regional Transmission Group (RTG):**

“Regional Transmission Group” or “RTG” shall mean a voluntary organization of transmission owners, transmission users and other entities approved by the Commission to efficiently coordinate transmission planning (and expansion), operation and use on a regional (and interregional) basis.

**Regulation:**

“Regulation” shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to separately increase and

decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

**Regulation Zone:**

“Regulation Zone” shall mean any of those one or more geographic areas, each consisting of a combination of one or more Control Zone(s) as designated by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, relevant to provision of, and requirements for, regulation service.

**Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority:**

“Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority” shall mean an entity that has jurisdiction over and establishes prices and policies for competition for providers of retail electric service to end-customers, such as the city council for a municipal utility, the governing board of a cooperative utility, the state public utility commission or any other such entity.

**Reliability Assurance Agreement or PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement:**

“Reliability Assurance Agreement” or “PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement” shall mean that certain Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, on file with FERC as PJM Interconnection L.L.C. Rate Schedule FERC No. 44, and as amended from time to time thereafter.

**Reliability Pricing Model Auction:**

“Reliability Pricing Model Auction” or “RPM Auction” shall mean the Base Residual Auction or any Incremental Auction, or, for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, any Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction.

**Required Transmission Enhancements:**

“Regional Transmission Enhancements” shall mean enhancements and expansions of the Transmission System that (1) a Regional Transmission Expansion Plan developed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 or (2) any joint planning or coordination agreement between PJM and another region or transmission planning authority set forth in Tariff, Schedule 12-Appendix B (“Appendix B Agreement”) designates one or more of the Transmission Owner(s) to construct and own or finance. Required Transmission Enhancements shall also include enhancements and expansions of facilities in another region or planning authority that meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities constructed pursuant to an Appendix B Agreement cost responsibility for which has been assigned at least in part to PJM pursuant to such Appendix B Agreement.

**Reserved Capacity:**

“Reserved Capacity” shall mean the maximum amount of capacity and energy that the Transmission Provider agrees to transmit for the Transmission Customer over the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Tariff, Part II. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty (60) minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis.

**Reserve Penalty Factor:**

“Reserve Penalty Factor” shall mean the cost, in \$/MWh, associated with being unable to meet a specific reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. A Reserve Penalty Factor will be defined for each reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

**Reserve Sub-zone:**

“Reserve Sub-zone” shall mean any of those geographic areas wholly contained within a Reserve Zone, consisting of a combination of a portion of one or more Control Zone(s) as designated by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, relevant to provision of, and requirements for, reserve service.

**Reserve Zone:**

“Reserve Zone” shall mean any of those geographic areas consisting of a combination of one or more Control Zone(s), as designated by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, relevant to provision of, and requirements for, reserve service.

**Residual Auction Revenue Rights:**

“Residual Auction Revenue Rights” shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that was not modeled pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.5 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.5 in compliance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.2 (h) and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.2(h), and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.2 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.2; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Tariff, Part VI; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

**Residual Metered Load:**

“Residual Metered Load” shall mean all load remaining in an electric distribution company’s fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) after all nodally priced load of entities serving load in such area(s) or territory(ies) has been carved out.

**Resource Substitution Charge:**

“Resource Substitution Charge” shall mean a charge assessed on Capacity Market Buyers in an Incremental Auction to recover the cost of replacement Capacity Resources.

**Revenue Data for Settlements:**

“Revenue Data for Settlements” shall mean energy quantities used in accounting and billing as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix and the corresponding provisions of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1.

**RPM Seller Credit:**

“RPM Seller Credit” shall mean an additional form of Unsecured Credit defined in Tariff, Attachment Q, section IV.

**Scheduled Incremental Auctions:**

“Scheduled Incremental Auctions” shall refer to the First, Second, or Third Incremental Auction.

**Schedule of Work:**

“Schedule of Work” shall mean that schedule attached to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement setting forth the timing of work to be performed by the Constructing Entity pursuant to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement, based upon the Facilities Study and subject to modification, as required, in accordance with Transmission Provider’s scope change process for interconnection projects set forth in the PJM Manuals.

**Scope of Work:**

“Scope of Work” shall mean that scope of the work attached as a schedule to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement and to be performed by the Constructing Entity(ies) pursuant to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement, provided that such Scope of Work may be modified, as required, in accordance with Transmission Provider’s scope change process for interconnection projects set forth in the PJM Manuals.

**Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A.

**Secondary Systems:**

“Secondary Systems” shall mean control or power circuits that operate below 600 volts, AC or DC, including, but not limited to, any hardware, control or protective devices, cables, conductors,

electric raceways, secondary equipment panels, transducers, batteries, chargers, and voltage and current transformers.

**Second Incremental Auction:**

“Second Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted ten months before the Delivery Year to which it relates.

**Security:**

“Security” shall mean the security provided by the New Service Customer pursuant to Tariff, section 212.4 or Tariff, Part VI, section 213.4 to secure the New Service Customer’s responsibility for Costs under the Interconnection Service Agreement or Upgrade Construction Service Agreement and Tariff, Part VI, section 217.

**Segment:**

“Segment” shall have the same meaning as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(e).

**Self-Supply:**

“Self-Supply” shall mean Capacity Resources secured by a Load-Serving Entity, by ownership or contract, outside a Reliability Pricing Model Auction, and used to meet obligations under this Attachment or the Reliability Assurance Agreement through submission in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction of a Sell Offer indicating such Market Seller’s intent that such Capacity Resource be Self-Supply. Self-Supply may be either committed regardless of clearing price or submitted as a Sell Offer with a price bid. A Load Serving Entity's Sell Offer with a price bid for an owned or contracted Capacity Resource shall not be deemed “Self-Supply,” unless it is designated as Self-Supply and used by the LSE to meet obligations under this Attachment or the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Self-Supply Entity:**

“Self-Supply Entity” shall mean the following types of Load Serving Entity that operate under long-standing business models: single customer entity, public power entity, or vertically integrated utility, where “vertically integrated utility” means a utility that owns generation, includes such generation in its regulated rates, and earns a regulated return on its investment in such generation or receives any cost recovery for such generation through bilateral contracts; “single customer entity” means a Load Serving Entity that serves at retail only customers that are under common control with such Load Serving Entity, where such control means holding 51% or more of the voting securities or voting interests of the Load Serving Entity and all its retail customers; and “public power entity” means cooperative and municipal utilities, including public power supply entities comprised of either or both of the same and rural electric cooperatives, and joint action agencies.

**Self-Supply Seller:**

“Self-Supply Seller” shall mean, for purposes of evaluating Buyer-Side Market Power, the following types of Load Serving Entities that operate under long-standing business models: vertically integrated utility or public power entity, where “vertically integrated utility” means a utility that owns generation, includes such generation in its state-regulated rates, and earns a state-regulated return on its investment in such generation; and “public power entity” means electric cooperatives that are either rate regulated by the state or have their long-term resource plan approved or otherwise reviewed and accepted by a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority and municipal utilities or joint action agencies that are subject to direct regulation by a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

**Sell Offer:**

“Sell Offer” shall mean an offer to sell Capacity Resources in a Base Residual Auction, Incremental Auction, or Reliability Backstop Auction.

**Service Agreement:**

“Service Agreement” shall mean the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto entered into by the Transmission Customer and the Transmission Provider for service under the Tariff.

**Service Commencement Date:**

“Service Commencement Date” shall mean the date the Transmission Provider begins to provide service pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date the Transmission Provider begins to provide service in accordance with Tariff, Part II, section 15.3 or Tariff, Part III, section 29.1.

**Short-Term Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

“Short-Term Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service” shall mean Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service under Tariff, Part II with a term of less than one year.

**Short-term Project:**

“Short-term Project” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Short-Term Resource Procurement Target:**

“Short-Term Resource Procurement Target” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, as to the PJM Region, for purposes of the Base Residual Auction, 2.5% of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement determined for such Base Residual Auction, for purposes of the First Incremental Auction, 2% of the of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement as calculated at the time of the Base Residual Auction; and, for purposes of the Second Incremental Auction, 1.5% of the of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement as calculated at the time of the Base Residual

Auction; and, as to any Zone, an allocation of the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target based on the Preliminary Zonal Forecast Peak Load, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative. For any LDA, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be the sum of the Short-Term Resource Procurement Targets of all Zones in the LDA.

**Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share:**

“Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018: (i) for the PJM Region, as to the First and Second Incremental Auctions, 0.2 times the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target used in the Base Residual Auction and, as to the Third Incremental Auction for the PJM Region, 0.6 times such target; and (ii) for an LDA, as to the First and Second Incremental Auctions, 0.2 times the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target used in the Base Residual Auction for such LDA and, as to the Third Incremental Auction, 0.6 times such target.

**Site:**

“Site” shall mean all of the real property, including but not limited to any leased real property and easements, on which the Customer Facility is situated and/or on which the Customer Interconnection Facilities are to be located.

**Small Commercial Customer:**

“Small Commercial Customer,” as used in RAA, Schedule 6 and Tariff, Attachment DD-1, shall mean a commercial retail electric end-use customer of an electric distribution company that participates in a mass market demand response program under the jurisdiction of a RERRA and satisfies the definition of a “small commercial customer” under the terms of the applicable RERRA’s program, provided that the customer has an annual peak demand no greater than 100kW.

**Small Generation Resource:**

“Small Generation Resource” shall mean an Interconnection Customer’s device of 20 MW or less for the production and/or storage for later injection of electricity identified in an Interconnection Request, but shall not include the Interconnection Customer’s Interconnection Facilities. This term shall include Energy Storage Resources and/or other devices for storage for later injection of energy.

**Small Inverter Facility:**

“Small Inverter Facility” shall mean an Energy Resource that is a certified small inverter-based facility no larger than 10 kW.

**Small Inverter ISA:**

“Small Inverter ISA” shall mean an agreement among Transmission Provider, Interconnection Customer, and Interconnected Transmission Owner regarding interconnection of a Small Inverter Facility under Tariff, Part IV, section 112B.

**Special Member:**

“Special Member” shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.5A.02, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.02, or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs.

**Spot Market Backup:**

“Spot Market Backup” shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

**Spot Market Energy:**

“Spot Market Energy” shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.

**Start Fuel:**

For units without a soak process, “Start Fuel” shall consist of fuel consumed from first fire of the start process to first breaker closing, plus any fuel expended from last breaker opening to shutdown.

For units with a soak process, “Start Fuel” is fuel consumed from first fire of the start process (initial reactor criticality for nuclear units) to the level at which the unit can follow PJM’s dispatch (including auxiliary boiler fuel), plus any fuel expended from last breaker opening to shutdown, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements. Start Fuel included for each temperature state from breaker closure to the level at which the unit can follow PJM’s dispatch shall not exceed the unit specific soak time period reviewed and approved as part of the unit-specific parameter process detailed in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(c) or the defaults below:

- Cold Soak Time = 0.73 \* unit specific Minimum Run Time (in hours)
- Intermediate Soak Time = 0.61 \* unit specific Minimum Run Time (in hours)
- Hot Soak Time = 0.43 \* unit specific Minimum Run Time (in hours)

**~~Start Additional Labor Costs:~~**

~~“Start Additional Labor Costs” shall mean additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels.~~

**Start-Up Costs:**

“Start-Up Costs” shall consist primarily of the cost of fuel, as determined by the unit’s start heat input (adjusted by the performance factor) times the fuel cost. It also includes operating costs, Maintenance Adders, emissions allowances/adders, and station service cost. Start-Up Costs can vary with the unit offline time being categorized in three unit temperature conditions: hot, intermediate and cold.

For units with soak process: Start-Up Cost shall mean the net unit costs from PJM’s notification to the level at which the unit can follow PJM’s dispatch and from last breaker open to shutdown.

For units without soak process: Start-Up Cost shall mean the unit costs from PJM's notification to first breaker close and from last breaker open to shutdown.~~mean the unit costs to bring the boiler, turbine and generator from shutdown conditions to the point after breaker closure which is typically indicated by telemetered or aggregated state estimator megawatts greater than zero and is determined based on the cost of start fuel, total fuel related cost, performance factor, electrical costs (station service), start maintenance adder, and additional labor cost if required above normal station manning. Start-Up Costs can vary with the unit offline time being categorized in three unit temperature conditions: hot, intermediate and cold.~~

**State:**

“State” shall mean the District of Columbia and any State or Commonwealth of the United States.

**State Commission:**

“State Commission” shall mean any state regulatory agency having jurisdiction over retail electricity sales in any State in the PJM Region.

**State Estimator:**

“State Estimator” shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.3 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.3.

**State Subsidy:**

“State Subsidy” shall mean a direct or indirect payment, concession, rebate, subsidy, non-bypassable consumer charge, or other financial benefit that is as a result of any action, mandated process, or sponsored process of a state government, a political subdivision or agency of a state, or an electric cooperative formed pursuant to state law, and that

- (1) is derived from or connected to the procurement of (a) electricity or electric generation capacity sold at wholesale in interstate commerce, or (b) an attribute of the generation process for electricity or electric generation capacity sold at wholesale in interstate commerce; or

(2) will support the construction, development, or operation of a new or existing Capacity Resource; or

(3) could have the effect of allowing the unit to clear in any PJM capacity auction.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, State Subsidy shall not include (a) payments, concessions, rebates, subsidies, or incentives designed to incent, or participation in a program, contract or other arrangement that utilizes criteria designed to incent or promote, general industrial development in an area or designed to incent siting facilities in that county or locality rather than another county or locality; (b) state action that imposes a tax or assesses a charge utilizing the parameters of a regional program on a given set of resources notwithstanding the tax or cost having indirect benefits on resources not subject to the tax or cost (e.g., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative); (c) any indirect benefits to a Capacity Resource as a result of any transmission project approved as part of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; (d) any contract, legally enforceable obligation, or rate pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act or any other state-administered federal regulatory program (e.g., the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule); (e) any revenues from the sale or allocation, either direct or indirect, to an Entity Providing Supply Services to Default Retail Service Provider where such entity's obligations was awarded through a state default procurement auction that was subject to independent oversight by a consultant or manager who certifies that the auction was conducted through a non-discriminatory and competitive bidding process, subject to the below condition, and provided further that nothing herein would exempt a Capacity Resource that would otherwise be subject to the minimum offer price rule pursuant to this Tariff; (f) any revenues for providing capacity as part of an FRR Capacity Plan or through bilateral transactions with FRR Entities; or (g) any voluntary and arm's length bilateral transaction (including but not limited to those reported pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 4.6), such as a power purchase agreement or other similar contract where the buyer is a Self-Supply Entity and the transaction is (1) a short term transaction (one-year or less) or (2) a long-term transaction that is the result of a competitive process that was not fuel-specific and is not used for the purpose of supporting uneconomic construction, development, or operation of the subject Capacity Resource, provided however that if the Self-Supply Entity is responsible for offering the Capacity Resource into an RPM Auction, the specified amount of installed capacity purchased by such Self-Supply Entity shall be considered to receive a State Subsidy in the same manner, under the same conditions, and to the same extent as any other Capacity Resource of a Self-Supply Entity. For purposes of subsection (e) of this definition, a state default procurement auction that has been certified to be a result of a non-discriminatory and competitive bidding process shall:

- (i) have no conditions based on the ownership (except supplier diversity requirements or limits), location (except to meet PJM deliverability requirements), affiliation, fuel type, technology, or emissions of any resources or supply (except state-mandated renewable portfolio standards for which Capacity Resources are separately subject to the minimum offer price rule or eligible for an exemption);
- (ii) result in contracts between an Entity Providing Supply Services to Default Retail Service Provider and the electric distribution company for a retail default generation supply product and none of those contracts require that the retail obligation be sourced from any specific Capacity Resource or resource type as set forth in subsection (i) above; and

- (iii) establish market-based compensation for a retail default generation supply product that retail customers can avoid paying for by obtaining supply from a competitive retail supplier of their choice.

**State of Charge:**

“State of Charge” shall mean the quantity of physical energy stored in an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in proportion to its maximum State of Charge capability. State of Charge is quantified as defined in the PJM Manuals.

**State of Charge Management:**

“State of Charge Management” shall mean the control of State of Charge of an Energy Storage Resource Market Participant using minimum and maximum charge and discharge limits, changes in operating mode, charging and discharging offer curves, and self-scheduling of non-dispatchable purchases and sales of energy in the PJM markets. State of Charge Management shall not interfere with an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant’s obligation to follow PJM dispatch, consistent with all other resources.

**Station Power:**

“Station Power” shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used in association with restoration or black start service; or (iv) that is Direct Charging Energy.

**Sub-Annual Resource Constraint:**

“Sub-Annual Resource Constraint” shall mean, for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year and for FRR Capacity Plans the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 Delivery Years, for the PJM Region or for each LDA for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) to establish a separate VRR Curve for a Delivery Year, a limit on the total amount of Unforced Capacity that can be committed as Limited Demand Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year in the PJM Region or in such LDA, calculated as the Sub-Annual Resource Reliability Target for the PJM Region or for such LDA, respectively, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the PJM Region or for such LDA, respectively.

**Sub-Annual Resource Price Decrement:**

“Sub-Annual Resource Price Decrement” shall mean, for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, a difference between the clearing price for Extended Summer Demand Resources and the clearing price for Annual Resources, representing the cost to procure additional Annual Resources out of merit order when the Sub-Annual Resource Constraint is binding.

**Sub-Annual Resource Reliability Target:**

“Sub-Annual Reliability Target” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean the maximum amount of the combination of Extended Summer Demand Resources and Limited Demand Resources in Unforced Capacity determined by PJM to be consistent with the maintenance of reliability, stated in Unforced Capacity, that shall be used to calculate the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement for Delivery Years through May 31, 2017 and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraint for the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 Delivery Years. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the Sub-Annual Resource Reliability Target, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Demand Resources. The calculation for the unconstrained portion of the PJM Region uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of DR (displacing otherwise committed generation) as interruptible from May 1 through October 31 and unavailable from November 1 through April 30 and calculates the LOLE at each DR level. The Extended Summer DR Reliability Target is the DR amount, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted peak load, that produces no more than a ten percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Sub-Annual Resource Reliability Target shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [the Forecast Pool Requirement] times [the DR Factor] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

**Sub-meter:**

“Sub-meter” shall mean a metering point for electricity consumption that does not include all electricity consumption for the end-use customer as defined by the electric distribution company account number. PJM shall only accept sub-meter load data from end-use customers for measurement and verification of Regulation service as set forth in the Economic Load Response rules and PJM Manuals.

**Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A.

**Surplus Interconnection Customer:**

“Surplus Interconnection Customer” shall mean either an Interconnection Customer whose Generating Facility is already interconnected to the PJM Transmission System or one of its affiliates, or an unaffiliated entity that submits a Surplus Interconnection Request to utilize Surplus Interconnection Service within the Transmission System in the PJM Region. A Surplus Interconnection Customer is not a New Service Customer.

**Surplus Interconnection Request:**

“Surplus Interconnection Request” shall mean a request submitted by a Surplus Interconnection Customer, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment RR, to utilize Surplus Interconnection Service within the Transmission System in the PJM Region. A Surplus Interconnection Request is not a New Service Request.

**Surplus Interconnection Service:**

“Surplus Interconnection Service” shall mean any unneeded portion of Interconnection Service established in an Interconnection Service Agreement, such that if Surplus Interconnection Service is utilized, the total amount of Interconnection Service at the Point of Interconnection would remain the same.

**Switching and Tagging Rules:**

“Switching and Tagging Rules” shall mean the switching and tagging procedures of Interconnected Transmission Owners and Interconnection Customer as they may be amended from time to time.

**Synchronized Reserve:**

“Synchronized Reserve” shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

**Synchronized Reserve Event:**

“Synchronized Reserve Event” shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve in one or more specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

**Synchronized Reserve Requirement:**

“Synchronized Reserve Requirement” shall mean the megawatts required to be maintained in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone as Synchronized Reserve, absent any increase to account for additional reserves scheduled to address operational uncertainty. The Synchronized Reserve Requirement is calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**System Condition:**

“System Condition” shall mean a specified condition on the Transmission Provider’s system or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service using the curtailment priority pursuant to Tariff, Part II, section 13.6. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

**System Energy Price:**

“System Energy Price” shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.

**System Impact Study:**

“System Impact Study” shall mean an assessment by the Transmission Provider of (i) the adequacy of the Transmission System to accommodate a Completed Application, an Interconnection Request or an Upgrade Request, (ii) whether any additional costs may be incurred in order to provide such transmission service or to accommodate an Interconnection Request, and (iii) with respect to an Interconnection Request, an estimated date that an Interconnection Customer’s Customer Facility can be interconnected with the Transmission System and an estimate of the Interconnection Customer’s cost responsibility for the interconnection; and (iv) with respect to an Upgrade Request, the estimated cost of the requested system upgrades or expansion, or of the cost of the system upgrades or expansion, necessary to provide the requested incremental rights.

**System Protection Facilities:**

“System Protection Facilities” shall refer to the equipment required to protect (i) the Transmission System, other delivery systems and/or other generating systems connected to the Transmission System from faults or other electrical disturbance occurring at or on the Customer Facility, and (ii) the Customer Facility from faults or other electrical system disturbance occurring on the Transmission System or on other delivery systems and/or other generating systems to which the Transmission System is directly or indirectly connected. System Protection Facilities shall include such protective and regulating devices as are identified in the Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards or that are required by Applicable Laws and Regulations or other Applicable Standards, or as are otherwise necessary to protect personnel and equipment and to minimize deleterious effects to the Transmission System arising from the Customer Facility.