

**Stakeholder Feedback on Connect and Manage Senior Task Force Survey Responses**

Question 1	
Company Name	Based on the presentations and discussion at the April 28 CAMSTF meeting, do you have any feedback and/or additional questions for PJM?
American Clean Power Association	<p>ACP appreciates PJM's continued engagement on C&amp;M design and offers the following feedback and questions arising from the April 28 meeting and the intersection of the C&amp;M framework with the RBP proposal.</p> <p>SIS BYONC eligibility under C&amp;M. ACP requests that PJM clarify whether a resource holding Surplus Interconnection Service (SIS) and serving as the supply-side counterparty to a bilateral RBP contract can qualify as BYONC such that the contracted load will avoid curtailment under C&amp;M. This question is distinct from BRA participation rights — the bilateral RBP contract is a multi-year commitment carrying construction milestones, COD obligations, and collateral requirements. The C&amp;M framework creates severe curtailment exposure for loads that interconnect without a qualifying BYONC resource, and neither the RBP proposal nor the most recent C&amp;M update addresses this question. Loads and developers cannot commit to multi-year bilateral contracts under this uncertainty.</p> <p>BYONC pre-qualification gap. The bilateral phase has no explicit resource-level eligibility screen beyond the general BYONC qualification standard. A large load may negotiate and execute a bilateral contract in good faith only to discover after the fact — when a subsequent RPM auction determines BYONC status — that its contracted supply does not satisfy BYONC criteria. At that point the load remains exposed to C&amp;M, has expended transaction costs, and may have foregone other supply options during the bilateral window. ACP asks whether CAMSTF will develop a pre-qualification framework for bilateral supply, or whether that is expected to fall entirely within the RBP design process.</p> <p>ELCC cascade to loads' BYONC showings. Under the central procurement structure, PJM credits EDCs with procured UCAP, and EDCs in turn allocate that capacity to loads as the basis for BYONC showings. When ELCC declines — for example, from 100 MW to 95 MW — the supplier faces shortfall penalties, but the supplier's penalty payment does not cure the load's C&amp;M exposure. The load is left with a BYONC showing that no longer covers its demand obligation and has no contractual remedy because it is not a party to the RBP contract. ACP asks whether CAMSTF has considered a mechanism for automatically adjusting EDC BYONC allocations to reflect actual resource accreditation, and whether a partial BYONC shortfall triggered by ELCC methodology changes would expose a load to C&amp;M curtailment.</p> <p>COD timing asymmetry and BYONC delivery year. The central procurement phase requires resources to achieve commercial operation no later than June 1, 2031. The bilateral phase has no equivalent COD constraint. ACP asks: if a load bilaterally contracts with a resource whose expected COD is after 2031, what delivery year does that contract confer BYONC credit for? Without clarity on how bilateral contract COD maps to BYONC exemption delivery years, loads could execute contracts that do not actually exempt them from C&amp;M for the delivery years in which they face curtailment exposure.</p> <p>Timing: 27/28 DY loads have no central procurement path. The 27/28 DY BYONC gate closes in February 2027 — one month before central procurement opens in March 2027. C&amp;M curtailment begins June 1, 2027 and central procurement results do not retroactively exempt 27/28 DY loads. This means the bilateral phase is the exclusive C&amp;M exemption pathway for the first class of affected loads. ACP asks whether PJM intends to publish explicit guidance to 27/28 DY loads confirming this, and what recourse those loads have if the bilateral phase fails to produce a qualifying BYONC contract before the February 2027 gate.</p>

**Question 2**

**Company Name**      **Based on the post meeting matrix and discussion, do you have other solution options and/or packages that you would like to share? Please note solution options and packages will need to be within the approved Issue Charge scope.**

American Clean Power Association

ACP offers the following solution options, each tied to a specific C&M design gap identified above:

1. SIS BYONC confirmation. PJM should issue explicit guidance confirming that resources holding SIS that bilaterally contract with large loads under the RBP will count as BYONC under C&M, removing those loads from curtailment exposure. If SIS resources cannot satisfy BYONC bilaterally, the problem is broader and PJM should address it urgently — SIS projects are frequently among the most shovel-ready in the TC2 queue and represent the most deliverable near-term supply for loads seeking C&M exemptions.
2. BYONC pre-qualification framework with safe harbor. PJM should publish a resource-level eligibility list for bilateral supply that qualifies for BYONC purposes, an attestation process allowing developers to confirm eligibility before contract execution, and a safe harbor under which a load's bilateral contract with a PJM-confirmed BYONC-eligible resource is treated as satisfying C&M exemption requirements pending the relevant RPM auction. Pre-qualification criteria should be scoped to BYONC eligibility characteristics — not imported wholesale from central procurement gating criteria, which include project feasibility screens (equipment procurement evidence, construction schedule attestation) that are appropriately scoped to central procurement only.
3. COD-linked BYONC delivery year clarity. PJM should establish a clear rule mapping bilateral contract COD to the specific delivery year for which BYONC credit attaches. A load contracting bilaterally with a resource whose COD is, for example, June 1, 2033 should know in advance whether that contract exempts it from C&M for 33/34 DY only, or whether it provides no exemption for delivery years prior to COD. Without this rule, bilateral contracting is effectively unbounded on the demand side in a way that could produce BYONC credits with no near-term reliability value.
4. System-level ELCC risk absorption to protect load BYONC showings. PJM should redesign ELCC risk allocation so that accreditation methodology changes do not cascade to loads' BYONC showings. Under ACP's proposed framework, if a central procurement resource's ELCC accreditation declines — from 100 MW to 95 MW, for example — the supplier's RBP obligation adjusts downward to match actual accreditation, the resource participates in RPM as a \$0 price-taker at the revised level, and the EDC's BYONC allocation to loads adjusts automatically. The system absorbs the 5 MW reliability consequence through a marginally more inelastic BRA supply curve rather than stripping loads of C&M exemptions they contracted for in good faith. ACP offers two implementation mechanisms: a de minimis harmless threshold (5% band absorbed with no adjustment) or a triennial accreditation reset using a rolling three-year average.
5. Explicit 27/28 DY guidance. PJM should publish guidance before bilateral matchmaking opens in September 2026 confirming that: (a) the bilateral phase is the exclusive RBP pathway to a C&M exemption for 27/28 DY loads; (b) central procurement results in August 2027 do not retroactively exempt loads from C&M curtailment beginning June 1, 2027; and (c) loads that cannot close a bilateral contract before the February 2027 BYONC gate have no RBP remedy for 27/28 DY exposure. This guidance is necessary for affected loads to make informed decisions at the outset of the bilateral window.