UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Kammer Juniata Transmission, LLC) Docket No. ER26-1734

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND ANSWER OF PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C.

Pursuant to Rules 212 and 213 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure,[1] PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) submits this Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer in response to certain protests[2] to the formula rate and transmission rate incentive request filed by Kammer Juniata Transmission, LLC (Kammer Juniata or the Company) on March 12, 2026 (March 12 Filing). The purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the formula rate and incentives requested by the Company are just and reasonable. Yet, the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA, together with PUC, the Protestors) misuse this proceeding to make unsupported and inaccurate assertions regarding PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) process that require correction.

First, the Commission should reject Protestors' attempts to convert this rate proceeding into a dispute about the selection of the Kammer Juniata Project or to raise underdeveloped challenges to the RTEP process, which reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of PJM's planning framework. This is not the proper proceeding for Protestors to launch a collateral attack on PJM's

[1] 18 C.F.R. § 385.212 & .213 (2025).

[2] *See* Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Docket No. ER26-1734 (Apr. 7, 2026) (PUC Comments); Protest and Request for Evidentiary Hearing of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, Docket No. ER26-1734 (Apr. 7, 2026) (OCA Protest) (collectively, the Protests).

Governing Documents,[3] whether by making broad challenges about the competitiveness of PJM's RTEP process or criticizing PJM's specific conduct in implementing 2025 RTEP Window 1 in particular.[4] The Commission should therefore reject the Protestors' arguments[5] as outside the scope of this proceeding, and reaffirm its "long-held"[6] and consistent determination that PJM's RTEP process is a "fair and open regional planning process that considers and evaluates projects for reliability and/or congestion [that] is … acceptable to the Commission."[7]

Second, notwithstanding the narrow scope of this proceeding, PJM also seeks leave to file this answer to address specific comments set forth in the Protests. Although difficult to follow, Protestors seem to argue that the rebuttable presumption applicable to transmission rate incentive filings should not apply to the March 12 Filing because 2025 RTEP Window 1 allegedly was not

[3] Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined have the meanings set forth in PJM's Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff), the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (Operating Agreement), or PJM Manuals.

[4] *See infra* Section II.A.

[5] This Answer is limited to PJM's responses to the Protestors' arguments regarding the RTEP process generally and PJM's conduct in 2025 Window 1. PJM does not take a position on the Protestors' arguments regarding the justness and reasonableness of any specific requested transmission rate incentive, nor regarding the Company's requested rates.

[6] *Valley Link Transmission Maryland, LLC*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113, at P 94 (2025) ("Specifically, such arguments go beyond the Commission's policy, as set forth in Order Nos. 679 and 679-A, of assessing whether a regional transmission planning process was fair and open and evaluated whether the transmission project would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion when determining whether that project qualifies for the rebuttable presumption. None of Ms. Ghiorzi's arguments about RTEP cause us to call into question our long-held determination that the RTEP process is fair and open.").

[7] Order No. 679 at P 58; *see, e.g.*, *Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,263, at P 19 (2025) ("[T]he Commission determined that the Project was entitled to the rebuttable presumption because it was approved through PJM's RTEP process, which evaluated whether the Project would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion, in accordance with Order No. 679."); *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,147, at P 20 (2023) ("The Commission has found that transmission projects that are approved as baseline upgrades in PJM's RTEP are entitled to the rebuttable presumption, as established under Order No. 679.") (citing *Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 129 FERC ¶ 61,300, at P 22 (2009)).

fair or open. Specifically, Protestors assert or insinuate that PJM: (i) withheld information and mischaracterized the violations for which solutions were sought;[8] (ii) failed to comply with the Operating Agreement, including with respect to: (a) window duration,[9] (b) the Designated Entity prequalification process,[10] and (c) issuance of the Designated Entity Agreement (DEA);[11] (iii) permitted anti-competitive bidding practices;[12] and (iv) inappropriately "rejected" or ignored feedback provided when it selected the more efficient or cost-effective solutions to address the 2025 RTEP Window 1 reliability violations.[13] PUC also seems to suggest that PJM should have adopted a "wait-and-see" approach to soliciting transmission solutions for reliability violations that will arise as soon as 2030.[14]

Protestors' arguments are baseless and plainly contrary to prior Commission orders, PJM's Governing Documents, and statements made by PJM throughout 2025 RTEP Window 1. Further, PUC's proposed "wait and see" approach is inconsistent with the Commission's stated objectives regarding regional transmission planning and suggests a passive, reactive planning approach that introduces unnecessary risk to reliability. Accordingly, the Commission should reject Protestors' claims that PJM's process for selecting the Company's Kammer-Juniata line proposal (Kammer Juniata Project or Project) violated the Operating Agreement or failed to satisfy applicable openness and transparency requirements.

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[8] *See* OCA Protest at 17.

[9] *See, e.g.*, OCA Protest at 10-11, 16-18; PUC Comments at 13-14.

[10] *See, e.g.*, PUC Comments at 13.

[11] *See, e.g.*, *id*.

[12] *See, e.g.*, OCA Protest at 18; PUC Comments at 3-4.

[13] *See, e.g.*, OCA Protest at 15-16, 19, 24; PUC Comments at 13.

[14] *See* PUC Comments at 4, 13.

Ultimately, Protestors' complaints are about rejecting a transmission solution for a reliability challenge that neither PUC nor OCA deny. PPL Corporation (PPL) formally requested that PJM consider 4 GW of additional load in the PPL footprint of the 2025 RTEP.[15] PJM did as requested. Once the 4 GW of load entered PJM's models, PJM was obligated to address the associated reliability challenge in its planning process. Not doing so could render the 2025 RTEP Window 1 solutions deficient because the selected solutions would not have considered such load from robustness, scalability, and flexibility perspectives. PJM's obligation to address that reliability need remained until a party demonstrated in writing either that (i) the 4 GW of load would not actually manifest or (ii) there would be sufficient generation to serve that load without necessitating a transmission solution. Protestors never attempted to make either of those demonstrations—although they were given many opportunities to do so during the planning process—and therefore the 4 GW of load forecasted by PPL remained in the RTEP model under a dedicated planning scenario.

PJM was in compliance with its Governing Documents when it adopted a transmission solution flexible enough to address the 4 GW of load in PPL and enable more transfer capability West to East for more surplus capacity to reach forecasted load growth in eastern PJM. Despite thus far failing to address the actual problem, Protestors can still resolve it in the future by making a formal, written filing with PJM showing that the 4 GW of load is not going to manifest or that Pennsylvania has sufficient generation, electrically proximate to load, to address the need without relying on transmission development. Until Protestors take such action, they must live with the solution to the reliability need that they themselves announced.

[15] *See* Attachment A, Letter of George Khoury to PJM (June 25, 2005) (PPL Letter).

I. BACKGROUND

A. The PJM RTEP Process

As part of its ongoing responsibilities as a Regional Transmission Organization, PJM is charged by the Commission with maintaining the safety, reliability, and security of the bulk electric transmission system in the PJM Region. Consistent with its regional transmission planning function, PJM prepares the RTEP each year in order to identify transmission system enhancements or expansions needed for reliable grid operations now and in the future for the 67 million people in the PJM Region. PJM evaluates the aggregate needs across the transmission system and identifies solutions to those needs on a regional basis.

Each year, PJM conducts the RTEP process to prepare the high-voltage transmission system to meet the projected demand and supply. The RTEP process integrates transmission, generation (existing, deactivated and planned), and demand response resources when assessing transmission system reliability constraints. The result is one process that integrates many system factors as detailed in PJM Manual 14B.[16] PJM's RTEP process applies North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards through a wide range of reliability analyses, including those listed under the PJM planning criteria, including load and generation deliverability tests.[17] Those tests are applied and the results are evaluated over a 15-year planning horizon. PJM documents all instances where the transmission system does not meet applicable reliability criteria and develops system reinforcements or upgrades (through the competitive solicitation and/or the

[16] PJM, Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process (rev. 58, Dec. 17, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m14b.pdf (Manual 14B).

[17] The PJM Planning Manuals, including Manual 14B, include the processes and procedures PJM uses to comply with applicable NERC standards.

immediate need processes) to ensure compliance with NERC standards and maintain the reliability of the bulk electric system.

PJM consults with its stakeholders through the Transmission Expansion Advisory Commission (TEAC) in its preparation of the RTEP.[18] The TEAC is an advisory-only, open PJM stakeholder committee, which holds regular (at least monthly) public meetings to review RTEP activities, analyses, and proposed transmission solutions, and to provide advice to PJM regarding the preparation of the PJM RTEP for review and approval by the PJM Board. TEAC activities are at the core of stakeholder input in the RTEP process. The scope of the TEAC's responsibility includes the review of and the provision of comments and input on the following: (i) scope and assumptions of RTEP studies; (ii) RTEP analyses at defined points during the RTEP process cycle; (iii) RTEP recommendations to be proposed to the PJM Board for approval; and (iv) specified RTEP process matters as requested by the PJM Board.

TEAC participation is open to all Transmission Owners, transmission customers, Nonincumbent Developers, PJM Members, representatives of state commissions, the agencies and offices of state consumer advocates of states in the PJM Region, and any other interested parties. Following the presentation of analyses, assumptions or results to the TEAC, stakeholders are able to provide feedback or ask questions during the meeting itself or provide written comments and or requests. These comments are provided to the PJM Board for its consideration and serve as the basis for ongoing dialogue at subsequent TEAC meetings.

[18] TEAC meetings are conducted in accordance with the requirements of PJM Manual 34 (PJM Stakeholder Process). *See* PJM, Manual 34: PJM Stakeholder Process (rev. 22, Sept. 25, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m34.pdf.

B. Identification of Reliability Needs in the PJM Region

PJM's reliability planning encompasses a comprehensive series of detailed analyses to maintain reliability under various forecasted operating conditions and using applicable planning criteria.[19] For the near-term, PJM identifies needs for transmission upgrades using a five-year-out system model (base case) that incorporates PJM's official load forecast. The RTEP five-year-out base case(s) also considers generation additions and announced generator deactivations, local transmission upgrades scheduled to be in service within the five-year timeframe and the forecasted load that is projected to materialize in the next five years. As appropriate, PJM also may utilize various load growth scenarios that represent more recent information (or information that has developed following the release of PJM's annual load forecast). PJM also utilizes seven/eight-year cases to identify nearer term needs that developers can propose robust, right-sized five-year solutions to address.[20]

PJM uses the base case to identify any reliability violations that need to be addressed pursuant to the planning criteria. Specifically, because compliance with NERC Reliability Standards is mandatory, if PJM identifies system conditions under which the PJM transmission system will violate NERC Reliability Standards, PJM is obligated to identify a transmission solution that will resolve the identified violation. In order to do so, PJM may open a competitive

[19] Specifically, PJM selects RTEP baseline projects as needed to comply and resolve the following reliability criteria: (i) NERC, SERC Reliability Corporation, ReliabilityFirst Corporation, PJM, and other applicable reliability criteria, including operational performance; (ii) individual Transmission Owner planning criteria as filed in the Transmission Owner's respective FERC Form No. 715; (iii) criteria to address economic constraints; and (iv) State Agreement Approach (public policy) expansions or enhancements as set forth in the Operating Agreement at Schedule 6, section 1.5.9.

[20] *E.g.*, *Reliability Analysis Update: Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee* at 3-4 (Apr. 1, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250401/20250401-item-15---2025-rtep-assumption-update.pdf (April 2025 TEAC Update).

window to solicit proposals from qualified Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers to address the identified needs through robust, holistic and expandable solutions that address and resolve the identified reliability violations. The PJM competitive planning process encourages innovative, cost-effective, and timely transmission solutions to the challenges of building and maintaining a reliable electric transmission system.

The competitive planning process begins with PJM notifying incumbent Transmission Owners, Nonincumbent Developers, and all interested stakeholders—through a TEAC meeting—of PJM's intention to solicit competitive solutions to the identified planning needs. PJM publishes a set of specific planning criteria violations for which PJM is soliciting solutions and provides periodic updates while the window is open addressing any corrections or additional information that is material for a successful transmission solicitation process. Transmission developers then have a stated period before the window closes to submit their proposed solutions for addressing the identified planning criteria violations. Incumbent Transmission Owners, Nonincumbent Developers, and any other interested stakeholders have the opportunity to request that PJM extend the window duration. PJM has accommodated such requests in the past.[21]

PJM does not itself propose any solutions to address identified reliability needs. PJM, however, may combine and/or stage different proposed solutions based on need to develop the more efficient or cost-effective solution to address the identified competitive window needs.

Once the proposal window is closed, PJM engages in a robust and transparent process to analyze the submitted solutions based on a variety of criteria as described above, which are outlined and shared with stakeholders through the TEAC and the competitive window material.

[21] The 2022 RTEP Window 3 opened on February 24, 2023 and was initially intended to close on April 25, 2023 as a 60-day window. Multiple transmission developers requested, and PJM accommodated, a delay of the window closing until May 31, 2023, an extension of 36 days.

PJM then selects the more efficient or cost-effective solution(s) for potential inclusion in the RTEP, and presents these proposed solutions to PJM stakeholders in a public TEAC meeting for stakeholder input. After the proposed solutions are presented during at least two TEAC meetings, the selected projects are recommended to the PJM Board for approval.[22]

C. 2025 RTEP Window 1

PJM presented the 2025 RTEP assumptions at the January, February, March, April, and May 2025 TEAC meetings, along with modeling and analysis criteria and the anticipated 2025 RTEP cycle timeline. To that end, PJM developed multiple scenarios using five-year (2030) and seven-year (2032) base case suites (representing a baseline and multiple additional scenarios) to analyze the effects of load, generation and consequent regional flow drivers on system performance and to ensure near- and long-term reliability criteria violations were identified and addressed. PJM's Problem Statement, which PJM issued on June 18, 2025, explained the scope of work as follows:

> PJM is seeking proposals to resolve identified reliability criteria violations as demonstrated in the 2030 RTEP model suite. The 2032 RTEP models suite will be primarily utilized to right-size needs already showing up in 2030 and for consideration of longer-term needs (requiring 7 or more years to develop, i.e., 500kV and above developments). The posted 2032 results are for reference only unless it is indicated that PJM is soliciting proposals for the associated flowgate(s).[23]

The 2025 RTEP cycle analysis identified the following needs encompassing both 2030 and 2032 baseline results:

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[22] The PJM competitive window process is described more fully in PJM Manuals 14B and 14F. *See* PJM, Manual 14F: Competitive Planning Process (rev. 10, Oct. 30, 2024), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m14f.pdf.

[23] PJM RTEP – 2025 RTEP Proposal Window #1: Problem Statement & Requirements at 6 (June 18, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/rtep-dev/expan-plan-process/ferc-order-1000/rtep-proposal-windows/2025-rtep-window-1/2025-rtep-window-1-without-analytical-files-v7.zip (Problem Statement).

- 113 transmission lines thermally overloaded at voltage levels 69 kV through 765 kV, with facility loadings reaching as high as 185%;
- 24 transformers thermally overloaded, with loadings reaching as high as 143%; and
- 783 facilities at voltage levels 69 kV through 765 kV, with voltage violations spanning six transmission owner zones.

On June 25, 2025 (one week after window opening on June 17, 2025), PPL sent PJM an update formally requesting the inclusion of an additional 4 GW of load in a sensitivity assessment during the 2025 RTEP cycle for the 2032 case.[24] PJM posted an addendum to the 2025 RTEP Window 1 on July 2, 2025, and updated its modeling files to add the PPL-requested 4 GW of load. At the July 8, 2025 TEAC meeting, PJM presented PPL's request to stakeholders.[25] PJM specifically "encourage[d] proposing entities to consider these additional loads [as] part of their robustness test while developing their solutions" because PPL's additional load was "expected to have a material impact on [2025 RTEP Window 1] posted violations/solutions."[26] **None of PJM's stakeholders asked PJM to exclude the 4 GW of PPL load from consideration or to extend the length of the competitive window**.

The 2025 RTEP Window 1 opened on June 18, 2025, and closed on August 18, 2025, during which PJM received **134 proposals from 19 different entities**. The proposals ranged from simple facility upgrades to new extra-high-voltage transmission lines (500 kV and 765 kV and grid enhancing technologies, such as underground HVDC or advanced conductors). PJM reviewed

[24] *See* PPL Letter at 1.

[25] *See Reliability Analysis Update: Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee* (July 8, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250708/20250708-item-11---reliability-analysis-update.pdf (July 8 Update).

[26] *Id.* at 13.

the performance and merits of all 134 competitive proposals, including those from Nonincumbent Developers and incumbent Transmission Owners, and recommended an RTEP solution set with a total cost estimate of approximately $11.8 billion to address the identified reliability needs covering the 2030 reliability violations, key, long-lead 2032 needs and to ensure the regional transfer needs triggered in the 2030 and 2032 were right-sized for the longer term.

The Problem Statement identified two areas of concern for the Mid-Atlantic Area Cluster (MAAC) 500 kV system, the region in which the Project is set to be located. First, due to New Jersey offshore wind, the Rock Springs-Bramah 500 kV line exceeded its conductor rating.[27] Second, for the 2032 analysis, the Problem Statement noted "multiple 500 kV facilities were overloaded due to terminal equipment constraints."[28] These reported violations reflected primarily the "baseline planning scenario" and the associated modeling information available at the time for 2025 RTEP Window 1. Following submission of the additional load information by PPL in late June, PJM added the load information to the competitive window material on July 2, 2025. While PJM noted that the problem of overloaded 500 kV facilities could be mitigated without long lead-time solutions, it did not preclude such proposals from being offered. PJM also stated as part of its June 5, 2026 update to the TEAC that PPL would "require additional transfer capability [to] enhance the import capability into PPL," but that the "details on how the western generation may materialize will have minimal impact on this need given the level of generation forecasted in the west."[29]

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[27] Problem Statement at 7.

[28] *Id.*

[29] Reliability Analysis Update at 38 (June 5, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250605/20250605-item-09---reliability-analysis-update.pdf.

Subsequently, on July 2, 2025, PJM posted an addendum to the 2025 RTEP Window 1 materials, which included updated study files and an updated problem statement. PJM discussed the updated problem statement and window objectives at the July 8, 2026 TEAC meeting, explaining that:

- In late June, PPL informed PJM that more load is anticipated to show up in PPL in 2030-2032 timeframe.
- The following future loads in PPL have Signed Agreements (SA). These loads are NOT included in 2025 load forecast, therefore not included in 2025 RTEP W1 posted cases.
- PPL will incorporate these loads in the 2026 load forecast.
- The additional loads are expected to have a material impact on 2025 W1 posted violations/solutions.
- PJM would encourage proposing entities to consider these additional loads part of their robustness test while developing their solutions.
- For the transparency purpose, the [IDV]s to model these loads are included in the 7/2 window addendum.[30]

FirstEnergy put forward four proposals to address the challenges in the MAAC system, including the PPL load growth and the need to enable more regional import capability to supply load growth in eastern PJM. NextEra and Exelon submitted four proposals to be completed by their proposed joint venture company, Kammer Juniata.[31] Each of FirstEnergy's proposals included two 500 KV lines originating within the Mid-Atlantic Region in Western Pennsylvania at the Keystone Generation 500 kV station, running across central Pennsylvania and terminating

[30] July 8 Update at 13.

[31] Kammer Juniata is currently a wholly-owned subsidiary of NextEra. NextEra and Exelon have entered into an agreement to establish a joint venture whereby Exelon or an Exelon affiliate will acquire a 25% ownership interest in the Company and NextEra will retain a 75% equity interest. That transaction is expected to close by early April 2026. *See* Transmittal Letter, Docket No. ER26-1734 at 4 (Mar. 12, 2026).

at Susquehanna near several new data center loads. FirstEnergy also proposed double-circuit, common-tower as well as single-circuit, separate tower construction options for the two new lines. Of FirstEnergy's proposals, PJM identified Proposal 826, a proposal for two double circuit lines from Keystone to Susquehanna, as one of the "shortlisted" solutions that warranted further evaluation and shared those shortlisted solutions and associated rationale at the November 4, 2025 TEAC meeting with PJM stakeholders. The shortlisted FirstEnergy Proposal 826 is illustrated below:

Two of NextEra's and Exelon's proposals aimed to provide further west-to-east transfer capability enhancements by extending the 765 kV backbone from Kammer near the Ohio and West Virginia border and terminating in the PPL Corporation (PPL) zone. One proposal terminated the new 765 kV line at Juniata (Proposal 237) and the other proposal extended it further across the PPL zone to Spicewood (Proposal 687). Those proposals are illustrated below:



In addition to evaluating the individual proposals submitted for the MAAC Regional cluster, PJM developed other potential solutions that were combined variations of the components of those individual proposals. For example, PJM considered the Kammer-Juniata 765kV line proposed by the Company combined with a single 500 kV line from Keystone to Susquehanna, which was sourced from FirstEnergy's Proposal 838.

At the November 4, 2025 TEAC meeting, PJM presented the short list of projects it was recommending for more detailed assessment in the 2025 RTEP.[32] NextEra's and Exelon's Proposal 237, which includes the Project, was among the shortlisted projects. Thus, stakeholders were made aware as early as the November 4, 2025 TEAC meeting that PJM was considering the Project.

The Project includes the construction of approximately 222-miles of greenfield 765 kV transmission lines from the Kammer substation in West Virginia to the Juniata substation in

[32] *See Reliability Analysis Update: 2025 Window 1 First Read* (Nov. 4, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20251104/20251104-item-14---reliability-analysis-update.pdf.

Pennsylvania.[33] An approximately 114-mile segment of the new line will connect Kammer to the new 765/500 kV Buttermilk Falls substation and loop into the Keystone-Conemaugh 500 kV transmission line.[34] The remaining approximately 108-mile segment of the new line will connect the Buttermilk Falls substation to the new 765/500 kV Mountain Stone substation and connect to the existing 500 kV Juniata substation.[35]

At the December 8, 2025 meeting, TEAC performed a second read of its recommended 2025 Window 1 solutions and a first read of proposed solutions for the 2025 Window 1 Regional Clusters.[36] At that meeting, PJM formally recommended the Project for development.[37] PJM explained that the Project: (1) provides stronger support to the Mid-Atlantic region in response to load growth in the PPL and MAAC areas in general, delays in OSW development, future generation retirements in MAAC, and any combination of those factors; (2) is a natural expansion of the existing 765 kV backbone into the PJM eastern region, which, PJM explained, allows for more flexibility in utilizing resources across the interconnection to serve load; (3) offers ~2 GW more import capability into the Mid-Atlantic region (including Pennsylvania) than proposal 826 and preserves existing 500 kV capacity; and (4) offers the highest transfer capability regardless of the future Source/Sink combination evaluated to account for future development scenarios.[38] PJM

[33] Transmittal Letter, Direct Testimony of Ryan Colley, Ex. No. RC-001 at 10 (Mar. 12, 2026) (Colley Testimony).

[34] *Id.* at 11.

[35] *Id.*

[36] *See Reliability Analysis Update: 2025 Window 1 Second Read* (Dec. 8, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20251208/20251208-item-11---reliability-analysis-update.pdf.

[37] *See id.* at 50.

[38] *See id.*

published the final results of 2025 RTEP Window 1 on January 23, 2026, where it noted that the Project met its reliability needs for both the 2030 model and the 2032 model.[39]

D. The Company's Designated Entity Status

Before an entity may construct, own, operate, maintain, or finance competitive planning projects, it must be a Designated Entity. However, neither the Tariff nor PJM's Manuals require a stakeholder to be pre-qualified as a Designated Entity before submitting a proposal in the RTEP. NextEra, a pre-qualified Designated Entity, submitted the Project as part of Proposal 237 while contemplating that Exelon, another pre-qualified Designated Entity, would be partner to the Project.[40] The Company separately submitted its own pre-qualification application to PJM on December 30, 2025, before PJM posted the final results of its 2025 RTEP Window 1.[41] PJM evaluated and granted that application consistent with the requirements of Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, section 1.5.8(a), and the Company has been prequalified as a Designated Entity since January 7, 2026.[42] The projected in-service date for the Project is June 2031.[43]

II. ANSWER

A. PUC's and OCA's Protests Are Outside the Scope of this Rate Proceeding

In rate proceedings such as this, the Commission's inquiry into whether a transmission project qualifies for the rebuttable presumption applicable to transmission rate incentive requests is limited to whether the applicant has complied with the Commission's policy—as set forth in

[39] *See* Reliability Analysis Report at 115.

[40] *See* Colley Testimony at 6.

[41] Application for Pre-Qualification for Designated Entity Status Submittal (Dec. 30, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/rtep-dev/expan-plan-process/ferc-order-1000/kammer-juniata/pre-qual-kammer-juniata-2025.pdf; *see* Reliability Analysis Report.

[42] *See* Colley Testimony at 4; PJM Letter Re: Kammer Juniata Transmission, LLC Pre-Qualification (Jan. 6, 2026).

[43] Colley Testimony at 11.

Order Nos. 679 and 679-A—to demonstrate that the "regional transmission planning process *[(i)] was fair and open and [(ii)] evaluated whether the transmission project would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion*."[44] The Commission has consistently concluded that PJM's RTEP process satisfies that rebuttable presumption because it is a fair and open planning process that evaluates projects for reliability and/or congestion.[45]

PUC and OCA have nonetheless improperly elected to collaterally attack Order No. 679 and PJM's RTEP process through this rate proceeding under Federal Power Act (FPA) section 205.[46] Collateral attacks on prior Commission orders are impermissible unless a petitioner (1) challenges the Commission's constitutional or statutory authority, (2) effectively reopens its prior orders, (3) the prior orders failed to place parties on notice of what would be required,[47] or if (4) it leaves an issue contingent on subsequent compliance proceedings.[48] PUC and OCA have alleged none of these things; therefore, their attacks on the existing Tariff are outside of the Commission's jurisdiction.[49]

It is well established that rate proceedings are not the correct forum to challenge PJM's RTEP or the prudence of a selected project, challenges which are instead "appropriately raised

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[44] *Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at P 94 (emphasis added) (discussing *Promoting Transmission Inv. Through Pricing Reform*, Order No. 679, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 679-A, 117 FERC ¶ 61,345 (2006), *order on reh'g*, 119 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2007)).

[45] *See supra* note 7.

[46] 16 U.S.C. § 824d.

[47] *See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC*, 428 F.3d 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (listing cases).

[48] *See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC*, 553 F.3d 820, 825 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing *La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FERC*, 522 F.3d 378, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).

[49] *See, e.g.*, *NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC*, 718 F.3d 947, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("this argument is merely a collateral attack on FERC's ability to approve non-conforming agreements…"); *Constellation Energy Commodities Grp., Inc. v. FERC*, 602 Fed.Appx. 536, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing *Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.*, 553 F.3d at 825 & *Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist.*, 428 F.3d at 299).

through separately filed complaints" under FPA section 206.[50] Indeed, the Commission has recently and explicitly confirmed that challenges regarding the competitiveness of PJM's RTEP process, PJM's selection of specific RTEP projects, and other claims similar to those raised by the Protestors go beyond the scope of whether the regional planning process was "fair and open" and evaluated whether the transmission project would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion.[51]

[50] *See, e.g.*, *Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at PP 93-94; *see also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,160, at P 18 (2024) ("[C]hallenges to the PJM Tariff cost allocation provisions or the selection of transmission projects included in the PJM RTEP pursuant to the provisions of the PJM Operating Agreement are appropriately raised through separately filed complaints and not through protests to the reports of cost responsibility assignments."); *accord, e.g.*, *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,094, at P 43 (2025) ("Public Citizen and Rate Counsel challenge the prudence of the costs of a project that was the subject of action in the Enforcement Order, and Hudson and Mr. Rousselle raise concerns related to the conduct examined in the Enforcement Order. We find that the protests of Public Citizen, Hudson, Rate Counsel, and Mr. Rousselle raise issues concerning cost recovery that are beyond the scope of this proceeding, which is, as discussed above, limited to whether the proposed cost responsibility assignments were correctly calculated pursuant to Schedule 12 of the Tariff."); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,160, at P 18 (2024) ("[C]hallenges to the PJM Tariff cost allocation provisions or the selection of transmission projects included in the PJM RTEP pursuant to the provisions of the PJM Operating Agreement are appropriately raised through separately filed complaints and not through protests to the reports of cost responsibility assignments.").

[51] *See Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113, at P 93("*We find protesters' arguments that the RTEP process was not competitive to be outside the scope of this proceeding*. To qualify for the rebuttable presumption under Order No. 679, an applicant must demonstrate that the project for which it is requesting incentives 'result[s] from a fair and open regional planning process that considers and evaluates projects for reliability and/or congestion and is found to be acceptable to the Commission.' *Order No. 679 does not require an applicant to demonstrate that such process was competitive*.") (emphasis added); *id.* P 94 ("Similarly, we find Ms. Ghiorzi's contentions that PJM should have selected a project other than the Amos-Welton Springs-Rocky Point line and that PJM was required to quantify the costs and benefits of the Project Portfolio's superior transfer capability are outside the scope of this proceeding. Specifically, *such arguments go beyond the Commission's policy, as set forth in Order Nos. 679 and 679-A, of assessing whether a regional transmission planning process was fair and open and evaluated whether the transmission project would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion when determining whether that project qualifies for the rebuttable presumption*. None of Ms. Ghiorzi's arguments about RTEP cause us to call into question our long-held determination that the RTEP process is fair and open.") (emphasis added, citations omitted).

Here, while PUC and OCA raise a myriad of complaints about whether PJM complied with its competitive window requirements,[52] none of Protestors' arguments actually get to the question of whether the process was "fair and open," a standard that is satisfied when "stakeholders, including ratepayers, had the opportunity to participate in and provide feedback on the RTEP."[53] Both PUC's and OCA's statements confirm that PJM extensively and transparently discussed the assumptions, the proposed solutions, and associated selection rationale addressing the 2025 RTEP Window 1 needs.[54] Indeed, PJM held 13 TEAC meetings between January 2025 and January 2026 to discuss all aspects of the competitive window,[55] and all stakeholders—including PUC and OCA—were able to provide feedback to the TEAC and the PJM Board.[56] The Commission also recently made clear that challenges regarding, for example, whether the solicitation process was competitive or whether PJM should have picked a different solution are beyond the requirement

[52] *See* OCA Protest, Section IV.B.1 (arguing that PJM failed to comply with the Operating Agreement by opening a 60-day window and making baseless accusations to suggest that PJM provided an unfair competitive advantage to certain transmission developers, but failing to demonstrate that the RTEP process was not fair and open).

[53] *See Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at P 90 (noting that PJM's 2024 RTEP Window 1 was "fair and open" because, among other things, "[a]fter the 2024 RTEP Window 1 project submission window closed, PJM discussed proposed solutions during five TEAC meetings between October 2024 and January 2025. The record also demonstrates that stakeholders were able to provide feedback to the TEAC and the PJM Board and that landowners and ratepayers submitted questions and feedback to both the TEAC and the PJM Board").

[54] OCA Protest at 14 ("After conducting a First Read of the project proposals on October 8, 2025 and a First Read of PJM"s Short List of projected proposals on November 4, 2025, PJM facilitated the "Second Read" at the December 8, 2025 TEAC Meeting."); PUC Comments at 3-4.

[55] PJM reviewed materials associated with the 2025 RTEP Window 1 starting with the January 7, 2025 TEAC meeting through the January 6, 2026 TEAC meeting, a total of 13 separate TEAC meetings. PJM addressed assumptions for the window prior to the opening of the window in June 2025 until its closing in August, at which point focus shifted to discussing the proposed solutions, PJM's analysis results, and associated selection rationale.

[56] OCA Protest at 14; PUC Comments at 3, 4. PJM staff also separately met with representatives from both PUC and OCA on several occasions to discuss the proposed 2025 RTEP Window 1 transmission solutions.

to demonstrate that the process was fair and open.[57] Protestors' arguments regarding PJM's compliance with its Governing Documents and the merits of the specific project selected thus do not bear on the specific inquiry relevant to this proceeding.

Moreover, neither PUC nor OCA allege—nor could they credibly do so—that the PJM 2025 RTEP Window 1 process failed to "evaluate[] whether the [Kammer Juniata Project] would enhance reliability and/or reduce congestion."[58] PJM acknowledges that OCA questions the reliability assumptions that underlie the 2025 RTEP Window 1 reliability violations,[59] but questioning the assumptions that form the basis for the reliability violations included in the competitive window is not the same as arguing that PJM failed to evaluate whether the Kammer Juniata Project would enhance the reliability of the PJM transmission system.[60] Rather, PUC itself provides a robust description of the 2025 RTEP Window 1 process[61] (albeit a description that is riddled with factual inaccuracies) to describe the more than year-long process PJM undertook to identify reliability violations, solicit solutions to resolve such violations, comparatively analyze the 134 proposed solutions from 19 entities, provide numerous updates to the TEAC, solicit and respond to feedback from stakeholders, and recommend the reliability solutions—including the

[57] *See Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at PP 93-94. Notwithstanding, as PJM demonstrates below, 2025 RTEP Window 1 was competitive, and PJM appropriately determined that the Kammer Juniata Project was the more efficient or cost effective solution to solve the identified reliability violations.

[58] *See id.* P 94.

[59] These reasons are invalid as discussed *infra* at Section II.B.

[60] The 2025 RTEP Window 1 through which the Kammer Juniata Project was selected was a reliability window; PJM did not evaluate whether the project would reduce congestion. However, as made clear in Order No. 679-A, to qualify for the rebuttable presumption, the regional planning process must consider whether the project enhances reliability *or* reduces congestion; it is not a requirement that the planning process consider both reliability and congestion-related benefits. Order No. 679-A, 117 FERC ¶ 61,345 at P 5.

[61] *See* PUC Filing at 6-16.

Kammer Juniata Project—to the PJM Board for inclusion in the RTEP models. The fact that PUC and OCA do not like the outcome does not equate to a finding that PJM did not perform the required evaluation.

In short, the arguments made regarding 2025 RTEP Window 1 and PJM's conduct with respect to the window are not properly before the Commission in this transmission rate proceeding. Protestors "may not attempt to circumvent the statutory requirements of FPA section 206 and the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure by raising in comments matters outside the scope of this limited proceeding."[62] PUC and OCA's arguments that call into question whether 2025 RTEP Window 1 was competitive, included the appropriate assumptions, and/or complied with the requirements of the Operating Agreement are all outside the scope of this proceeding and should thus be rejected.

B. Protestors' Arguments Fail on the Merits: PJM's RTEP Process Was Fair, Open, Transparent, and in Compliance with PJM's Governing Documents and Manuals

The Commission has consistently found that PJM's RTEP process is fair, open, and transparent.[63] Protestors' arguments to the contrary are factually incorrect, inconsistent with PJM's Governing Documents and Commission precedent, and should be rejected.

1. Protestors' Factual Summaries of the Problem Statement and TEAC Materials Are Based on Fundamental Misunderstandings of the Information Provided in those Documents

Protestors' arguments rest on material factual inaccuracies that reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the 2025 RTEP Window 1 Problem Statement and supporting TEAC materials on which their claims rely. Moreover, Protestors employ inflammatory rhetoric,

[62] *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,160, at P 18 (2024).

[63] *See supra* note 7 (listing cases).

including unfounded allegations regarding the behavior of PJM staff during and after the window. Such statements are unsupported and should be afforded no weight. Here, PJM corrects Protestors' factual inaccuracies related to the 2025 RTEP Window 1 Problem Statement and TEAC materials, and in the following sections, PJM demonstrates that Protestors' arguments also fail as a matter of law.

First, Protestors' identical statements that "PJM was clearly signaling that long-lead solutions, like a new 765 kV backbone, were not sought,"[64] are not supported by the quotations from the Problem Statement or TEAC materials, and reflect a fundamental misreading of these materials. Protestors recognize that the Problem Statement sought solutions "with required in-service dates between three and five years out,"[65] and that "[s]olutions proposed to address the 2030 RTEP model suite needs should be considered in view of the evolving needs demonstrated in the 2032 RTEP model suite and beyond given the trend currently demonstrated through the PJM 2025 Load Forecast (right sizing, scalable or incremental options)."[66] But then Protestors make the illogical leap that because PJM also noted violations in the MAAC area "*can* be mitigated without long lead-time solutions,"[67] PJM "clearly sought solutions that did not entail regional transfer or long lead-time solutions."[68]

Protestors' argument rests on an inference that PJM limited the scope of solutions to exclude what they call "long-lead solutions,"[69] larger-scale facilities, or 765 kV solutions.

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[64] OCA Protest at 16; PUC Protest at 13.

[65] *See* OCA Protest at 10 (citing Manual 14F § 1.1).

[66] *Id.* (citing Problem Statement at 6).

[67] Problem Statement at 7 (emphasis added).

[68] OCA Protest at 11.

[69] As discussed below, both PUC and OCA apply inconsistent and unsupported definitions to what they consider to be "long-lead" projects. At times, the OCA correctly invokes the Operating

However, at no point did PJM state that it would not consider 765 kV solutions, nor did PJM specify any voltage class to address the robustness of the solutions sought to address the identified reliability needs presented in the 2025 RTEP window. Window participants were free to propose solutions regardless of voltage class and could also demonstrate the level of scalability, flexibility, and robustness for those proposed solutions. That is, PJM's role in the competitive planning process is to identify system needs (i.e., reliability violations and required in-service dates)—not to "signal" the form, scale or characteristics of solutions. Developers are responsible for proposing solutions to identified reliability needs. PJM does not know in advance whether proposed solutions will be of a specified voltage level or how long the proposal will actually take to develop. The Problem Statement's reference to "right sizing, scalable or incremental upgrade options" does, however, reflect a request for flexibility, not a limitation. Similarly, noting that certain violations "*can* be mitigated without long-lead time solutions" does not mean that any specific solutions are prohibited. It simply acknowledges that multiple solution types may exist.

Additionally, as discussed further below, many of the Protestors' arguments are premised on Protestors' improper conflation of voltage level and development time with required in-service dates to address identified reliability violations. While the Protestors use multiple definitions for "long-lead solutions,"[70] they primarily seem to suggest that these solutions are higher-voltage

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Agreement and Manual definitions, which tie the concept to the project's *required* in-service date, while elsewhere they each suggest the definition turns on construction duration or voltage level. Those alternative formulations are not grounded in the Operating Agreement or Manuals. PJM's analysis herein is grounded in the definitions set forth in its Governing Documents, which is based on the timing of the identified need (i.e., the year in which the reliability violations first arise, not how long it will take to build the project, or what voltage level the project will be). To the extent Protestors rely on references in the TEAC materials to "long-lead solutions," those references reflect shorthand descriptive statements used in stakeholder discussions and do not purport to apply or modify the Operating-Agreement defined term. Any attempt to elevate that informal usage in stakeholder materials over the governing Operating Agreement definition would be misplaced.

[70] *See supra* note 69.

facilities, and specifically 765 kV facilities. That is incorrect. As specified in the PJM Operating Agreement and Manuals, whether a facility is a (defined term) "Short-term Project" or a (defined term) "Long-lead Project" is based on when the facility is required to be in service, which, in turn, is based on the year in which the reliability violations that the project is proposed to solve first appear.[71]

Second, OCA misreads the Problem Statement and TEAC materials to inaccurately and inappropriately suggest that PJM changed the assumptions underlying 2025 RTEP Window 1 after the window closed and without adequate notice,[72] and insinuates that PJM changed the assumptions to benefit the Company. These allegations are baseless. PJM first modeled its initial 2025 RTEP assumptions between November 2024 and February 2025.[73] PJM then set forth its base case for the 2025 RTEP Window 1, which it first publicized to the TEAC in February 2025.[74] At the April 1, 2025 TEAC meeting, PJM updated its 2025 RTEP scenarios to include that it would be conducting a 7-year (2032) analysis where "base cases [would] be *developed and evaluated [as] part of the 2025 RTEP*."[75] In the May 2025 TEAC, PJM presented six total scenarios that

[71] *See infra* Section II.B.2.

[72] *See* OCA Protest at 17 ("After the formal solicitation period closed, PJM publicly made untimely changes to the solutions sought, which resulted in bidders receiving incomplete, unreliable information too late in the process to conform their competitive proposals to PJM's solicitation of solutions.").

[73] *See Reliability Analysis Update: Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee* at 7 (Feb. 4, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250204/20250204-item-12---reliability-analysis-update.pdf (February 2025 TEAC Update).

[74] *See id.* at 8.

[75] April 2025 TEAC Update at 3-4.

would be considered in the 2025 RTEP Window 1, including four scenarios addressing 2032 base case needs.[76] Included in those scenarios was the removal of offshore wind in the MAAC region.[77]

As PJM explained above, PJM posted an addendum to the 2025 RTEP Window 1 on July 2, 2025, and updated its modeling files and Problem Statement to include the PPL-requested 4 GWs of load in the PPL zone. PJM explained that certain large future loads with signed agreements were not yet incorporated into the 2025 load forecast but would be included in the future forecast, and that these loads could materially impact identified violations and solutions. PJM then discussed these updates at the July 8, 2025 TEAC meeting, encouraged developers to consider the additional load in their solution development as part of robustness testing, and provided the necessary modeling inputs (IDVs) in the posted addendum to enable that analysis.

Against this backdrop, the Protestors' claims that PJM updated assumptions after the window closed and without adequate notice are unfounded. PJM publicly posted the updated information one week after the window opened, explained the changes in the open TEAC meeting, and provided the data needed for participants to incorporate the updates into their proposals. Protestors' assertion that PJM untimely changed the solutions it was seeking without adequate notice reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the RTEP process.

Moreover, Protestors' insinuation that PJM selectively provided updated information to the Company[78] is a serious, unsupported allegation and should not be taken lightly. PJM provided the

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[76] *See* PJM, *2025 RTEP Assumption Updates: Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee* at 3 (May 6, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250506/20250506-item-11---2025-rtep-assumption-update.pdf.

[77] *See id.*

[78] *See* OCA Protest at 16-17 ("Only two proponents contributed proposals for MAAC regional transfer issues, and only one proponent, NEET/Exelon, submitted 765 kV lines. This raises the question of how certain transmission owners could make proposals that conformed to new criteria

updated materials through publicly-posted addenda and discussed them with interested stakeholders at TEAC meetings. All interested parties had access to the same information at the same time. The Commission should not tolerate the insinuations about PJM staff's conduct with respect to the window process.

2. PJM Followed the Requirements of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals in Conducting 2025 RTEP Window 1

a. The 60-Day Window Was Perfectly Appropriate

Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 and Manual 14F state that PJM will open a 60-day proposal window for Short-term Projects, which are "those that address reliability driven upgrades … with *required* in-service dates between three and five years out,"[79] or that it will "open a 120-day proposal window for projects with *required* in-service dates greater than five years out that address identified reliability criteria violations, energy market economic constraints, operational performance and public policy requirements," i.e., for "Long-lead Projects."[80] Importantly, "*PJM may shorten or extend the window as needed.*"[81]

That is, the Operating Agreement and Manual 14F set window timing based on when the need for a project arises (the "needed" or "required" in-service date) (i.e., a 60-day window for a violation arising between three and no more than five years out, or a 120-day window for a violation arising five years or greater), not by how long it will take to construct or the date by which it will actually be placed into service (the "projected" in-service date). A required in-service date for a baseline transmission project included in the RTEP refers to the date by when, in PJM's

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that were contrary to the criteria (1) expressly specified in the June 18, 2025, Problem Statement, and (2) reinforced by the opening of a 60-day versus a 120-day window.").

[79] Manual 14F § 1.1; *accord* Operating Agreement § 1.5.8(c) (emphasis added).

[80] Manual 14F § 1.1; *accord* Operating Agreement § 1.5.8(c) (emphasis added).

[81] Manual 14F § 1.1 (emphasis added).

engineering judgment—informed by extensive analyses—a selected transmission solution is needed to address identified reliability criteria violations. That is, if a transmission solution is not in service by its required in-service date, there is the potential that the reliability criteria violations that PJM identified as part of the window process will occur. In contrast, a projected in-service date for a baseline transmission project included in the RTEP refers to the date by which the relevant transmission developer expects the upgrade to be ready to be placed in service. The projected in-service date represents the developer's estimated date of when the project will actually be completed and energized, taking into account things like its anticipated timeline for engineering and procurement, permitting, siting and construction.

The Commission has found that the use of a 60-day window solicitation for Short-term Projects (again, projects that are required to be in-service in three to five years) is just and reasonable because it "may be necessary to identify and evaluate" the relevant transmission projects and "to permit time for a reevaluation of a transmission project should the need occur."[82] Moreover, consistent with the Operating Agreement and Manuals, it is appropriate to conduct a window on the shorter, 60-day timeframe where, as here, PJM is seeking solutions for reliability violations that arise in the three- to five-year out horizon, even if a project's actual in-service date may extend beyond the five-year period. This aspect of the Operating Agreement and Manuals helps to ensure that PJM corrects the reliability violations as quickly as possible, and shortens the gap period between when a reliability need is required to be addressed and when the reliability solution can be implemented.

[82] *See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 142 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 238 (2013), *partial reh'g*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2014), *partial reh'g*, 150 FERC ¶ 61,038, *reh'g order*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2015).

Protestors do not demonstrate that they understand these nuances. As indicated above, PUC seems to believe that Long-lead Projects are determined by voltage,[83] which is nowhere mentioned in the definition of either Long-lead or Short-Term Projects, both of which are defined by when a transmission need arises. Regardless, the 60-day window was appropriate here. PJM clearly stated in the Problem Statement and TEAC materials that 2025 Window 1 "will focus on addressing near-term (5-year needs)."[84] But, PJM also explained that "the 2032 RTEP models suite will be primarily utilized to right-size needs *already showing up in 2030* and *for consideration of longer-term needs* …."[85] And, even if PJM should have opened a 120-day window (a premise with which PJM disagrees), as stated above the Operating Agreement provides PJM the discretion to shorten or lengthen a window process as long as it provides notice.[86] ***PJM was clear at all times that the 2025 RTEP Window 1 would be a 60-day window***.[87] ***No party objected to the duration of the window until well after it closed–when PJM began discussing shortlisted solutions***, and numerous parties submitted large backbone solutions to address violations arising in 2030 and right-sized to address violations in 2032 sensitivity cases.

[83] *See, e.g.*, PUC Comments at 4 (arguing that PJM needed to have a 120-day window because PJM selected a 765 kV project, which PUC characterizes as a "long-lead solution").

[84] *See, e.g.*, July 8 Update at 4; Problem Statement at 6 ("PJM is seeking proposals to resolve identified reliability criteria violations as demonstrated in the 2030 RTEP model suite. The 2032 RTEP models suite will be primarily utilized to right-size needs already showing up in 2030 and for consideration of longer-term needs (requiring 7 or more years to develop, i.e., 500kV and above developments). The posted 2032 results are for reference only unless it is indicated that PJM is soliciting proposals for the associated flowgate(s).").

[85] Problem Statement at 6 (emphasis added).

[86] *See* Operating Agreement, Sched. 6 § 1.5.8(c); Manual 14F § 1.1.

[87] *See* Problem Statement at 16; February 2025 TEAC Update at 7; *Reliability Analysis Update: Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee* at 3 (Mar. 4, 2025) https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250304/20250304-item-15---reliability-analysis-update.pdf (same); July 8 Update at 4.

That is exactly why PJM selected the Project. PJM observed that violations would arise in the MAAC region in 2030 and that others would arise in one of the 2032 sensitivity cases for which PJM clearly stated it would consider right-sized solutions.[88] In Protestors' view, PJM must use a 120-day window if PJM considers even one Long-lead Project in a solicitation despite PJM clearly communicating that the focus would be on Short-term Projects (i.e., projects needed to address violations arising in five years out or less), which it was. PJM made clear that it was soliciting Short-term Projects to address its needs with the limited exception of considering right-sized solutions for 2032 needs. That was a clear indication that PJM would consider proposals addressing 2032 needs if they were right-sized solutions. Protestors' claims that PJM's evaluation of how a short-term solution could also solve an anticipated long-term need should transform the entire solicitation into a 120-day window are counter-productive.

b. Protestors Wrongly Claim that the Joint Venture Was Not Adequately Prequalified for Designated Entity Status

PUC asserts that the Company was not prequalified for Designated Entity status before submitting its bid for the Project and thus "is not even a representative entity owned by the two transmission operators whose 'joint project' was selected by PJM."[89] PUC's argument is based on a flawed reading of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 14F, the latter of which PUC inaccurately claims "requires that an entity submitting project bids for an open planning window must be prequalified before submitting its bid."[90]

[88] *See* Problem Statement at 6.

[89] PUC Comments at 5.

[90] *Id.* (citing PJM Manual 14F: Competitive Planning Process § 2.1 (Pre-Qualification Process) (rev. 10, Oct. 30, 2024).

PUC misreads Manual 14F section 2.1, which provides that "[e]ntities that want to participate in the competitive planning process *and* become the Designated Entity for a transmission project that they propose, must be pre-qualified as required under Schedule 6 of the PJM Operating Agreement."[91] As the Commission recently recognized, neither the Operating Agreement nor Manual 14F requires that a developer must be pre-qualified in order to participate in the competitive planning process.[92] Operating Agreement Schedule 6 sets forth the processes and requirements that an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer must satisfy to be eligible to *become a Designated Entity* should its competitive proposal be selected as a cost-effective solution to a transmission need, not the processes or requirements an entity must satisfy in order to be permitted to *submit a bid in a competitive window*. As PJM has made clear, an entity is not required to be prequalified to participate in a competitive bidding process, but it must prequalify as a Designated Entity before it can construct, own, operate, maintain and finance competitive planning projects.[93]

c. The Operating Agreement Sets Forth the Timing By When DEAs Must Be Issued

PUC observes that no DEA has yet been executed in its list of challenges to the Company's joint venture status.[94] It is, of course, no surprise that a DEA has not been executed considering

[91] PJM Manual 14F § 2.1 (emphasis added).

[92] *Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at P 88.

[93] PJM, *Competitive Planning Process*, https://www.pjm.com/planning/competitive-planning-process ("While not a requirement to propose competitive projects, an entity must obtain Designated Entity status in order to construct, own, operate, maintain and finance competitive planning projects."); PJM, *Pre-Qualification for Designated Entity Status*, https://www.pjm.com/planning/competitive-planning-process/pre-qualification (same). *See also Valley Link*, 191 FERC ¶ 61,113 at P 88.

[94] *See* PUC Comments at 5.

that the process for executing a DEA set forth in the Operating Agreement takes at least four months and that time is regularly extended.

Once PJM staff has completed the TEAC process with its stakeholders, PJM staff presents the proposed RTEP for PJM Board review and approval.[95] If the RTEP is approved, entities identified as Designated Entities are notified within 15 business days.[96] Companies must advise PJM that they accept the designation and provide a development schedule within 30 days.[97] The Operating Agreement permits PJM to extend the deadline to submit the development schedule for good cause.[98] Once PJM receives the development schedule, it then has 15 days or any "other reasonable time as required" to review it, notify the Designated Entity of any issues with the development schedule, and tender an executable DEA.[99] Next, the Designated Entity must, within 60 days of receiving an executable DEA or any "other such period as mutually agreed upon by the Office of the Interconnection and Designated Entity" submit a letter of credit and return the executed DEA to PJM unless the Designated Entity intends to seek dispute resolution under the Operating Agreement or file the DEA unexecuted with the Commission.[100]

At a minimum, PJM had 120 days to execute a DEA with the Company from the date the PJM Board approved the Project, i.e., February 12, 2026. Thus, the Company and PJM are still

[95] *See* Operating Agreement, Sched. 6 § 1.6 ("Based on the studies and analyses performed by the Office of the Interconnection under Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, the PJM Board shall approve the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan in accordance with the requirements of Operating Agreement, Schedule 6.").

[96] *Id.* § 1.5.8(i).

[97] *Id.* § 1.5.8(j).

[98] *Id.*

[99] *Id.*

[100] *Id.*

comfortably within the 120-day timeframe to execute the DEA. Neither PJM nor the Company are in violation of the Operating Agreement's requirements regarding the DEA.

3. 2025 Window 1 Was Competitive

a. There Is Nothing Impermissible About the Company's Joint Venture Status

Protestors' attacks on the Company's joint venture status are groundless. Nothing in the Tariff, Operating Agreement, or the Commission's regulations prevents NextEra and Exelon from forming a joint venture, and Protestors provide no evidence to that effect.

The Commission recognizes and encourages the benefits of jointly-developed transmission projects.[101] That makes sense because joint ventures are an effective means of completing large,

[101] The Commission discussed the benefits of joint ventures at length in the Order No. 1920 rulemaking proceeding and, while the Commission ultimately declined to make joint ventures an explicit exception from competitive transmission development under Order No. 1000, it affirmed the value of joint ventures and encouraged their proliferation, including through the use of incentives. *See, e.g.*, *Bldg. for the Future Through Electric Reg'l Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 179 FERC ¶ 61,028, at P 359 (2022) ("Since Order No. 1000, joint proposals or joint ownership arrangements between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission developers have been an option generally available to qualified transmission developers participating, pursuant to public utility transmission provider tariffs, in competitive transmission development processes."); *id*. P 372 ("Joint ownership arrangements could, consistent with Commission precedent, help increase opportunities for investment in the transmission system, as well as ensure not unduly discriminatory access to the transmission system by transmission customers."); *id.* P 373 ("[G]iven the nature of a joint-ownership arrangement, individual parties working together may achieve efficiencies in addressing their collective transmission needs and, therefore, achieve lower overall costs compared to developing transmission facilities to resolve more individualized needs in a more piecemeal manner as is the case today."); *id.* P 374 ("Jointly-owned regional transmission facilities, by spreading the risks and responsibilities of developing transmission facilities among multiple parties, may act as a useful hedging tool against expected longer-term, future transmission system development costs by allowing the parties to offset near-term expenditures on constructing transmission facilities necessary to maintain reliability."); *Bldg. for the Future Through Electric Reg'l Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection*, Order No. 1920, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068, at P 30 (2024) (Phillips, Chairman, and Clements, Comm'r, concurring) ("[W]e underscore that our decision today should not be construed as a lack of support for the concept of joint ownership or the potential for a federal [right of first refusal] to effectively encourage its use. Indeed, joint ownership structures that partner transmission owners with other load-serving entities in their footprint, such as public power or non-profit cooperatives, can provide

capital-heavy infrastructure projects that also require access to expansive engineering and logistical resources (as well as access to, and utilization of, existing rights of way). In recognition of those facts, Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 and Manual 14F expressly contemplate such arrangements. Both the Operating Agreement and Manual 14F require an applicant to demonstrate the relevant qualifications, experience, finances, and other capabilities of the applicant's "affiliate, partner, or parent company," indicating that a Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer may permissibly coordinate development activities with an affiliated Designated Entity.[102] This requirement is repeated seven times throughout Manual 14F and Schedule 6.[103] Furthermore, the definition of a "Designated Entity" explicitly includes "an *existing* Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer."[104]

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many benefits and should be encouraged."); *id.* P 31 ("[J]oint ownership structures bring together diverse parties, allowing the participating entities to better allocate risks and responsibilities, capture efficiencies, and promote innovation, all to customers' ultimate benefit. Moreover, by bringing a wider range of entities into the transmission development fold, joint ownership can leverage additional sources of capital, including those that do not typically invest in transmission facilities, which can itself have significant benefits for customers."); *id.* P 33 ("[W]e clarify that nothing in this final rule should be interpreted to prohibit or impair joint ownership arrangements. To the contrary, we encourage transmission providers, in compliance with this rule and elsewhere, to find ways to encourage these arrangements."); *id.* ("[W]e note that the developers of a jointly owned transmission facility can consider seeking transmission incentives under section 205 of the FPA that reflect the risks and challenges associated with developing such facilities.").

[102] PJM Manual 14F § 2.2; *see also id.* § 1.5.8(a)(4) ("As determined by the Office of the Interconnection, an entity may submit a pre-qualification application outside the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window for good cause shown. For a pre-qualification application received outside of the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window, the Office of the Interconnection shall use reasonable efforts to process the application and notify the entity as to whether it pre-qualifies as eligible to be a Designated Entity as soon as practicable.").

[103] *See id.* § 2.2(2) (technical qualifications), § 2.2(3) (demonstrated experience), § 2.2(4) (previous record), § 2.2(5) (capabilities), § 2.2(6) (financial statements), § 2.2(8) (ability to remedy failures), § 2.2(9) (rights of way acquisition); Operating Agreement Sched. 6 § 1.5.8(a)(1).

[104] Operating Agreement, Definitions C-D, "Designated Entity" (emphasis added). A Designated Entity is "an entity, including an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer, designated by [PJM] with the responsibility to construct, own, operate, maintain, and finance

Here, both NextEra and Exelon have been pre-qualified to be a Designated Entity consistent with the procedures set forth in Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, section 1.5.8(a). Nothing in Operating Agreement, Schedule 6 prohibits a combination of Designated Entities such as NextEra and Exelon from coordinating through a joint venture to participate in the RTEP process or to construct and operate RTEP projects. And, contrary to PUC's argument,[105] it does not matter that the Company was not a joint venture at the time of submitting its bid since it was a prequalified joint venture at the time that the PJM Board accepted the inclusion of the Project in the RTEP and the designation of construction responsibility to the Company.

b. There is No Record Basis to Claim that PJM Did Not Consider Alternatives

Protestors would have the Commission believe that PJM only superficially considered the Company's proposal during the RTEP since it was the only one that offered a 765 kV line. For example, OCA argues that "[o]nly two sets of proposals fortuitously happened to meet the new criteria. And only one set aimed for 765 kV projects. PJM selected that one. That is a not a fair and open process."[106] OCA also argues that "[o]nly two proponents contributed proposals for MAAC regional transfer issues, and only one proponent, NEET/Exelon, submitted 765 kV lines."[107] Those arguments are misleading. Protestors deliberately frame their arguments to hide that PJM considered multiple different proposals before ultimately selecting the Project.

Immediate-need Reliability Projects, Short-term Projects, Long-lead Projects, or Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, section 1.5.8."

[105] *See* PUC Comments at 5.

[106] *See* OCA Protest at 22.

[107] *Id.* at 16; *see* PUC Comments at 4 ("Pennsylvanians would be ill-served by a final selection occurring until all possible alternatives have been thoroughly evaluated in a more transparent manner and in compliance with PJM's Operating Agreement.").

PJM received over 134 proposals from 19 different entities during the 2025 RTEP Window 1.[108] PJM reviewed the performance and merits of all 134 competitive proposals by the proposing entities, including Nonincumbent Developers and incumbent Transmission Owners.[109] Three entities submitted eight proposals for the MAAC region: four FirstEnergy proposals offering variations on two 500 kV lines from Keystone to Susquehanna and four NextEra and Exelon proposals, for three 765 kV lines and one 500 kV line. And, as discussed above, PJM openly and transparently weighed and considered each of these proposals before ultimately selecting the Project.[110]

Protestors further argue that the RTEP process was not "fair and open"[111] and not "properly competitively bid."[112] OCA even insinuates that PJM just identified the proposal that provided for 765 kV projects and selected that one without much thought.[113] Underlying those claims is the idea that PJM did not adequately consider alternatives to the Project. There is no support for that idea.

PJM's Reliability Analysis Report for the 2025 RTEP Window 1 shows that PJM considered all of the available alternatives, weighed the costs and benefits of each of them, and then ultimately determined that the Project provided the best solution. As discussed, eight

[108] Reliability Analysis Report at 4.

[109] *Id.*

[110] *See supra* Background at 12-13.

[111] OCA Protest at 20.

[112] PUC Comments at 3.

[113] *See* OCA Protest at 22 ("Only two sets of proposals fortuitously happened to meet the new criteria. And only one set aimed for 765 kV projects. PJM selected that one. That is a not a fair and open process.").

proposals were submitted to address this specific need. PJM focused primarily on Proposals 826 and 237. As PJM reasoned:

> While both 826 and 237 proposals mitigate the 500 kV overloads at varying degrees, Proposal 237 provides stronger support to the Mid-Atlantic Region, naturally extends the PJM 765 kV western and southern network into MAAC and supports future load growth not only in PPL, but in the entire Mid-Atlantic Region. Proposal 237 offers the highest transfer capability overall among studied transfer scenarios, preserves more of the existing 500 kV transmission capacity for utilization of interconnecting load or generation, and allows for adding further capability incrementally while maintaining more efficient or cost-effective orderly development of the transmission system.
>
> Moreover, Proposal 237 supports delivery of future generation development in western Pennsylvania, PJM West and Southern regions to load, based on the future generation outlook, as informed by the PJM New Service Requests Process.[114]

As such, PJM concluded that the Project provided: (1) "a stronger support to the Mid-Atlantic Region, including load growth in PPL and MAAC area in general, delays in OSW development, future generation retirements in MAAC or any combination of these factors;" (2) a "natural expansion of the existing 765 kV backbone into the PJM Eastern Region;" (3) 2 GW more import capability to the Mid-Atlantic region than that offered by proposal 826 while preserving 500 kV of existing capacity; and (4) the highest transfer capability regardless of source/sink combination.[115]

Protestors may disagree with PJM's conclusions, but their insinuations that PJM did not thoroughly consider alternatives to the Project are plainly false.

[114] Reliability Analysis Report at 58.

[115] *Id.*

c. OCA's Claim that PJM Provided "Misinformation" to Stakeholders and the Implication that PJM Conspired with NextEra and Exelon Are Completely False

OCA claims the RTEP process "went awry," makes the patently false claim that PJM "publicly provided misinformation to bidders," and hints that this "misinformation" was provided to give NextEra and Exelon an advantage in submitting their proposals.[116] Those are serious allegations requiring serious proof, which OCA has not provided. Not only do they injure PJM's reputation, they also cast unjustifiable doubt on the credibility of the RTEP.

OCA's statements are off base. The RTEP did not go "awry." PJM thoroughly and successfully reviewed the merits of 134 competitive proposals from 19 different entities and was able to recommend an RTEP solution set in the amount of $11.8 billion to address crucial needs.[117] Moreover, the RTEP demonstrated efficient integration of 23.8 GW of new loads and 14.7 of GW queued generation capacity enabling the needed additional bulk generation capacity and associated bulk regional transfer to be met reliably. The OCA's disagreement with the selection of a single project out of the 32 total projects selected does not call into question the integrity of the RTEP process—if anything, it reflects that the process works as intended. PJM solicited, evaluated, and compared multiple competing solutions before selecting the project that best met the identified

[116] OCA Protest at 17 ("Except for NEET's and Exelon's Transmission submissions, the other bidders' submissions conformed to PJM's formal solicitation of short-term solutions. That *no other* transmission owner submitted a long-lead solution demonstrates that the process went awry. After the formal solicitation period closed, PJM publicly made untimely changes to the solutions sought, which resulted in bidders receiving incomplete, unreliable information too late in the process to conform their competitive proposals to PJM's solicitation of solutions. PJM's decision to select the KJT proposal, which contained solutions that *were the opposite* of the criteria that PJM formally and publicly solicited when it opened the competitive solicitation window, also demonstrates that the process went awry.") (emphasis in original).

[117] Reliability Analysis Report at 4.

need. OCA's position reflects a policy preference regarding outcomes, not a deficiency in the openness, competitiveness, or rigor of the process itself.

Likewise, PJM did not provide misinformation to its stakeholders. The Problem Statement issued months before the RTEP kickoff said that the 2032 RTEP models would be used to right-size needs already showing up in 2030.[118] PJM initially believing that the violations at the MAAC 500kV system could be mitigated without long lead-time solutions did not prohibit PJM from considering such solutions. PJM updated the Problem Statement after it received additional information from PPL as described above.[119] And, as PJM also explained above, both FirstEnergy and the Company submitted multiple solutions addressing the 2025 RTEP Window 1 needs, including consideration of the additional sensitivity scenarios representing delays to the NJ offshore wind and additional load growth in PPL and the 2032 violations.[120]

OCA's assertion that only one developer proposed a "long-lead" solution is incorrect. This claim appears to stem either from a misunderstanding of the TEAC materials, which plainly analyze several solutions, or from an incorrect idea that voltage level determines whether a project qualifies as a "Long-lead Project."[121] In either case, the claim that no other developer submitted proposals to address the specified violations is flatly wrong. There is nothing to support the claims that the RTEP "went awry" or that PJM manipulated its criteria to benefit NextEra and Exelon. The Commission should reject OCA's baseless and fallacious assertions.

[118] *See* Problem Statement at 6.

[119] *See supra* section I.C.

[120] *See supra* section I.C.

[121] *See supra* section II.B.1.

C. PUC's "Wait-and-See" Approach to Transmission Planning and Its Request for Generation Alternatives Are Meritless and Antithetical to the Commission's Push for Expedited Infrastructure Development

Rather than acting prudently, proactively, and expeditiously to identify and address transmission needs in the MAAC region, PUC advocates a "wait-and-see" approach that the Commission should reject. As the PUC notes, it advocated that PJM avoid transmission solutions to the needs in the PPL zone altogether until PJM considered generation solutions.[122] "At a minimum, the PA PUC requested that PJM conduct an analysis to determine the total amount of new generation capacity necessary to address the forecasted shortfall in central Pennsylvania."[123] To further slow things down, PUC "avers there was value in breaking [the Project] into phases" by PJM "proceed[ing] with the portions that address the most immediate reliability concerns while delaying the major backbone portion until further analysis can be conducted."[124] PUC asserts, without evidence, that "[t]he reliability need triggering the 765 kV backbone project, likely to be built over the course of many years, would not be materially harmed by a stepwise approach to ensure full competition and least-cost results."[125] These are bald, baseless assertions. Besides being factually unfounded, PUC's wait-and-see approach is contrary to the Commission's policy goals.

Moreover, PJM has repeatedly explained in discussions with the PUC and OCA that the RTEP follows an annual update process and can adjust, stage, advance, or delay project components as needed and as new facts and refined information become available. Currently, there are no indications that there will be sufficient generation development in central or eastern

[122] *See* PUC Comments at 4.

[123] *Id.*

[124] *Id.*

[125] *Id.*

Pennsylvania that would delay or materially change the need for the proposed developments. Moreover, current interest in developing high capacity generation focuses on western Pennsylvania, which will require transmission transfer capability to bring the needed supply into Pennsylvania and the greater Mid-Atlantic region.

PUC's assertions regarding PJM considering generation solutions rather than transmission solutions are meritless. PJM has no authority to "examine possible generation solutions" before committing to transmission projects because PJM has no control over generation development, a function that lies with the states. PJM can evaluate its transmission needs while considering generation that is already available in its queue, which PJM did as part of 2025 Window 1,[126]— but PJM has no control over additional "generation solutions."[127]

The Commission has sent a clear message: transmission providers must expedite their transmission planning and interconnection processes. In Order No. 1920, the Commission emphasized the need to "remedy the identified deficiencies in existing regional and local transmission planning … [to] ensure the identification, evaluation, and selection, as well as the allocation of the costs, of more efficient or cost-effective regional transmission solutions to address

[126] Reliability Analysis Report at 5 ("The five-year case balanced the load with existing generation, GIA/ISA generation, suspended ISA generation, Fast Lane generation, Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) and Chesterfield plants. Approximately 1248 MW OSW projects were also assumed to be in service in the 2030 base case. PJM also prepared a seven-year out base case suite, to capture impacts of forecasted load growth, delays to OSW generation development and how these factors may impact transmission needs. The seven-year out base case suite required additional generation (beyond what was modeled in the five-year model) to account for the additional forecasted load and generation deficiencies due to OSW delay conditions. To account for this, PJM included, on top of the generation already in the 2030 case, TC1 and TC2 generation (including RRI). OSW projects were assumed to be in service in Scenario 1 and out of service in Scenario 2, both of which are 2030 scenarios.").

[127] PUC Comments at 4.

Long-Term Transmission Needs."[128] In line with that goal, the Commission has recently approved a number of creative solutions designed to reinforce the grid and expedite transmission planning and generation interconnection.[129] For example, in the Commission's recent order approving Southwest Power Pool, Inc's Consolidated Planning Process, Commissioner Rosner praised that proposal for satisfying the Commission's goals under Order No. 1920.[130]

By complying with the Operating Agreement's competitive window timelines and moving quickly to address reliability and resource adequacy needs, PJM meets the Commission's goals of ensuring grid reliability and timely transmission development and generation interconnection. Ultimately, the PUC ignores that transmission planning is about managing uncertainty, not about providing absolute certainty.

D. PJM Properly Considered Stakeholder Input Consistent with its Established Planning Process

Protestors seem to suggest that PJM improperly rejected or ignored stakeholder input when it selected the Project as the more efficient or cost-effective solution to address the identified

[128] *Bldg. for the Future Through Elec. Reg'l Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation*, Order No. 1920, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068, *reh'g denied in part and setting aside in part*, Order No. 1920-A, 189 FERC ¶ 61,126, at P 1 (2024), *reh'g denied*, Order No. 1920-B, 191 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2025), *pet. for review pending sub nom. Advanced Energy United v. FERC*, No. 25-1265 (4th Cir. 2025).

[129] *See, e.g.*, *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,192 (2026) (accepting SPP's Consolidated Planning Proposal); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026) (accepting SPP's High Impact Large Load proposal); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2025), *reh'g denied*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2026) (accepting SPP's Expedited Resource Adequacy Study program), *pet. for review pending sub nom. Advanced Energy United v. FERC*, Case No. 25-1265 (Nov. 18, 2025); *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2025), *reh'g denied*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,050 (2026) (accepting MISO's Expedited Resource Adequacy Study program); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,084, *reh'g denied*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2025) (accepting PJM's Reliability Resource Initiative proposal whereby an additional 50 projects would be studied to address near-term resource adequacy concerns).

[130] *See* Order No. 1920 at P 6 ("It is also important to note that the CPP-20 study is exactly the type of smart, efficient long-term transmission planning that the Commission intended when we developed Order No. 1920.").

reliability violations.[131] Such claims are inaccurate. PJM received feedback from stakeholders[132] and discussed the issues throughout the stakeholder process, including at TEAC meetings, and PJM staff informed the Board of the feedback received.[133] Both PUC and OCA also sent letters directly to the PJM Board and met with PJM staff multiple times. While PJM considers stakeholder input as part of its planning process, such input is advisory in nature. PJM evaluates that input alongside its independent technical and engineering assessments and ultimately exercises its judgment in determining how to proceed. The fact that Protestors disagree with PJM's ultimate decisions does not demonstrate that PJM failed to consider their views or acted improperly.

III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER

The Commission has discretion to accept responses to comments or protests and has routinely done so for good cause shown where accepting the response would either lead to a more complete or accurate record, improve the Commission's understanding of the issues, clarify disputed or erroneous matters, or help the Commission in its decision-making.[134] There is good cause for the Commission to accept PJM's answer because it corrects misrepresentations made regarding PJM's Operating Agreement, Manuals, and its conduct of the 2025 RTEP Window 1 process.[135]

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[131] *See* OCA Protest at 15-16; PUC Comments at 13.

[132] *See* PJM, *Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) Recommendations to the PJM Board* at 5 (Feb. 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2026/20260203/20260203-pjm-board-whitepaper-february-2026.pdf.

[133] *See id*.

[134] 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2); *see, e.g.*, *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,133, at P 12 (2017); *KO Transmission Co.*, 156 FERC ¶ 61,147, at n.5 (2016).

[135] *See, e.g.*, *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 171 FERC ¶ 63,040, at P 20, *appeal denied*, 172 FERC ¶ 63,008 (2020); *Gulf S. Pipeline Co., LP*, 145 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 35 (2013), *reh'g denied*, 154 FERC

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Commission should accept this answer while considering the Company's March 12 Filing.

Respectfully submitted,

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April 24, 2026

¶ 61,219 (2016); *Pioneer Transmission, LLC v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co.*, 140 FERC ¶ 61,057, at P 94 (2012).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have on this day caused to be served a copy of the foregoing answer upon all parties on the service list in these proceedings in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.2010 (2025).

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April 24, 2026

ATTACHMENT A

Letter of George Khoury to PJM

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PPL Electric Utilities

Dear PJM Transmission Planning Team,

PPL Transmission Planning is writing to formally request the inclusion of a specific set of loads, as presented during the May 2025 Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) meeting, to be included in a sensitivity assessment during the 2025 RTEP cycle for the 2032 case.

These loads have Signed Agreements (SA) and are expected to have a material impact on regional system planning. To ensure a comprehensive and forward-looking analysis, we believe it is essential that these loads be considered in the development of potential transmission solutions.

Furthermore, we would like to highlight that these loads will be incorporated into the 2026 Load Forecast and will be presented in greater detail during the upcoming Load Analysis Subcommittee (LAS) Load Adjustment Meeting scheduled for Fall 2025. This will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to review and validate the assumptions and methodologies used in forecasting these additions.

We appreciate PJMs continued collaboration and commitment to transparent and inclusive planning processes. Please find below a table summarizing the relevant load additions, including their associated need numbers, estimated load values in capacity and demand. The 2032 demand load values are to be used in the 2032 Case. The IDEVs provided have the 2032 load demand values.

Need #	Solution Date	2032 Load Capacity (MW)	2032 Load Demand (MW)	IDEV/BUS #
PPL-2025-0003	May TEAC	1440	1008	SS0X load. PPL-2025-0003 IDVs
PPL-2025-0005	June TEAC	500	350	PPL-2025-0005 IDVs
PPL-2025-0006	June TEAC	1000	700	PPL-2025-0006 IDVs
PPL-2025-0007	June TEAC	450	315	PPL-2025-0007 IDVs
PPL-2025-0008	TBD	600	420	PPL-2025-008 BUS 207973
PPL-2025-0009	June TEAC	500	350	PPL-2025-0009 IDVs
PPL-2025-0010	TBD	1000	700	PPL-2025-0010 BUS 207969

We look forward to your consideration of this request and are available to provide any additional information or clarification as needed.

Sincerely,

George Khoury

Transmission Planning Supervisor, PPLEU

6/25/2025