

195 FERC ¶ 61,211
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Laura V. Swett, Chairman;
David Rosner, Lindsay S. See,
Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket No. EL26-67-000

AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc.
Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
American Transmission Systems, Incorporated
Appalachian Power Company
Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duquesne Light Company
Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC
Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Kentucky Power Company
Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company
Kingsport Power Company
Linden VFT, LLC
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC
Monongahela Power Company
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC
NextEra Energy Transmission MidAtlantic Indiana, Inc.
Ohio Power Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative
PECO Energy Company

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation
 The Potomac Edison Company
 Potomac Electric Power Company
 Public Service Electric and Gas Company
 Rockland Electric Company
 Silver Run Electric, LLC
 Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company
 Transource West Virginia, LLC
 UGI Utilities, Inc.
 Virginia Electric and Power Company
 Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
 Wheeling Power Company

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDING

UNDER SECTION 206 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT

(Issued June 18, 2026)

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1. Over the past year, the Commission has taken action in numerous dockets¹ to address issues related to (a) unprecedented increases in requests for transmission service to serve large loads² and (b) growing interest in the co-location of loads with generating facilities (co-location arrangements³). Separately, the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) released an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) in October 2025. The ANOPR, issued pursuant to section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act,⁴ directed the Commission to consider taking additional actions to address the addition of large and co-located loads to the transmission system.⁵ The records in these proceedings illustrate a host of urgent challenges associated with providing the transmission service needed to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while maintaining reliability and affordability. In particular, stakeholders have expressed concerns that large loads are not efficiently and appropriately integrated onto the transmission system; have identified a

¹ See, e.g., *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 (2025) (PJM Show Cause Order); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2025) (PJM Co-Location Order); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026) (SPP HILL Order); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2026) (SPP CHILLS Order); see also, e.g., *Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025); *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026).

² As explained below, it appears that it would be reasonable to define a large load as (1) a new commercial or industrial customer, (2) located at a single site behind one or more points of interconnection, (3) that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, (4) interconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, and (5) is not part of a co-location arrangement. See *infra* P 58.

³ The PJM Co-Location Order defined co-located load as “configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the facilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer’s side of the Point of Interconnection to the PJM Transmission System.” PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 164 (alterations in original). The PJM Co-Location Order used the term co-location arrangement when referring to both the co-located load and the associated generator. *Id.* P 3.

⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 7173.

⁵ See *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System*, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); see also Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025). The ANOPR uses the term “hybrid facilities,” which it explains are large loads that “share a point of interconnection with new or existing generation facilities.” ANOPR at P 12. In this order, we use the term co-located load.

number of unique challenges that large load integration poses for the reliable operation of that system; and have debated how best to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service remain just and reasonable as more and more large loads are onboarded onto that system.⁶ The records in these proceedings likewise present serious concerns about the lack of clarity and consistency in Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) tariffs—including with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to flexible large loads, co-location arrangements, load with behind the meter generation, and generating facilities with electrically proximate large load⁷ or co-located load.

2. The findings in several recent Commission proceedings establish the foundations of a just and reasonable framework for addressing these concerns and ensuring the timely, efficient, and reliable integration of large and co-located loads onto the transmission system. For example, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) has recently taken a number of innovative and proactive steps to address the challenges of integrating large loads, co-located loads, and/or generation and electrically proximate large load onto the transmission system while ensuring that its tariff remains just and reasonable.⁸ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), through the Commission’s show cause proceedings, is also addressing the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to co-location arrangements and establishing new transmission services that reflect the ability of Eligible Customers⁹ taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load to limit their

⁶ Throughout this order we rely on comments and answers filed in response to the ANOPR in Docket No. RM26-4-000 and all referenced comments in this order were filed in that docket, unless otherwise noted. A full list of commenter names and abbreviations is attached to this order as an Appendix. Additionally, we have relied on the discussions held in the Federal and State Current Issues Collaborative in Docket No. AD24-7-000 (NARUC Collaborative). All entities who wish to participate in this docket, regardless of participation in the ANOPR proceeding or NARUC Collaborative, should file to intervene in Docket No. EL26-67-000.

⁷ As explained below, for purposes of this order, an “electrically proximate large load” is a large load, as defined in this order, that is sufficiently electrically close to the interconnection customer’s requested point of interconnection, such that the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is located no more than two substations away from the generating facility). *See infra* P 94.

⁸ SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196.

⁹ PJM’s Tariff defines an Eligible Customer as:

withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.¹⁰ PJM has also taken steps attempting to enhance resource adequacy in the region.¹¹ Because the Commission is addressing its concerns related to co-located load in the separate and ongoing Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206¹² proceeding involving PJM, this order is limited to addressing the integration of large loads that are *not* co-located with generation. While we appreciate the steps PJM has already taken with respect to co-location arrangements, we note that PJM has not yet proposed tariff revisions to address the challenges associated with the integration of large loads.

3. As discussed below, we find that PJM's existing Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) appears to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential. We

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- (i) Any electric utility (including any Transmission Owner and any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any person generating electric energy for sale for resale . . .
 - (ii) Any retail customer taking unbundled transmission service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Provider or a Transmission Owner offer the transmission service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a Transmission Owner, is an Eligible Customer under the Tariff. As used in Tariff, Part VIII, Eligible Customer shall mean only those Eligible Customers that have submitted an Application and Study Agreement.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions E) (2.0.0) (PJM Tariff).

¹⁰ PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, *order on reh'g*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2026) (PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order). In the PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, the Commission used the term Eligible Load to refer to co-located load and/or load with Behind the Meter Generation. PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 91.

¹¹ *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2026) (PJM EIT Order); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,084, *order on reh'g*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2025); *see also* PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Jan. 20, 2026); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Supplemental Informational Report, Docket Nos. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Feb. 23, 2026); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Second Supplemental Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Mar. 9, 2026).

¹² 16 U.S.C. § 824e.

thus institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to section 206 of the FPA, and we direct PJM and the Transmission Owners,¹³ within 60 days of the date of this order, to either:

(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential without provisions addressing:

(a) the application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational requirements that apply to Eligible Customers seeking transmission service on behalf of large loads;

(b) additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade¹⁴ costs to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, and a mechanism to ensure such payments are appropriately credited toward transmission owners' transmission revenue requirements consistent with the Commission's cost-of-service regulations;

(c) transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions;¹⁵ and

¹³ Transmission Owners refers to the entities listed in the caption of this order. We recognize that PJM's transmission owners include entities that are not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because they are not public utilities pursuant to section 201(f) of the FPA. *See* 16 U.S.C. § 824(f); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,022, at PP 44-45 (2022). Accordingly, the Commission has not included AMP Transmission, LLC; City of Cleveland, Department of Public Utilities, Division of Cleveland Public Power; City of Hamilton, OH; East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.; and Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. here as Transmission Owners that must respond to this order to show cause. Nonetheless, the Commission retains the authority to review each entity's formula rates as a component of PJM's Tariff in an order to show cause directed towards PJM, and PJM must respond to this order regarding the non-public utilities' PJM Tariff provisions on file with the Commission. *See Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,022 at P 40.

¹⁴ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Tariff.

¹⁵ As explained below, for purpose of this order, "flexible" large loads are a subset of large loads, as used in this order, that are not co-located with generation, but are

(d) the rates, terms, and conditions of service applicable to interconnection customers serving electrically proximate large load or co-located load; or

(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff.

4. We are also concerned with PJM's need to ensure adequate generation to serve new large loads.¹⁶ We therefore direct PJM to submit, within 30 days of the date of issuance of this order, an informational report on how PJM intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads, as detailed later in this order.

5. We recognize that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take service from, the transmission system. We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that process. We also understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service. This proceeding is not intended to disrupt existing commercial arrangements, but rather to establish prospective reforms. Accordingly, any Tariff revisions offered by PJM and/or the Transmission Owners in response to this proceeding should (a) propose a reasonable implementation period to ensure minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements, and (b) allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing completion as of the date such Tariff provisions are filed with the Commission. Such proposed Tariff revisions should include a reasonable effective date that accommodates such considerations regarding these existing commercial arrangements.

willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. *See infra* note 178.

¹⁶ *Cf.* PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 237-239 (highlighting PJM's ongoing Critical Issue Fast Path stakeholder process to consider proposals to help integrate large load additions without causing resource inadequacy and directing an informational report on the status of those proposals).

I. Background

A. Growth of Large and Co-Located Loads and ANOPR

6. As the Secretary explained in the ANOPR, electricity demand in the United States is expected to grow at an extraordinary pace in the near term, largely due to the rapid growth of large loads.¹⁷ The Secretary highlighted findings from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that show that demand growth is now higher than at any point in the past two decades, driven in part by increasing quantities of large commercial and industrial load, most notably data centers, connecting rapidly to the transmission system.¹⁸ The Secretary also highlighted NERC's conclusion that the size and speed with which data centers can be connected to the grid present unique challenges for demand forecasting and system planning. The ANOPR proposed that, in light of the unprecedented current and expected growth of large loads seeking to interconnect to the transmission system, the Commission should standardize interconnection procedures and agreements for large loads, including those that seek to share a point of interconnection with new or existing generation facilities.¹⁹

7. On April 16, 2026, the Commission issued an order regarding its intent to act with respect to the ANOPR docket.²⁰ In that order, the Commission explained that it agreed with the Secretary "that, '[i]n light of the unprecedented current and expected growth of large loads' such as data centers, there is an urgent need for thoughtful reforms to ensure that large loads are 'able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and

¹⁷ ANOPR at 2 (citing U.S. Dep't of Energy, *Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability & Security of the United States Electric Grid* (July 2025), www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf).

¹⁸ *Id.* (citing NERC, *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* 8 (Dec. 2024, updated July 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf).

¹⁹ *Id.* P 12. For example, the ANOPR proposed that load and hybrid facilities should be studied together with generating facilities, observing that "siting a large load near or at the same point of interconnection as a new generating facility could reduce the network upgrades needed to interconnect only the load or only the generating facility." ANOPR at P 20.

²⁰ *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission Sys.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act).

non-discriminatory manner.”²¹ After recognizing the Commission’s recent actions in proceedings involving issues associated with large loads,²² the Commission concluded that it was clear that additional “action is warranted to support further progress where it is needed.”²³

8. PJM’s load forecast predicts peak load growth of 32 gigawatts (GW) from 2024 to 2030, 30 GW of which is projected to be from data centers.²⁴ Many commenters in the ANOPR proceeding highlight the unprecedented load growth in PJM associated with large loads. For example, AES Ohio currently forecasts over 6.3 GW of new load by 2032, which will nearly triple AES Ohio’s current peak.²⁵ Exelon states that, in ComEd’s service territory, data center demand has grown at an annual rate of 27% through June 2025, and ComEd’s most recent large load adjustment request to PJM included a future expected demand increase of 11 GW by 2040, 6 GW higher than ComEd’s submission relative to the prior year.²⁶ WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines note that PJM is expected to host as much as 70% of future U.S. data center development and that this concentration of demand, especially in northern Virginia’s “data center alley,” is creating intense pressure for new greenfield transmission to support the interconnection

²¹ *Id.* P 2.

²² *Id.* (citing PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,181; *Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); *Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237).

²³ *Id.* PP 3-4.

²⁴ Letter from David E. Mills, PJM Board of Managers Chair, PJM, Interconnection, L.L.C. to PJM Stakeholders (Aug. 8, 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2025/20250808-pjm-board-letter-re-implementation-of-critical-issue-fast-path-process-for-large-load-additions.pdf> (PJM Board Letter). Since the issuance of the PJM Board Letter, PJM has published its 2026 Long-Term Load Forecast Report, which anticipates lower peak demand in the near term due to forecasting improvements, revising the peak load forecast for 2030 downward by 875 MW, but confirms significant growth in the next 20 years. PJM, *PJM’s Updated 20-Year Forecast Continues to See Significant Long-Term Load Growth* (Jan. 14, 2026), <https://insidelines.pjm.com/pjms-updated-20-year-forecast-continues-to-see-significant-long-term-load-growth/>.

²⁵ AES November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

²⁶ Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2.

of data centers.²⁷ Buckeye states that load growth of approximately 10 GW driven largely by data centers in the Dominion Zone of PJM resulted in approximately \$12 billion in transmission investment across PJM.²⁸

9. A number of commenters in the ANOPR proceeding assert that large load additions have caused growing resource adequacy, reliability, and affordability problems in PJM.²⁹ Commenters also argue that large load interconnection in PJM is experiencing significant delays.³⁰ In addition, Buckeye and Southeast PIOs express concern that infrastructure costs driven by data center loads will be borne by all transmission customers in the corresponding PJM transmission zones and, where applicable, in the broader PJM region.³¹ They and other commenters argue that wholesale transmission customers are at risk of absorbing cost shifts and that retail large load tariffs do not protect wholesale transmission customers from cost shifting.³² Vistra also raises concerns that PJM and transmission owners' processes for determining Network

²⁷ WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

²⁸ Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6.

²⁹ *See, e.g.*, ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Joint Consumer Advocates November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7; PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-5, 13-14; PJM IMM November 25 ANOPR Comments, Attach. A at 3-5.

³⁰ International Energy Credit Association November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2, 49-51.

³¹ *See, e.g.*, Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11 (asserting that there is a significant overlap between multi-driver projects that may be driven by increased loads, including data centers, and those transmission projects selected in PJM's recent RTEP solicitation).

³² *See, e.g.*, APPA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6 ("Wholesale transmission customers in particular could be left shouldering massive costs if new large loads do not ultimately attain or maintain the level of electricity demand that is being forecasted."); NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21 (noting the risk that other transmission customers could bear stranded upgrade costs caused by large loads that they cannot absorb); TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26 ("[A] number of state commissions are moving forward with retail large load tariffs, which provide for varying protections, but may not require the revenues and minimum demand levels to be included in wholesale transmission rates.").

Upgrades are not included in the Tariff and that existing transmission customers may be disproportionately shouldering the costs for interconnecting large loads.³³ OCC requests that the Commission provide additional transparency regarding large load additions.³⁴ Commenters also support reforms to capture the efficiencies of generation paired with electrically proximate large load.³⁵

10. Moreover, many commenters in the ANOPR proceeding filed persuasive comments documenting, generally, the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions to ensure regulatory and process certainty, fairness and consistency, and efficiency as large loads are added to the transmission system in increasing numbers.³⁶ There is also broad support for rules that help to ensure that other transmission customers are not unfairly burdened with additional costs or reliability impacts as large loads interconnect to the transmission system.³⁷ In addition, many ANOPR commenters highlighted the need to

³³ Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 22-23.

³⁴ OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4.

³⁵ *See, e.g.*, AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 10-12; Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14; Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

³⁶ *See, e.g.*, AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; Calibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-3; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-11; Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-11; EPSA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4-6; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4-7; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; ODEC December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; R Street November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; Switch December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Tract November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Vantage November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Vistra December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2.

³⁷ *See, e.g.*, APPA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17; Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; NCSL November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; NY UIU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Oklo December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Southeast PIOs December 5 ANOPR Comments 11-15; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; Tri-State November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; UCS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-11; U.S. Representatives November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1.

efficiently integrate large loads, particularly data centers, to support national security priorities and economic development.³⁸

B. Recent Proceedings Addressing Large and Co-Located Loads

11. Over the past year, the Commission has begun to address, both *sua sponte* and in response to complaints and FPA section 205³⁹ filings, the growing use of co-location arrangements.⁴⁰ The Commission's orders in those proceedings have addressed the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to co-location arrangements and for transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads and load with behind the meter generation that are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. Several other Commission proceedings have addressed the challenges of integrating large loads onto the transmission system, including the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions regarding the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and for interconnection customers serving electrically proximate large load. As explained below, these proceedings provide examples that will help to ensure that jurisdictional transmission service is provided in a manner that is just and reasonable and maintains reliability as large loads are integrated onto the transmission system and co-location arrangements become more common. It is in this context, and in recognition of the steps PJM has taken with respect to co-location arrangements, that the Commission now considers whether PJM's Tariff remains just and reasonable.

1. PJM Co-Location Proceedings

12. On February 20, 2025, the Commission initiated a show cause proceeding against PJM and the PJM Transmission Owners regarding the lack of tariff provisions addressing with sufficient clarity or consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply

³⁸ See, e.g., AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Google November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-3; Verrus December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2.

³⁹ 16 U.S.C. § 824d.

⁴⁰ See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, *order on reh'g*, PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196.

to co-location arrangements.⁴¹ The Commission explained when initiating that proceeding that the absence of such provisions may leave entities unable to determine what steps they can or must take to effectuate co-location arrangements of various configurations and how to do so in a manner that is just and reasonable.⁴² On December 18, 2025, the Commission found that PJM's Tariff was indeed unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity or consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located load.⁴³

13. Specifically, the Commission found that the PJM Tariff was unjust and unreasonable because there is a lack of sufficient clarity or consistency as to the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load.⁴⁴ The Commission also found that PJM's Tariff was unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads that are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.⁴⁵ Additionally, the Commission found that PJM's behind the meter generation rules were no longer just and reasonable.⁴⁶ The Commission directed PJM to file a compliance filing to revise its Tariff: (1) to set forth specific terms and conditions that an interconnection customer in PJM seeking to serve co-located load must follow in order to effectuate a co-location arrangement;⁴⁷ (2) to require that the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of co-located load takes one of three transmission services: (a) network integration transmission service (NITS) or a new interim, non-firm transmission service while Network Upgrades to provide full NITS service are

⁴¹ See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115.

⁴² *Id.* P 74. The PJM Show Cause Order defined co-located load as a “configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the facilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer's side of the Point of Interconnection (‘POI’) to the PJM Transmission System.” *Id.* P 3 n.4.

⁴³ PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217.

⁴⁴ *Id.* P 176.

⁴⁵ *Id.* P 177.

⁴⁶ *Id.* P 179.

⁴⁷ *Id.* PP 187-192, 225-230.

constructed (interim NITS); (b) a new firm contract demand transmission service; or (c) a new non-firm contract demand transmission service;⁴⁸ (3) to revise the behind the meter generation rules and implement a transition process for existing behind the meter generation participants;⁴⁹ and (4) to make several clarifications on how certain aspects of PJM's generator interconnection process apply to interconnection customers seeking to serve co-located load.⁵⁰

14. On June 18, 2026, concurrently with the instant order, the Commission issued an order modifying the discussion in the PJM Co-Location Order and setting aside the order in part; accepting in part and rejecting in part PJM's compliance filing, and directing a further compliance filing; and establishing as just and reasonable certain rates, terms, and conditions for the new transmission services (i.e., interim NITS, firm contract demand transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service).⁵¹

2. SPP High Impact Large Load Process and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment Processes

15. On January 14, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP's tariff to add a high impact large load (HILL) study process and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment (HILLGA) process.⁵² SPP's tariff revisions established HILLs as a new category of load;⁵³ imposed enhanced study requirements to enable SPP to assess the

⁴⁸ *Id.* PP 193-218. The Commission also established a paper hearing to determine the just and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for the new transmission services. *Id.* PP 219-220.

⁴⁹ *Id.* PP 221-224.

⁵⁰ *Id.* PP 161, 231-236.

⁵¹ PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 7-9. PJM's compliance filing proposing revisions in response to the Commission's directives regarding clarification that certain aspects of PJM's generator interconnection process apply to interconnection customers seeking to serve co-located load was accepted in part on April 16, 2026. *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026).

⁵² SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 61, 64.

⁵³ SPP defines a HILL as:

A new commercial or industrial load, or increase in commercial or industrial load, at a single site connected through one or more shared Points of Interconnection (POIs) or delivery points, where such load is either: (1) 10 MW or

HILL's reliability impacts on the transmission system;⁵⁴ and created additional, ongoing operational requirements for transmission customers serving HILLs to ensure continued reliability of the transmission system.⁵⁵ The tariff revisions also established the HILLGA process, a new generator interconnection service and related interconnection process to facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are specifically identified for, and limited to, serving a HILL and are located no more than two substations away from the HILL.⁵⁶

more if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage level less than or equal to 69 [kilovolts (kV)]; or (2) 50 MW or more if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage level greater than 69 kV. An Electric Storage Resource is not considered a HILL.

SPP, Open Access Transmission Tariff, Sixth Revised Vol. No. 1, pt. I, § 1 (Definitions H) (1.0.0).

⁵⁴ SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 13-17 (explaining that the HILL process requires up to three additional studies beyond those required of all transmission service requests for transmission customers requesting to add or modify a delivery point associated with a HILL, including a HILL delivery point study, HILL supplemental load connection study, and potential supplemental Electromagnetic Transient study).

⁵⁵ *Id.* P 18 (explaining that market participants registering a HILL must: (1) follow all nonconforming load requirements (e.g., additional load forecast requirements); (2) provide load data via telemetry in real time; (3) have remote capability to disconnect the load from the transmission system made available to the transmission operator; (4) have an up/down ramp rate not exceeding 20 MW per minute unless otherwise directed; (5) include additional information with registration; and (6) not have withdrawals from the transmission system without appropriate transmission service); *id.* P 19 (explaining that the transmission owner, at the transmission customer's expense, must install a phasor measurement unit or similar equipment); *id.* PP 20-21 (explaining that the transmission customer will be required to comply with ride-through requirement guidelines).

⁵⁶ *Id.* P 27 (explaining that, under the HILLGA process, SPP proposes to study HILLGA requests to determine whether any network upgrades are needed to accommodate the generating facility's injection to the local area); *id.* P 32 (explaining that SPP will grant HILLGA customers a new type of interconnection service, load limited resource interconnection service, which grants limited interconnection service solely to serve the associated HILL).

16. The Commission stated that SPP demonstrated that the “unprecedented growth in large loads in the SPP region presents significant and unique operational and planning challenges.”⁵⁷ The Commission found that SPP demonstrated that its proposed HILL process was a just and reasonable approach for integrating transmission customers’ new large loads onto SPP’s transmission system in a reliable manner.⁵⁸ The Commission found that it was reasonable to impose additional study requirements and other proposed requirements given the unique operating characteristics of HILLs. The Commission further found that the proposed study requirements would ensure the reliable integration of the transmission customer’s HILLs onto SPP’s transmission system and would provide SPP with information about their impact on SPP’s transmission system, including the transmission system’s ability to withstand and control disturbances by the HILL at the point of interconnection.⁵⁹ In addition, the Commission found that the proposed study deposits would discourage speculative HILL study requests.⁶⁰ Finally, the Commission concluded that the proposed ongoing reliability requirements would allow SPP to maintain reliable operation of its transmission system by increasing SPP’s visibility, providing necessary data, and imposing real-time operational safeguards for HILLs.⁶¹ In accepting HILLGA, the Commission found that “SPP’s HILLGA process reasonably provides a flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a HILL in the same local area.”⁶²

3. SPP Conditional High Impact Large Load Service

17. On June 5, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP’s tariff to add a new type of non-firm transmission service, conditional high impact large load service

⁵⁷ *Id.* P 60.

⁵⁸ *Id.* P 61.

⁵⁹ *Id.* P 62.

⁶⁰ For the HILL delivery point study, SPP required a \$10,000 non-refundable application fee and a \$100,000 study deposit, with an additional \$200,000 study deposit if an Electromagnetic Transient study was also required. *Id.* P 15. For the HILL supplemental load connection study, SPP allows the host transmission owner to require a \$25,000 study deposit. *Id.* P 16.

⁶¹ *Id.* P 63.

⁶² *Id.* P 64.

(CHILLS).⁶³ CHILLS allows transmission customers serving HILLs to reliably receive transfers of energy until sufficient designated resources and/or network upgrades are in place to support long-term, firm transmission service.⁶⁴ CHILLS is an as-available transmission service that will transfer energy to designated points of delivery to serve the portion of a HILL eligible to receive CHILLS, subject to curtailment and interruption.⁶⁵ CHILLS has a maximum term of seven years, which is intended to incentivize transmission customers seeking CHILLS to obtain the designated resources and/or complete the network upgrades needed to procure long-term firm transmission service through existing tariff processes.⁶⁶

18. The Commission found that SPP had shown that unprecedented growth in large loads presents significant and unique operational and planning challenges.⁶⁷ The Commission also found that SPP's ability to add HILLs to its transmission system in a timely manner may be limited due to delays in obtaining sufficient designated resources and completing network upgrades needed to provide long-term firm transmission service to such load.⁶⁸ The Commission concluded that CHILLS is a just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential approach to addressing the need to expeditiously interconnect and provide transmission service to new HILLs, while maintaining the reliable operation of SPP's transmission system.⁶⁹

II. PJM's Existing Processes

A. Existing Tariff Processes

19. PJM's Tariff sets forth a process by which an Eligible Customer may request either NITS,⁷⁰ including modifications to existing service agreements to add new

⁶³ SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at P 1.

⁶⁴ *Id.* P 7.

⁶⁵ *Id.* PP 9-10.

⁶⁶ *Id.* P 9.

⁶⁷ *Id.* P 84.

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ NITS is a transmission service that allows Network Customers to use their Network Resources (as well as other non-designated generation resources) to serve their

Network Loads, or Point-to-Point Transmission Service.⁷¹ In the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission also directed PJM to create three new transmission services that an Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of co-located load may take: (1) an interim, non-firm transmission service until all Network Upgrades necessary to provide the requested NITS are complete, (2) a new Firm Contract Demand transmission service, and (3) a new Non-Firm Contract Demand transmission service.⁷²

20. In PJM, new load additions are processed in one of two ways: (1) an Eligible Customer requesting new transmission service submits a Transmission Service Request to PJM; or (2) for existing Network Customers adding new Network Loads, the Network Customer provides PJM with notice of the designation of new Network Load and must modify its existing service agreement accordingly.⁷³ For NITS and Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service Requests, PJM determines whether a Phase I System Impact Study⁷⁴ is needed to assess whether the transmission system has sufficient available capability to provide the requested service and tenders an Application and Studies

Network Load located in the PJM region and designated additional loads. PJM Tariff, pt. III, § 28.1 (Scope of Service) (1.0.0).

⁷¹ Point-to-Point Transmission Service provides for “the reservation and transmission of capacity and energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery.” *Id.* pt. I, § 1 (Definitions O-P-Q) (36.0.0) (definition of Point-to-Point Transmission Service).

⁷² PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 160.

⁷³ PJM Tariff, pt. III, § 31.2 (New Network Loads Connected With the Transmission Provider) (1.0.0). To the extent that a Network Customer seeks to add a new Delivery Point or interconnection point between the PJM transmission system and a Network Load, the Network Customer must provide PJM with as much advance notice as reasonably practicable. *Id.* pt. III, § 31.4 (New Interconnection Points) (0.0.0).

⁷⁴ PJM’s study process for New Service Requests consists of Phase I, II, and III System Impact Studies.

Agreement⁷⁵ to initiate a New Service Request pursuant to which the Eligible Customer agrees to reimburse PJM for the required Phase I System Impact Study.⁷⁶

21. PJM studies all New Service Requests including generator interconnection requests, merchant transmission interconnection requests, and long-term firm transmission service requests⁷⁷ in a single queue (New Services Queue), which is governed by the transitional interconnection process in Part VII of the Tariff (for requests submitted between April 1, 2018 and September 30, 2021, where an Interconnection Customer does not have an Interconnection Service Agreement as of July 10, 2023), and the new cycle interconnection process in Part VIII of the Tariff (“new rules” for valid New Service Requests submitted on or after October 1, 2021).⁷⁸ PJM’s New Services

⁷⁵ PJM’s Tariff defines an “Application and Studies Agreement” as the application that must be submitted by a Project Developer or Eligible Customer that seeks to initiate a New Service Request. PJM Tariff, pt. VII, § 300 (Definitions A) (3.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions A) (2.0.0).

⁷⁶ *Id.* pt. III, § 32.1 (Notice of Need for Phase I System Impact Study) (2.0.0); *id.* pt. II, § 19.1 (Notice of Need for Phase I System Impact Study) (4.0.0). As the RTO, PJM administers the interconnection of generating facilities and Merchant Transmission Facilities, requests for transmission service, and upgrades to existing transmission owner facilities in the PJM transmission system through the New Service Requests process. PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process, § 1.1 (Sep. 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m14h.ashx> (PJM Manual 14H).

⁷⁷ *Id.* pt. VII, subpt. C, § 306(A)(3) (Application Rules) (1.1.0) (includes specific additional application requirements for Long-Term Firm Transmission Service seeking to initiate a New Services Request); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. B § 403(A)(3) (Application Rules) (0.1.0); *id.*, pt. VII, § 300 (Definitions N) (2.0.0) (definition of New Service Request); *id.* pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions N) (2.0.0) (definition of New Service Request); *see also id.* pt. VII, § 300 (Definitions C) (2.0.0) (definition of Completed Application); *id.* pt. VII, § 300 (Definitions I) (2.0.0) (definition of Interconnection Request); *id.* pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions C) (2.0.0) (definition of Completed Application); *id.* pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions I) (2.0.0) (definition of Interconnection Request); *id.* pt. I, § 1 (Definitions A-B) (19.1.1) (definition of Application).

⁷⁸ *See id.* pt. VII, § 301 (Transition Introduction) (1.0.0) (“Part VII sets forth the procedures and other terms governing the Transmission Provider’s administration of the transition to the new Cycle-process, including procedures and other terms regarding studies and other processing of New Service Requests within the Transition Cycle”); *id.* pt. VIII, § 401 (Applications for Cycle Process Intro) (2.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, § 401(A) (New Cycle Process) (2.0.0) (“Part VIII of the Tariff applies to valid New Service Requests

Queue is a first-ready, first-served clustered cycle approach that consists of an application phase, a three-phase study process, where each phase includes a System Impact Study and decision point, and a final agreement negotiation phase. For transmission service requests, once the New Service Request is processed, the transmission customer will enter into a transmission service agreement, a construction service agreement, and/or a Network Upgrade cost responsibility agreement. PJM's Tariff does not have any specific study provisions or requirements for Eligible Customers requesting transmission service on behalf of large load additions.

22. The system impact study is an assessment by PJM of: (1) the adequacy of the transmission system to accommodate a New Service Request; (2) whether any additional costs may be incurred in order to provide such transmission service or to accommodate a New Service Request; and (3) an estimated date that the New Service Requests can be interconnection with the transmission system and an estimate of the cost responsibility for the interconnection of the New Service Request.⁷⁹ The System Impact Studies also provide "estimates of cost responsibility and construction lead time for new facilities required to interconnect the project and required system upgrades,"⁸⁰ including Network Upgrades. The Tariff describes the phases and studies that determine the cost allocation of Network Upgrades to New Service Requests, and PJM Manual 14H provides the implementation details used to govern the interconnection and transmission customers service request process for new generating facilities seeking to connect to or use the PJM transmission system through PJM's cluster-based queue methodology.⁸¹ Specifically, the

submitted on or after October 1, 2021, and sets forth the . . . procedures and other terms regarding studies and other processing of New Service Requests"); *id.* pt. VIII, § 401(B) (Applications for Cycle Process) (2.0.0) ("Part VIII of the Tariff applies to (a) Generation Interconnection Requests; (b) Transmission Interconnection Requests; and (c) Completed Applications").

⁷⁹ *Id.* pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions S) (3.0.0) (definition of System Impact Study). The System Impact Study includes facilities study analysis.

⁸⁰ *Id.* pt. VII, subpt. D, § 307 (Introduction) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VII, subpt. D, § 307(A)(2)(a)(ii) (Overview of System Impact Studies) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404 (Introduction) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404(2)(a)(ii) (Introduction) (1.0.0).

⁸¹ *See id.* pt. VII, subpt. D § 307 (Introduction) (1.0.0) (including a description of the phases and an overview of the System Impact Studies and cost allocation of Network Upgrades, noting that the cost allocation will be in accordance with PJM Manuals); *id.* pt. VII, subpt. D § 307(A)(5)(c) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404 (Introduction) (1.0.0), *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404(A)(5)(c) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0); *see* PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests

Tariff provides that each “Eligible Customer shall be obligated to pay for 100% of the costs of the minimum amount of Network Upgrades necessary to accommodate its New Service Request and that would not have been incurred under the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan [(RTEP)] but for such New Service Request, net of benefits resulting from the construction of the upgrades, such costs not to be less than zero.”⁸² The Tariff further specifies that “[a]ll New Service Requests that contribute to the need for a Network Upgrade will receive cost allocation for that upgrade pursuant to each New Service Request’s contribution to the reliability violation identified on the transmission system in accordance with PJM Manuals.”⁸³

23. As relevant on the generator interconnection side, pursuant to the Tariff, a Project Developer may request, and PJM may provide, Provisional Interconnection Service for limited interconnection service at the discretion of PJM based upon an evaluation that will consider the results of available studies.⁸⁴ PJM determines, through available studies or additional studies as necessary, “whether stability, short circuit, thermal, and/or voltage issues would arise” if the Project Developer interconnects without modifications to the Generating Facility or the transmission system.⁸⁵ Under the Tariff, a Project Developer may also request surplus interconnection service for an unneeded portion of interconnection service capacity at an existing point of interconnection.⁸⁶ The surplus interconnection study consists of reactive power, short circuit/fault duty, stability analysis and any other appropriate analyses, and steady-state (thermal/voltage) analyses may be

Cycle Process, § 4.2.6 (Sep. 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m14h.ashx> (PJM Manual 14H).

⁸² PJM Tariff, pt. VII, subpt. D, § 307(A)(5)(a) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404 (A)(5)(a) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0).

⁸³ *Id.* pt. VII, subpt. D, § 307(A)(5)(c) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0); *id.* pt. VIII, subpt. C, § 404 (A)(5)(c) (Cost Allocation for Network Upgrades) (1.0.0).

⁸⁴ *Id.* pt. IX, subpt. B, app. 2, § 1.4A.2 (Provisional Interconnection Service) (0.0.0).

⁸⁵ *Id.*

⁸⁶ *Id.* pt. VIII, subpt. E, § 414(A) (Surplus Interconnection Service Request) (1.0.0).

performed as necessary to ensure that all required reliability conditions are studied under off-peak conditions.⁸⁷

24. In PJM, electric distribution companies and transmission owners administer load interconnection processes for existing Network Customers, and transmission owners perform local transmission planning to accommodate load additions.⁸⁸ PJM, as transmission provider, conducts additional studies and transmission planning activities to support load additions. Requests to physically interconnect loads are submitted to transmission owners, who have their own study processes and requirements. Some transmission owners have established specific large load interconnection procedures and requirements.⁸⁹ New loads taking bundled retail service from a transmission owner or that are served subject to state-required retail access programs (Native Load) are studied through transmission owners' local transmission planning processes. Transmission owners must designate resources and loads to serve Native Load in the same manner as any Eligible Customer.⁹⁰

25. Network Upgrades identified in transmission owners' local transmission planning process as needed to accommodate load additions are designated as Supplemental Projects under Attachment M-3 of PJM's Tariff.⁹¹ Under Attachment M-3, transmission owners plan for the local transmission needs of their own transmission systems. Attachment M-3 provides procedures for stakeholder review and comment on Supplemental Projects in the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (230 kV or above) and Subregional RTEP Committee (below 230 kV) and as part of a transmission

⁸⁷ *Id.* pt. VIII, subpt. E, § 414(B)(1) (Surplus Interconnection Study) (1.0.0).

⁸⁸ *See* PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6.

⁸⁹ *See, e.g.*, EEI March 12 ANOPR Comments at 13 (“In December 2025, Exelon subsidiary Delmarva Power submitted proposed changes in line with the Commission’s November 2025 order: a new service class ‘GS-LD’ applicable to large demand customers with a monthly maximum of 25 MW or greater. The company also proposed implementing an application process and specific requirements for potential customers with a projected load of at least 50 MW.”); *id.* (“Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) has proposed revisions to Rider DE that clarify requirements and procedures for large load customers' new service requests.”).

⁹⁰ PJM Tariff, pt. III, § 28.2 (Transmission Provider Responsibilities) (1.0.0).

⁹¹ *See id.* attach. M-3 (Additional Procedures for Planning Supplemental Projects and Asset Management Projects) (1.0.0).

owner's Local Plan, before the Local Plan is submitted for integration into the RTEP.⁹² These transmission projects do not qualify for region-wide cost allocation, and PJM conducts only a "do no harm" test to ensure that local transmission facilities do not adversely impact the reliability of the broader transmission system before the Supplemental Projects are added into the RTEP base case.⁹³ Supplemental Project costs are allocated to the local transmission owner's zone pursuant to individual transmission owner cost allocation frameworks.⁹⁴

26. Attachment H of the PJM Tariff includes the formula rate for each transmission owner. The formula rate calculates the annual transmission revenue requirement, and resulting NITS rate, in the relevant PJM transmission zones. The demand charges for NITS, which are charged to the relevant Network Customer (i.e., the Eligible Customer), are determined by multiplying the rate for NITS (based on the NITS rate in Attachment H of the relevant transmission zone) by the customer's coincident peak demand.⁹⁵

27. In some instances, an aggregation of large loads, coupled with other drivers, could trigger regional (as opposed to local) transmission system needs, which would be identified and addressed by a regional transmission project in the RTEP, which is subject to PJM's regional cost allocation method. For example, a transmission owner may identify a local transmission need that may be more efficiently or cost-effectively addressed by a regional transmission project identified in the RTEP.⁹⁶

28. The Tariff includes a hybrid cost allocation method that was accepted as part of PJM's compliance with Order No. 1000 for Regional Facilities and Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities that address a reliability need.⁹⁷ Under this method, PJM allocates

⁹² See *id.* § (c) (Procedures for Review of Attachment M-3 Projects).

⁹³ See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Answer, Docket No. EL25-49-000, at 6-7 (filed Mar. 24, 2025); PJM Manual 14B: PJM Regional Transmission Planning Process, § 1.1 (Apr. 2026), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m14b.pdf#page=14>.

⁹⁴ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Answer, Docket No. EL25-49-000, at 7 (filed Mar. 24, 2025).

⁹⁵ PJM Tariff, pt. III, § 34.1 (Monthly Demand Charge) (1.0.0).

⁹⁶ See, e.g., *Potomac Edison Co.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,074, at PP 5, 22 (2025) (allowing for recovery of abandoned plant costs where a local transmission project was superseded by regional transmission development in PJM's RTEP process).

⁹⁷ PJM identifies reliability transmission needs and economic constraints that result from the incorporation of public policy requirements into its sensitivity analyses

50% of the costs of Regional Facilities or Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities on a load-ratio share basis and the other 50% based on the solution-based distribution factor (DFAX) method. PJM allocates all of the costs of Lower Voltage Facilities using the solution-based DFAX method. Cost responsibility assignments pursuant to the Order No. 1000-compliant cost allocation method are included in Schedule 12-Appendix A of the Tariff.

29. Schedule 12 of the Tariff provides that cost responsibility for the portion of costs allocated on a load-ratio share basis will be updated annually using the applicable zonal loads at the time of each zone's annual peak load from the 12-month period ending October 31 of the calendar year preceding the calendar year for which the annual cost responsibility assignment is determined, consistent with section 34.1 of the Tariff.⁹⁸

30. Schedule 12 of the Tariff also provides that, for the portion of cost responsibility assignments allocated pursuant to the solution-based DFAX method, PJM shall make a preliminary cost responsibility assignment for each Required Transmission Enhancement at the time such transmission facility is selected in the RTEP for purposes of cost allocation. Further, beginning with the calendar year in which a transmission facility is scheduled to enter service, and thereafter annually at the beginning of each calendar year, PJM shall update the preliminary cost responsibility assignment for each transmission facility using the values and inputs used in the base case of the most recent RTEP approved by the PJM Board prior to the date of the update.⁹⁹

B. Recent Stakeholder Proceedings in PJM

31. PJM has begun considering reforms to address large load additions, including the development of solutions to ensure large load additions can continue to be integrated

and allocates the costs of the solutions to such transmission needs in accordance with the type of benefits they provide. *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 142 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 441 (2013); see PJM Tariff, Schedule 12 (15.0.0), § (b)(v) (assigning cost responsibility for Economic Projects that are either accelerations or modifications of Reliability Projects, or new enhancements or expansions that relieve one or more economic constraints); PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, § 1.5 (Procedure for Development of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan) (29.1.0), 1.5.7(c)(iii).

⁹⁸ PJM Tariff, Schedule 12, § (b)(i)(A)(1) (Designation of Customers Subject to Transmission Enhancement Charges) (15.0.0).

⁹⁹ *Id.* § (b)(iii)(H)(2) (Designation of Customers Subject to Transmission Enhancement Charges) (15.0.0). The annual update includes any projects that were included to address any individual transmission owner Form No. 715 local planning criteria.

rapidly and reliably without causing resource inadequacy. On January 16, 2026, the PJM Board issued a decisional letter on the Critical Issues Fast Path (CIFP) detailing the initiatives that PJM will move forward to implement, which include: (1) a definition for large load additions; (2) load forecasting improvements; (3) voluntary “Bring Your Own New Generation” commensurate with large load additions; (4) an expedited generator interconnection track to offset large loads; (5) requiring, in specific circumstances, some new large loads to be subject to curtailment prior to the deployment of pre-emergency demand response pursuant to a “connect and manage” framework; (6) immediate initiation of reliability backstop procurement; (7) holistic review of investment incentives in PJM’s energy, reserve, and capacity markets; and (8) feedback on whether to extend the price collar for the 2028/2029 and 2029/2030 capacity auctions.¹⁰⁰

32. Additionally, on January 16, 2026, governors from each of the 13 states in PJM met with the White House National Energy Dominance Council and issued a statement of principles calling on PJM to: (1) provide 15-year price certainty for new capacity resources by holding a reliability backstop auction to procure new capacity resources commencing no later than September 2026; (2) allocate the costs of capacity procured through the reliability backstop auction to load serving entities with new data centers that have not self-procured new capacity or agreed to be curtailable; (3) extend the existing price collar to the next two Base Residual Auctions; (4) refine load forecasting methodologies by improving large load modeling assumptions; (5) accelerate ongoing generator interconnection studies; and (6) embark on a stakeholder process to reform the capacity market to ensure long-term viability.¹⁰¹

33. In response, PJM has initiated stakeholder processes on several items. The PJM Board initiated a new CIFP stakeholder process to engage stakeholders in the

¹⁰⁰ PJM, *Board Decisional Letter on Critical Issue Fast Path - Large Load Additions* (Jan. 16, 2026), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2026/20260116-pjm-board-letter-re-results-of-the-cifp-process-large-load-additions.pdf>. PJM has since submitted its proposal to extend the price collar for the 2028/2029 and 2029/2030 delivery years, which the Commission accepted on April 28, 2026. *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,076 (2026). PJM has also since submitted its proposal for a temporary, expedited generator interconnection process (Expedited Interconnection Track), which the Commission accepted on June 9, 2026. PJM EIT Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,197.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of Energy, *Statement of Principles Regarding PJM* (Jan. 16, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm>.

development of a reliability backstop procurement mechanism.¹⁰² PJM also developed a Connect and Manage Senior Task Force to consider the “connect and manage” framework to manage the reliability challenges during the transition period in which new load additions are outpacing the additions of new capacity in the PJM system.¹⁰³ Following initial stakeholder workshops, the PJM Board decided to expand the scope of the CIFP regarding the reliability backstop procurement mechanism to include the “connect and manage” framework, given the substantive overlap between the two proposals.¹⁰⁴ PJM expects to develop a comprehensive proposal by the end of June, which it expects to file with the Commission shortly thereafter, with the goal of procuring any shortfall resulting from the upcoming Base Residual Auction through a centralized procurement in September 2026.¹⁰⁵ PJM has additionally issued a report examining market design and investment incentives in light of rising demand, which is driven in part by the expansion of large loads, and constrained supply.¹⁰⁶ PJM has scheduled a series of workshops through August 2026 to develop recommendations based on the choices presented in the report.¹⁰⁷

34. While we are encouraged by PJM’s stakeholder efforts, and by its initial attention to the pressing concerns associated with large and co-located loads,¹⁰⁸ and to the

¹⁰² PJM, *Critical Issue Fast Path – Reliability Backstop Procurement*, <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp>.

¹⁰³ PJM, *Connect and Manage Senior Task Force*, <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/task-forces/camstf>.

¹⁰⁴ PJM, Third Supplemental Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed May 20, 2026); *see also* PJM, *Critical Issue Fast Path - Reliability Backstop Procurement / Connect & Manage*, <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp>.

¹⁰⁵ PJM, Third Supplemental Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed May 20, 2026).

¹⁰⁶ PJM, *Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, and Stimulating Investment to Support Durable Reliability* (May 6, 2026), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-design.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ PJM, *Powering Reliability Through Market Design Workshops*, <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/workshops/prtmdw>.

¹⁰⁸ PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; *see also* PJM, *Large Load Additions Workshop*, at 1 (May 9, 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/workshops/llaw/2025/20250509/20250509-item-02-->

Secretary's interest in these issues,¹⁰⁹ we are initiating this FPA section 206 proceeding in order to ensure that PJM's ongoing processes generate reforms that are sufficiently timely and comprehensive to address the concerns we today identify. As such, and as the Commission explained in the April Order Regarding Intent to Act, we find that the Commission must now take further action to ensure that PJM promptly proposes revisions to ensure that its Tariff remains just and reasonable.

III. Discussion

35. Based on the discussion below, pursuant section 206 of the FPA, we direct PJM and the Transmission Owners, within 60 days of the date of this order, to either:

(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential without provisions addressing:

- (a) the application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational requirements that apply to Eligible Customers seeking transmission service on behalf of large loads;
- (b) additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade costs to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant transmission owner and Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, and a mechanism to ensure such payments are appropriately credited towards transmission owners' transmission revenue requirements consistent with the Commission's cost-of-service regulations;
- (c) transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions; and
- (d) the rates, terms, and conditions of service applicable to interconnection customers serving electrically proximate large load or co-located load; or

-large-load-additions-workshop---presentation.pdf (discussing challenges with reliability of connecting large loads); PJM IMM, *Planning for Large Load Additions* (Jan. 7, 2025), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2025/IMM_PC_Large_Load_Additions_20250107.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ See *supra* PP 6-7.

(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff.

36. We also direct PJM to submit, within 30 days of the date of issuance of this order, an informational report on how PJM intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads.

37. Interested entities may respond within 30 days of PJM's and the Transmission Owners' filings, addressing either or both of: (1) whether the existing Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what changes to the Tariff should be implemented as replacement rates.

38. We recognize that PJM and/or the Transmission Owners (to the extent the matters addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights) may elect to address some or all of the issues discussed in this order by proposing revisions to the Tariff pursuant to their applicable FPA section 205 filing rights. We strongly encourage this. Although both the Secretary's ANOPR and our own Order Regarding Intent to Act expressly recognized (and indeed encouraged) that possibility,¹¹⁰ no such filings were received from PJM by the Commission prior to the issuance of this order. Should PJM and/or the Transmission Owners elect to make such filings in response to this order, those filings should state explicitly that the proposals are being submitted under FPA section 205. Should PJM and/or the Transmission Owners submit a filing under FPA section 205, they should also explain which of the Commission's above directives their filing addresses and how it resolves them. Additionally, any such filing should provide a reasoned explanation for how the proposal will avoid disrupting existing commercial arrangements and clearly identify a reasonable effective date that accommodates such existing commercial arrangements.

39. The Commission will consider requests from PJM and/or the Transmission Owners to hold, for up to 90 days, all or certain aspects of this FPA section 206 proceeding in abeyance, including the deadline to respond to this order. Any such abeyance, which will begin as of the deadline to respond to this order, would be considered to provide PJM and the Transmission Owners time while they work through the stakeholder processes to develop FPA section 205 filings to revise the Tariff to address the issues raised in this order. Requests for a full or partial abeyance¹¹¹ should be

¹¹⁰ See ANOPR at P 32; Order Regarding Intent to Act, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045 at P 5.

¹¹¹ A partial abeyance may be appropriate to the extent PJM is developing FPA section 205 filings in response to only a subset of the directives in this order. For any

submitted prior to the deadline to respond to this order, specifically within 45 days of issuance of this order, to allow time for the Commission to act on the abeyance request. We emphasize that we will not grant such abeyances reflexively, that any abeyance will be limited to 90 days, and that we will look with great disfavor toward requests to extend the abeyance period. We anticipate that successful abeyance requests, if any, will include both (1) a robust description of the content of a potential future filing under FPA section 205 and (2) a reasoned and specific explanation of when such a filing is expected to be made.

40. In cases where, as here, the Commission institutes a section 206 investigation on its own motion, section 206(b) of the FPA requires that the Commission establish a refund effective date that is no earlier than the date of the publication by the Commission of notice of its intention to initiate such proceeding nor later than five months after the publication date. In such cases, in order to give maximum protection to customers, and consistent with our precedent, we have historically tended to establish the section 206 refund effective date at the earliest date allowed by section 206, and we do so here as well.¹¹² That date is the date of publication of notice of initiation of this proceeding in the *Federal Register*.

A. Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large Loads

41. We today make a preliminary finding that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks provisions that address, with sufficient clarity and consistency, how PJM and/or the Transmission Owners will timely study (i.e., within 60-90 days of receiving the request) the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.¹¹³

42. Throughout this order, we use the phrase "the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads" to encompass the provision of new, modified, or additional jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. We note that this phrase is not limited to instances where an Eligible Customer submits an application to request new transmission service. It also includes instances where an Eligible Customer requests a new or modified point of

remaining directives, we expect a response to this order within the 60-day deadline set forth herein.

¹¹² See, e.g., *Idaho Power Co.*, 145 FERC ¶ 61,122 (2013); *Canal Elec. Co.*, 46 FERC ¶ 61,153, *order on reh'g*, 47 FERC ¶ 61,275 (1989).

¹¹³ As discussed below, our findings here also apply to the study process for unbundled retail transmission service requests by end-use large load customers, as allowed by state law or voluntary utility rules.

delivery to serve a large load, where a large load seeks a new or modified delivery point as an unbundled retail transmission service customer, or where large loads are otherwise included in an Eligible Customer's reported load growth and that Eligible Customer is taking NITS.

43. We direct PJM and the Transmission Owners to the extent the matters addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without an application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational requirements that address the unique characteristics and challenges of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, or to propose appropriate Tariff revisions.

1. Jurisdiction

44. At the outset, we clarify the principles relating to the Commission's jurisdiction over the matters relevant to the integration of large loads onto the transmission system and the impacts of large loads on the transmission system. We recognize that rates, terms, and conditions associated with the addition of and service to large loads implicate both federal and state interests. We also recognize that resolution of issues related to large load additions will require the involvement of both federal and state actors, including the Commission, state public utility commissions, and other state and local entities. We are encouraged by efforts made at the state level to address issues related to large load additions that fall within state jurisdiction.¹¹⁴

45. As discussed below, however, certain aspects of the process for integrating large loads onto the transmission system fall squarely within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction. Specifically, we find that it is within the Commission's exclusive authority to ensure that transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs include sufficiently clear and consistent provisions governing how transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads interconnecting to the transmission system will be studied, including whether new or upgraded transmission facilities are necessary to provide the requested transmission service. The Commission has jurisdiction over the study process for transmission service to both Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and unbundled retail transmission service to end-use large load customers where, pursuant to state law or a public utility's voluntary offer of such service, the large load is an Eligible Customer under the transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ See generally NARUC April 14 ANOPR Comments (highlighting action taken by state public utility commissions related to large loads).

¹¹⁵ Under the *pro forma* OATT, Eligible Customers include end-use customers seeking unbundled retail transmission service, pursuant to state law or public utility's

46. The Commission is a creature of statute and has jurisdiction over only those matters that Congress has given it the authority to regulate.¹¹⁶ That authority includes jurisdiction over the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, including all facilities used for such sale and transmission.¹¹⁷ As relevant here, the Commission must ensure that the rates, charges, and classifications for such transmission of electricity—as well as the practices directly affecting such transmission of electricity—are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.¹¹⁸ The Supreme Court has held that the Commission’s authority over interstate transmission is not limited to wholesale transmission service and that the Commission has authority over unbundled retail transmission service.¹¹⁹ As part of its transmission authority, the Commission has exercised jurisdiction over the terms of certain interconnections to the transmission system as an element of transmission service,¹²⁰ including the interconnection of wholesale load to the transmission system.¹²¹

47. As applied to large load additions to the transmission system, these principles mean that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads connecting to the transmission system, and the practices directly affecting the provision of such interstate transmission of electricity. An essential component of providing such transmission service is the process by which the transmission provider and/or

voluntary offer of such service. *Pro forma* OATT, § 1.12 (Definitions – Eligible Customer); *see also* PJM Tariff pt. VIII, § 400 (Definitions E) (2.0.0).

¹¹⁶ *Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC*, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

¹¹⁷ 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).

¹¹⁸ *Id.* §§ 824d, 824e; *see FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n*, 577 U.S. 260, 278 (2016) (*EPSA*) (approving “a common-sense construction of the FPA’s language, limiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that ‘directly affect the wholesale rate’” (cleaned up)).

¹¹⁹ *New York v. FERC*, 535 U.S. 1, 17, 19-20 (2002) (upholding the Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission service).

¹²⁰ *Tenn. Power Co.*, 90 FERC ¶ 61,238, at 61,761 (2000) (*Tennessee Power*), *order denying reh’g*, 91 FERC ¶ 61,271 (2000); *Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procs.*, Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, at P 9 (2003); *see also Laguna Irrigation Dist.*, 91 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,152 (2000).

¹²¹ *Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.*, 109 FERC ¶ 61,392, at P 37 (2004); *Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.*, 115 FERC ¶ 61,193, at PP 36-38 (2006).

transmission owner evaluates (1) whether it can provide the requested transmission service and (2) the impact that providing such transmission service will have on the jurisdictional transmission system, including determining whether any new or upgraded transmission facilities are needed to provide transmission service while maintaining reliable operation of the transmission system. This transmission service study process determines what Network Upgrades are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, the costs of which are included in transmission rates. As such, this study process directly affects Commission-jurisdictional transmission rates.¹²² The Commission has exclusive authority to ensure that the process to study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. We therefore find that we have authority to ensure that tariffs include provisions that clearly and consistently address the study process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, including the unique impacts that providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads may have on the transmission system.

48. At the same time, we continue to recognize that the FPA expressly reserves to states the authority over any other sale of electric energy, including retail sales and wholesale sales not in interstate commerce (such as wholesale sales within the Electric Reliability Council of Texas region), as well as facilities used for the generation and distribution of electricity.¹²³ As such, we recognize that states will continue to regulate: (1) the specific terms of retail sales to large load;¹²⁴ (2) which entities may make retail sales within their borders, including which entities are legally permitted to provide electricity to retail large load customers;¹²⁵ and (3) any siting decisions and construction

¹²² *Cf. Transmission Plan. & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & Operating Pub. Utils.*, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at P 112 (2011) (“It is through the transmission planning process that public utility transmission providers determine which transmission facilities will more efficiently or cost-effectively meet the needs of the region, the development of which directly impacts the rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional service.”).

¹²³ 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); *see Dayton Power & Light Co. v. FERC*, 126 F.4th 1107, 1129 (6th Cir. 2025).

¹²⁴ *See EPSA*, 577 U.S. at 279-80 (recognizing state authority over retail electricity sales); *New York v. FERC*, 535 U.S. at 28 (same).

¹²⁵ PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at PP 68-69.

associated with the large load project.¹²⁶ Nothing in this order is intended to intrude upon state authority over retail service to large loads.

49. In sum, we today exercise our authority to ensure that the process by which jurisdictional transmission providers and/or transmission owners will study the provision of jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads interconnecting to the transmission system, including where, as allowed by state law or a public utility's voluntary offer of such service, an end-use large load seeks unbundled retail transmission service, is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. Pursuant to that authority, we find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it lacks sufficiently clear and consistent provisions regarding the study process related to the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. We need not comprehensively address the Commission's jurisdiction over other aspects of the addition of large loads to the transmission system at this time.

2. Tariff Provisions

50. In the following section, we begin by considering PJM's Tariff as it relates to how PJM and/or the Transmission Owners will study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and explain our concerns that the lack of sufficiently clear and consistent provisions regarding the study process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential. We then consider whether the Tariff is unjust and unreasonable without certain elements. First, we consider whether the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing an appropriate definition of large load, as a separate category of load. Second, we consider whether the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing an application process and requirements for Eligible Customers requesting transmission service on behalf of large loads and a study process that considers the unique operational challenges of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. Third, we consider whether the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing ongoing operational requirements necessary to ensure that PJM can reliably provide transmission service given the unique operational impacts on the transmission system of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. Finally, we consider whether the Tariff requires such ongoing operational

¹²⁶ See, e.g., *Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC*, 125 F.4th 229, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)) (recognizing state authority over generation resource mix, including through their siting authority); Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 107 (acknowledging state authority over siting, permitting, and construction of transmission facilities).

requirements for Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads to be memorialized in service agreements.

51. We preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and consistency how PJM and/or the Transmission Owners will study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. We recognize that PJM and/or the Transmission Owners may have existing load integration processes, including studies that are performed in evaluating the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.¹²⁷ However, we are concerned that those processes and any required studies with regard to the provision of transmission service are not described in the Tariff with the degree of clarity and specificity necessary to ensure that the transmission provider can mitigate operational risks of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, given their impact on the transmission system, avoid disputes regarding how studies are conducted, deter speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and help avoid excessive and unnecessary Network Upgrades. Moreover, we are concerned that the existing Tariff does not contain other elements akin to those described below, which we preliminarily find may be necessary to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of jurisdictional transmission service are just and reasonable.

52. At the outset, we recognize that the Transmission Owners may be primarily responsible for conducting the studies that (1) evaluate whether a large load may be interconnected to the transmission system and served by the Eligible Customer, and (2) determine whether Network Upgrades are necessary to provide transmission service. We appreciate that this role may stem from how PJM and the Transmission Owners allocated rights and responsibilities in the governing documents establishing PJM. We do not seek to alter that allocation of rights and responsibilities.

53. We are nonetheless concerned that PJM's Tariff lacks a study process that addresses the unique operational and reliability challenges that providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads presents to the transmission system. Large loads can be more energy intensive and geographically concentrated than traditional load, and exhibit different load profiles and operational characteristics.¹²⁸ PJM

¹²⁷ See *supra* PP 20-24.

¹²⁸ See, e.g., SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 7-8; NERC, *Characteristics and Risks of Emerging Large Loads* (July 2025), <https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/standing-committees/rstc/whitepaper->

itself has recognized that enhanced large load saturation can have a disproportionate impact on system reliability, including voltage and frequency fluctuations due to their size and unique characteristics, if mitigating operational steps and other protection schemas are not developed and implemented.¹²⁹ The PJM Board has also recognized that the scale, pace, and characteristics of large load growth present significant operational and planning challenges.¹³⁰ As a result, providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads may be more complex and could raise greater reliability concerns for the transmission system, relative to a situation where Eligible Customers seek transmission service on behalf of traditional load.

54. Without a clear and consistent process to study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, PJM and/or the Transmission Owners may not fully capture the transmission system impacts of providing such transmission service, which could result in significant operational risks for the transmission system. Furthermore, we are concerned that, without sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions, PJM will not have the ongoing visibility and operational control necessary to provide reliable transmission service.

55. We are also concerned that the absence of sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions for how PJM and/or the Transmission Owners will study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads will lead to disputes over a variety of issues—e.g., study timelines and delays,¹³¹ how the transmission service needed on behalf of the large load is studied,¹³² what types of Network Upgrades are

characteristics-and-risks-of-emerging-large-loads.pdf (NERC Characteristics and Risks of Large Loads).

¹²⁹ PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12.

¹³⁰ See PJM Board Letter. PJM TOs further note that many data centers' initial loads are significantly lower when they first enter commercial operation, but following expansion and full potential of operation capacity, their demand increases to much higher levels. PJM TOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9.

¹³¹ See, e.g., Institute for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; ODEC December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4; Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21 (discussing lack of defined load interconnection process in PJM and lack of detail in PJM Tariff and manuals regarding load integration study).

¹³² Commenters raised concern that large loads are not studied with consideration of their known operating characteristics, including their willingness to be flexible or curtailable. See, e.g., ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23-24; Critical Loop November 21 ANOPR

considered, and how required Network Upgrades to provide the requested transmission service are determined.¹³³ Such disputes may arise from the lack of transparency in how studies are performed and how decisions will be made.¹³⁴ We are thus concerned that the lack of clear and consistent provisions in PJM's Tariff related to the study process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential.

56. Lastly, we are concerned that PJM's existing Tariff fails to deter speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. Many ANOPR comments assert that clear and consistent provisions establishing study timelines and costs, readiness requirements, and/or penalties will deter speculative or duplicative requests related to large load additions.¹³⁵ Commenters explain that

Comments at 3; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; L. Lynne Kiesling November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10.

¹³³ Specifically, commenters raised concern that transmission providers/owners may only consider traditional transmission infrastructure or that there is a lack of consideration of alternative transmission solutions. *See, e.g.*, ACORE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4, 6-7; American Terawatt November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4-5; Calibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2, 3; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; Chamber of Commerce November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; CTC Global Corporation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-3; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; GridCARE December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4; Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 27-28; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR Comments at 18; Iron Mountain Data Centers, LLC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4; Land Trust Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 22; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 44-45; WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-8.

¹³⁴ *See, e.g.*, CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; ECA December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; EPSA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4, 6-7; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 39-40; Switch December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Tract November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Vantage November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6, 12; Vistra December 5 ANOPR Comments at 27.

¹³⁵ *See, e.g.*, ACORE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; Amazon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Crusoe December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12-13; EEI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; Fervo November 21 ANOPR

speculative requests may bog down and delay the study process, wasting time and resources for transmission providers;¹³⁶ result in inaccurate study results or delays for other Eligible Customers seeking transmission service on behalf of load;¹³⁷ create a substantial risk of cost shifts if the large load additions do not materialize as planned;¹³⁸ and distort load forecasts.¹³⁹ Clear and consistent study procedures that include readiness requirements (i.e., meaningful milestones and/or financial commitments) can help ensure that Eligible Customers' requests for transmission service on behalf of large loads are more viable and more likely to materialize as planned, given that they must meet specific milestones and/or pay costs to proceed.

57. More specifically, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions that

Comments at 3; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; Invenergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Ohio FEA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

¹³⁶ See, e.g., Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; Institute for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; Ohio FEA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23.

¹³⁷ See, e.g., Amazon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15.

¹³⁸ See, e.g., AES November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15, 22-24; Tri-State November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6, 8; Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23.

¹³⁹ See, e.g., CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; EEI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; ELCON November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Invenergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 41; Talen November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9.

address certain aspects of the process to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, including:

- (1) a definition of large load sufficient to capture loads that present the unique challenges described herein;
- (2) the application process for requesting transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and the study procedures, including readiness requirements, for studying the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads;
- (3) ongoing operational requirements for transmission customers¹⁴⁰ serving large loads necessary to ensure reliable operation of the transmission system; and
- (4) *pro forma* provisions in transmission service agreements to memorialize these terms.

58. First, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks a definition of large load, as a new category of load. As PJM acknowledges, integrating large loads poses specific challenges to transmission system operation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the transmission system.¹⁴¹ An appropriate definition, including a load size and interconnection voltage threshold, should be based on the characteristics of PJM's transmission system. That said, based on the record in the ANOPR proceeding,¹⁴² it appears that it would be reasonable to define a large load as a new, commercial or

¹⁴⁰ We note that such ongoing operational requirements should apply to transmission customers, rather than Eligible Customers, as these requirements apply after the Eligible Customer has an executed (or a filed unexecuted) service agreement for transmission service and have become transmission customers under the Tariff.

¹⁴¹ PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12.

¹⁴² *See, e.g.*, Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13 (supporting a voltage threshold); DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3, 17-19 (recommending a threshold of an amount between 50 MW to 100 MW); Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9 (recommending a voltage threshold greater than or equal to an amount between 60 kV to 100 kV); Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7 (supporting a 20 MW or 50 MW threshold and consideration of other factors, such as voltage level); ITC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3 (recommending a threshold of between 50 MW to 100 MW); Nebraska Board November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4 (proposing a 50 MW threshold); New Mexico Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5 (proposing a 50 MW threshold).

industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or more points of interconnection, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, interconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, and is not part of a co-location arrangement. In its response to this order, PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without such a definition, or propose Tariff revisions establishing its own definition of large load.

59. Second, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing the application process and study procedures that will be used when PJM and/or the Transmission Owners evaluate the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable, for example, without: (1) an application process that accepts Eligible Customers' applications for transmission service on behalf of large loads on a rolling basis; (2) a non-refundable application fee and sufficient readiness requirements that escalate at distinct phases of the study process to deter duplicative or speculative requests for transmission service (e.g., meaningful milestones and/or financial commitments); and (3) information and data requirements that Eligible Customers must submit to PJM and/or the Transmission Owners regarding the characteristics of the large load on behalf of which the Eligible Customer is taking transmission service, including disclosure to PJM of any substantially similar pending transmission service requests on behalf of the same large load customer.¹⁴³ PJM may also elect to propose Tariff revisions establishing such an application process, fee, and requirements.

60. Further, PJM's Tariff appears to lack sufficiently clear and consistent provisions establishing a study process for evaluating the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that considers the unique characteristics and impacts of large loads on the transmission system. For example, we are concerned that PJM's Tariff may not clearly and consistently require PJM or the Transmission Owners to conduct studies that evaluate the transmission system's ability to withstand risks observed from analyzed large load behavior created by the large load at the point of interconnection, or any other necessary supplemental studies to evaluate the impact of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) has proposed a similar disclosure requirement in its Batch Zero process for large load interconnections. ERCOT Planning Guide, § 9.7.1(1)(b) (proposed Mar. 4, 2026).

¹⁴⁴ See generally NERC, *Industry Recommendation: Large Load Interconnection, Study, Commissioning, and Operations* (Sep. 2025), <https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/programs/bpsa/alerts/2025/nerc-alert-level-2--large->

Additionally, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears unjust and unreasonable because it lacks appropriate provisions recognizing within the transmission service request study process the unique operational characteristics of large loads that are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals under certain conditions, which may thereby lessen or potentially avoid the need for certain Network Upgrades. While flexible large loads can reduce the demand on the transmission system, and therefore potentially reduce the need for additional transmission capacity, additional informational and study requirements may be necessary to account for the dynamic nature of these types of loads while maintaining reliability.¹⁴⁵ Additionally, we note that accurate models using Electromagnetic Transient studies may help to ensure that transmission service needed on behalf of large loads can be provided without compromising reliability.¹⁴⁶

61. Additionally, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies¹⁴⁷ as potential solutions to accommodate an Eligible Customer's request for transmission service on behalf of a large load. Alternative transmission technologies can add more capacity on existing transmission lines quickly,

loads.pdf (finding that unique operational characteristics of large loads necessitate enhancements to studies).

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Thermal Battery Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10.

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., NERC, *Draft Reliability Guideline: Risk Mitigation for Emerging Large Loads* 6-7 (May 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/standing-committees/rstc/reliabilityguideline_riskmitigationforemerginglargeloads.pdf; NERC, *Assessment of Gaps in Existing Practices, Requirements, and Reliability Standards for Emerging Large Loads* 31 (Mar. 2026), <https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/guidelines/reliability/white-paper---assessment-of-gaps.pdf>; see also SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 62.

¹⁴⁷ For purposes of this order, alternative transmission technologies include static synchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced power flow control devices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers, voltage source converters, advanced conductors, tower lifting, and dynamic line ratings. We note that the Commission has also referred to these types of technologies as Grid Enhancing Technologies (GETs).

often within one to three years.¹⁴⁸ Unlike with traditional load growth,¹⁴⁹ large load customers often have development timelines requiring interconnection to the transmission system faster than traditional Network Upgrades can be built, necessitating a sufficient evaluation of alternative transmission technologies that can more quickly accommodate transmission service requests from Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.¹⁵⁰ The Commission has previously recognized that alternative transmission technologies have the potential to mitigate or defer the need for traditional Network Upgrades and often can be deployed both more quickly and at lower cost than traditional Network Upgrades, and therefore failing to consider whether alternative transmission technologies can meet transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than traditional Network Upgrades has the potential to render Commission-jurisdictional rates

¹⁴⁸ WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6.

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 7 (explaining that the HILL proposal was needed in part due to large load customers frequently requesting transmission service within months rather than years of their intended commercial operation, straining legacy regulatory frameworks and planning processes originally designed for slow, incremental, and predictable load growth); see also Commission Staff, *2025 State of the Market Report* 8 (Mar. 2026) (“[D]ata centers have characteristics unlike more traditional loads [including] size, strong desire for faster interconnection, and potential flexibility.”).

¹⁵⁰ Exec. Off. of the President, *Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan* 1-2, 15 (July 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf> (explaining that accelerated deployment of AI data centers is a critical matter of national security and international economic competitiveness, and recommending federal policy action to optimize the existing grid through advanced grid technologies); WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-8 (“[Alternative transmission technologies’] deployment timelines are more aligned with the interconnection needs of new large loads, which may only take 1-2 years to construct.”); Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 28 (“Achieving speed-to-power in the near-term, while also protecting customers, will require the use of GETs, advanced reconductoring, and unlocking all available system capacity.”); Energy Systems Integration Group, *Historical and Modern Large Loads: Characteristics, Context, and Industry Action to Meet Grid and Customer Needs* 4 (Mar. 2026), <https://www.esig.energy/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ESIG-Historical-vs-Modern-Large-Loads-white-paper-2026.pdf> (describing the timing mismatch between how long it takes to build a new data center and how long it takes to plan, permit, and build transmission).

unjust and unreasonable.¹⁵¹ Further, to the extent Network Upgrade costs to accommodate an Eligible Customer's request for transmission service on behalf of a large load are rolled into a transmission owner's transmission revenue requirement, transmission customers other than the Eligible Customer may bear a portion of those Network Upgrade costs, highlighting the need for clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of least-cost options like alternative transmission technologies to mitigate the rate impact on all transmission customers.

62. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions that: (1) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies in transmission service request studies, using models that are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for advanced transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of a large load; and (2) if traditional Network Upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of a large load of a sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., would not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request; or propose Tariff revisions establishing such provisions. This transparency and informational requirement is warranted for the regulatory scheme we are establishing for transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads given demand from and the expedited development timelines for large load customers. We underscore that we are not mandating the use of alternative transmission technologies. To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements beyond those contemplated here, we seek further briefing.

63. Finally, based on the record, it appears reasonable that such study processes, culminating in a report to the Eligible Customer with the results of the studies, including any Direct Assignment Facilities and Network Upgrades necessary to accommodate the transmission service request as well as a non-binding good-faith estimate of the cost and the time to construct such facilities, should take no more than 60-90 days calendar days to

¹⁵¹ *Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements*, Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 1583, *order on reh'g*, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, *errata notice*, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024); *see also Bldg. for the Future Through Elec. Reg'l Transmission Plan. & Cost Allocation*, Order No. 1920, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068 at P 1201, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 1920-A, 189 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2024), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 1920-B, 191 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2025).

complete.¹⁵² To the extent PJM or the Transmission Owners already have such procedures and conduct such studies, but those processes are not included in the Tariff, PJM and the Transmission Owners should explain their existing processes and consider whether amendments are necessary to the Tariff to memorialize those processes and also address the concerns expressed herein. Otherwise, PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without: (1) sufficiently clear and consistent provisions to evaluate the impact of providing the requested transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, including identifying the Direct Assignment Facilities and Network Upgrades necessary to provide such service reliably; (2) provisions to appropriately recognize within the transmission service study process the unique operational characteristics of large loads; (3) a study deadline of no more than 60-90 calendar days; or propose Tariff revisions establishing them.

64. Third, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks provisions addressing ongoing operational requirements for transmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads. We are concerned that without such requirements the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service may be unjust and unreasonable. The unique nature of these large loads creates challenges for operation of the transmission system and necessitates greater visibility and operational control when providing transmission service to transmission customers on behalf of large loads, without which the reliability of the transmission system could be at risk.¹⁵³ For example, we are concerned that PJM's Tariff does not require transmission customers to provide PJM hourly forecasts, telemetry data, and other data to ensure sufficient visibility or specify requirements for maintaining communication channels between PJM and the transmission customer on behalf of the large load. Additionally, we are concerned that the Tariff does not require transmission owners to install, and transmission customers to pay for, equipment to enable PJM to monitor large loads for impacts of, for example, fast-ramping load that may impact the transmission system too quickly to be captured by conventional data acquisition systems (e.g., the need for phasor

¹⁵² Several commenters support a 60-day timeline. *See, e.g.*, Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26; Critical Loop December 5 ANOPR Comments at 8; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16; Tract November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9. Other commenters note that SPP's HILL process has a 90-day timeline, or otherwise support a 90-day timeline. *See, e.g.*, AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; Eolian December 5 ANOPR Comments at 27; Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17.

¹⁵³ *E.g.*, ATC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14; CAISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10 (citing NERC Characteristics and Risks of Large Loads); Herb Schrayshuen November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-5.

measurement units or similar equipment). We are also concerned that the Tariff does not require the transmission customer to enable PJM to remotely disconnect large loads when necessary to maintain reliability of the transmission system, with the costs of such equipment directly assigned to the transmission customer, as well as the terms and conditions under which PJM may remotely disconnect the large load (e.g., emergency conditions, so that transmission equipment is not harmed). Further, we are concerned that the Tariff does not specify ramp rate or ride-through requirements with which the transmission customer taking transmission service on behalf of the large load must comply. Lastly, we are concerned that the Tariff does not specify requirements for necessary control technologies and/or protection systems that may be necessary to limit a transmission customer's withdrawals from the transmission system as appropriate.¹⁵⁴ PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without these or other ongoing operational requirements as part of the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service or propose Tariff revisions establishing necessary ongoing operational requirements.

65. Fourth, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks *pro forma* provisions in a transmission service agreement between PJM and the transmission customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load to memorialize the above terms (e.g., equipment requirements, data requirements, remote disconnect capability). We are concerned that, without such *pro forma* provisions in a transmission service agreement between PJM and the transmission customer, PJM may be unable to enforce ongoing operational requirements for transmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without such *pro forma* provisions in a transmission service agreement, or propose revisions to include *pro forma* provisions memorializing the ongoing operational requirements in a transmission service agreement between PJM and the transmission customer.

B. Cost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers

66. We next preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service. In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack of: (1) transparency regarding the assignment of Network Upgrades, and their associated costs, that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads; and (2) a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant

¹⁵⁴ Specifically, as discussed below, the Commission has found that such necessary control technologies and/or protection schemes may be appropriate where Eligible Customers are taking one of the new transmission services. *See infra* P 87.

transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that help ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of Network Upgrades.

67. We direct PJM and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) robust, accurate, and systematic provision of data on PJM's website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, regarding the cost for Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads; and (2) a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load, or to propose Tariff revisions to provide additional transparency and establish such a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement. We encourage state regulators responsible for setting retail rates to provide input to PJM regarding their transparency needs.

1. Jurisdiction

68. The Commission has a duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers that may result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates. As explained above, the Commission is obligated to ensure that the rates charged for jurisdictional transmission service—as well as any practice directly affecting such rates—are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. With respect to the addition of large loads to the transmission system, the Commission has exclusive authority to ensure that transmission rates are just and reasonable. The costs of those upgrades to the transmission system (i.e., Network Upgrades) necessary to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads are inputs to jurisdictional transmission rates, and thus directly affect the Commission-jurisdictional rates paid by transmission customers. To fulfill its responsibility to ensure that transmission rates are just and reasonable, the Commission must act to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers due to (1) the process transmission providers and/or transmission owners use to evaluate the facilities needed, and the associated costs, for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and (2) speculative transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates.

69. In response to the ANOPR, many commenters raise concerns about the impact that large load additions can have on retail ratepayers, particularly the concern that other retail ratepayers may be forced to subsidize Network Upgrades needed to add large loads to the

transmission system.¹⁵⁵ While we appreciate and are similarly concerned about this issue, the Commission is limited to addressing jurisdictional transmission rates and as such, we do so herein. As the Commission has explained, states determine how Commission-approved rates are collected among the relevant retail consumers along with the rates for state-jurisdictional matters.¹⁵⁶ Specifically, states have authority over how the wholesale costs of providing electricity, including transmission of such electricity, to those retail customers are recovered through retail rates.¹⁵⁷ We are encouraged by efforts taken by states to reform retail tariffs to address the potential for retail cost shifting as large loads come online,¹⁵⁸ as well as voluntary efforts by transmission owners to protect retail ratepayers through cost recovery agreements with large loads.¹⁵⁹ We are also encouraged by the execution of the President's Ratepayer Protection Pledge, through which data center developers have committed to shield retail ratepayers from increased electricity prices.¹⁶⁰

70. We expect that the additional cost transparency measures proposed in the following section will give state public utility commissions and other state regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are caused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the appropriate retail customers. Indeed, the Commission's objective in this proceeding is to respect the cooperative federalism approach established under the FPA. Specifically, one of the benefits of providing transparency on the costs of Network Upgrades necessary to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is so that state regulators can use that information to protect residential and small commercial customers

¹⁵⁵ See, e.g., Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12; Missouri Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; OMS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

¹⁵⁶ PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 167.

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* P 68.

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Pennsylvania Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; Maryland Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; Virginia Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4-5

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., *Commonwealth Edison Co.* 194 FERC ¶ 61,106; *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,109; *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,110; *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2026); *PECO Energy Co.*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,148; *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,103; *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,220 (2024).

¹⁶⁰ Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

by incorporating those costs into the retail rates as they see fit given their authority to set rates for different classes of retail customers. We encourage state public utility commissions, state regulators, and state consumer advocates to submit comments explaining whether this information is sufficient and granular enough or to submit comments explaining precisely which additional information on transmission cost allocation may be needed to inform proper state-jurisdictional cost allocation.

2. Additional Cost Transparency

71. We preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions requiring the provision of data on PJM's website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service requested by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, for Network Upgrades evaluated in the local transmission planning process that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of those large loads, and the costs for those Network Upgrades. We preliminarily find that cost transparency measures are needed to provide stakeholders with sufficient information and visibility regarding the Network Upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.

72. As discussed above, Network Upgrades needed to accommodate a new transmission service request or designation of new network load may be designated as local transmission facilities (i.e., Supplemental Projects) or contribute to regional transmission system needs and be addressed by a Required Transmission Enhancement in the RTEP. PJM's Tariff Schedule 12 Appendix and Appendix A include the cost responsibility assignments for regional transmission projects selected through the RTEP process. In addition, Attachment M-3 of PJM's Tariff provides procedures for stakeholder review and comment on Supplemental Projects identified through transmission owners' local transmission planning process in the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (230 kV or above) and Subregional RTEP Committee (below 230 kV) and as part of a transmission owner's Local Plan, before the Local Plan is submitted for integration into the RTEP.¹⁶¹ PJM's website also includes a list of Required Transmission Enhancements and Supplemental Projects with their project status, cost, and cost allocation.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ See PJM Tariff, attach. M-3, § (c) (Procedures for Review of Attachment M-3 Projects) (1.0.0).

¹⁶² PJM, *Project Status & Cost Allocation*, <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/project-construction>.

73. However, PJM's Tariff does not appear to require that information identifying the Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and the costs of those Network Upgrades determined through local transmission planning processes be readily available on PJM's website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data. We acknowledge that PJM's website provides information concerning certain transmission projects, including Supplemental Projects, such as project status, cost, cost allocation, and the type of equipment and upgrade, and includes the primary driver for each transmission project (i.e., load growth), but these postings do not appear to be specific to transmission projects needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. The speed and scale with which Eligible Customers are seeking transmission service on behalf of large loads makes it difficult for interested parties, including transmission customers and state regulators, to accurately assess which transmission costs are driven by requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers to serve large loads. Further, as PJM acknowledges, it forecasts significant peak load growth, but there is a large cone of uncertainty around the trajectory and amplitude of future demand growth.¹⁶³ We are concerned that the potentially speculative nature of requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads,¹⁶⁴ the speed and scale with which large loads are seeking to be added to the transmission system, the projected need for significant Network Upgrades to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the lack of centralized information on the associated transmission costs in PJM hamper the ability of the Commission and stakeholders (including transmission customers and state regulators¹⁶⁵) to understand and accurately assess the relationship between the addition of large loads to the transmission system and wholesale transmission costs.

¹⁶³ See PJM Board Letter at 1.

¹⁶⁴ See *supra* P 56.

¹⁶⁵ See Transcript, NARUC Collaborative, Docket No. AD24-7-000, at 16-17 (Feb. 11, 2026) (Chair Bagot, Virginia) (asserting that additional transparency at the RTO level would help the states get the information they need to “identify . . . that bucket of costs” related to large load-driven transmission costs), 19 (Commissioner Chattopadhyay, New Hampshire) (noting the need for “all parties to be able to see things transparently” with respect to wholesale transmission costs), 35-37 (Chair Martz, Iowa) (raising concern that currently RTOs/ISOs do not have to clearly explain when a “bucket of costs is specifically for this large load” and noting that “if we, at the state level, can’t see the driver [of transmission costs], we can’t assign the cost to the causer[,] [a]nd so we need that clarity”), 69-70 (Chair Myers, Arizona) (“[B]eing able to allocate the large load costs to the correct bucket when it gets to the states is kind of a top priority.”).

74. We are concerned that without sufficient transparency regarding the Network Upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, stakeholders may lack information and visibility regarding the costs driven by large load additions. We preliminarily find that, for Network Upgrades evaluated in the local transmission planning process¹⁶⁶ that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, PJM must provide clear, timely, and detailed information regarding the extent to which requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads necessitate Network Upgrades to accommodate the transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of those Network Upgrades.

75. We note that centralized information regarding Network Upgrades needed to accommodate requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads would also help inform stakeholders at the state and local level to address affordability and other challenges posed by the integration of large loads. Indeed, commenters state that the opaque nature of requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the associated Network Upgrades required to provide that transmission service, prevent wholesale and retail customers, states, and other stakeholders from understanding such costs.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ Our concern with transparency regarding Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of such upgrades, is limited to Network Upgrades planned through the local transmission planning process. While we acknowledge that in Order No. 890, the Commission adopted requirements for RTOs/ISOs, as well as for transmission owners to the extent that they perform transmission planning within an RTO/ISO, to have open and transparent transmission planning processes, there are additional requirements that apply to regional transmission planning processes (that do not apply to local transmission facilities) and thus is relevant to the distinction here. Specifically, under Order No. 1000, public utility transmission providers, including RTOs/ISOs, must evaluate as part of their regional transmission planning process whether there are transmission facilities that more efficiently or cost-effectively meet the transmission planning region's identified transmission needs. *See* Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 11.

¹⁶⁷ *See* OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3 (“Consumers, state advocates and state regulatory commissions have a right to know which entities are seeking large-load interconnections, the nature of the requested service, and how related costs could flow through to transmission and distribution rates.”); U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking Members November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2 (urging the Commission to “require sufficient transparency from grid operators so it can determine which specific large load facilities are responsible for grid upgrade needs”); *see also* CPUC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17

76. Accordingly, we preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not require the provision of data on PJM's website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, that identifies the Network Upgrades that are needed to accommodate requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the costs of those Network Upgrades. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions that would require PJM and the Transmission Owners to publicly post and regularly update data that details: (1) the aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions in PJM's footprint, including the aggregate amounts in each transmission pricing zone; (2) the planned Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, identified by type of equipment and Network Upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a new high-voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request; and (3) cost estimates for those Network Upgrades; or propose such Tariff revisions. PJM and the Transmission Owners should also consider what other data related to transmission costs resulting from the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads would be useful to include on PJM's website. To the extent there are concerns about data confidentiality, PJM and the Transmission Owners should consider whether there are ways to mitigate those concerns while still providing the necessary transparency.

3. Cost Recovery Agreements

77. We next preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service. In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack of a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that help ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of Network Upgrades.

78. Several commenters discuss the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers that could result from transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.¹⁶⁸ Commenters also argue that retail-level large load tariffs do not

(asserting that the public posting of large load cost responsibility determinations would improve transparency, to the benefit of businesses and ratepayers).

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-13; APPA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6 ("Wholesale transmission customers in particular could be left shouldering massive costs if new large loads do not ultimately attain or maintain the level of electricity demand that is being forecasted."); NRECA

protect wholesale transmission customers from cost shifting.¹⁶⁹ Specifically, commenters in the record contend that, while a retail-level large load tariff protects the load serving entity taking wholesale transmission service and its retail customers, it fails “to provide any mechanism to protect *other wholesale transmission customers*” from stranded transmission costs.¹⁷⁰ The Kansas Commission states that while its Large Load Power Services rate plan that requires large loads to make minimum payments toward transmission costs protects retail ratepayers from large-load driven transmission costs, it cannot protect against cost shifting associated with regional transmission buildout where “the large loads that formed the basis for the [regional] transmission plans do not materialize, leaving only existing customers to pay for generational expansions of the transmission grid.”¹⁷¹ TAPS contends, moreover, that it is not sufficient for the Commission to rely on transmission owners to voluntarily file cost recovery agreements to protect transmission customers from cost shifting for Network Upgrades.¹⁷²

79. We are likewise concerned that there may be speculative transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could result in cost shifting among transmission customers, which may lead to unjust and unreasonable increases in jurisdictional transmission rates. When a transmission owner constructs Network Upgrades to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load, those transmission costs will be included in the transmission owner’s transmission revenue requirement. If, however, the Eligible Customer takes less transmission service than anticipated because the large load operates at a lower demand

November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21 (noting the risk that other transmission customers could bear stranded upgrade costs caused by large loads that they cannot absorb); TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 22-24; California DWR November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

¹⁶⁹ TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26 (“[A] number of state commissions are moving forward with retail large load tariffs, which provide for varying protections, but may not require the revenues and minimum demand levels to be included in wholesale transmission rates.”); Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-16; Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15-16.

¹⁷⁰ Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; *see* TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26-27 & nn.50-51.

¹⁷¹ Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12.

¹⁷² TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 25-26 (noting that AES Ohio “committed to reflecting the payments it received from the data center in its Commission-jurisdictional transmission revenue requirement so that other customers are protected,” in a Construction Service Agreement with Amazon).

than anticipated or fails to materialize at all, other transmission customers may see an increase in transmission rates. In such a situation, those other transmission customers may have to pay for potentially unnecessary Network Upgrades that they neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from. In other words, this introduces the risk that costs may be unfairly shifted to other transmission customers, which may result in those costs then being passed through to residential customers, among others.

80. PJM's Tariff does not require cost recovery agreements between PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load. Such agreements would help ensure that the Eligible Customer makes a minimum contribution to the transmission owner's transmission revenue requirement commensurate with the costs incurred to provide the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed Network Upgrades. Absent such cost recovery agreements, we are concerned that there is no mechanism to help ensure that Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads (as opposed to other transmission customers) bear the risk of, and are ultimately responsible for, the costs incurred to provide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed Network Upgrades.

81. Accordingly, we preliminarily find that, in order to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifting among transmission customers, it appears necessary for PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load to enter into a cost recovery agreement that requires the Eligible Customer to make a minimum contribution toward the transmission owner's transmission revenue requirement, if the Eligible Customer ultimately takes less transmission service than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as planned or is not developed at all. We preliminarily find that such cost recovery agreements are necessary to help ensure that the Eligible Customer is responsible for timely paying the costs of large load-driven transmission (i.e., the costs incurred to provide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed Network Upgrades), rather than having those costs paid by other transmission customers that neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from those Network Upgrades.¹⁷³ Our preliminary finding is not intended to alter or call into question existing regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades, but instead is focused on helping to prevent cost shifting among transmission customers.

82. We note that several transmission owners and large load customers have filed cost recovery agreements (Transmission Security Agreements or Construction Service Agreements) with the Commission that guarantee minimum contributions from a large

¹⁷³ See, e.g., *Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC*, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004); *Ill. Com. Comm'n v. FERC*, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).

load customer (rather than from the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of the large load customer) to the transmission owner's transmission revenue requirement.¹⁷⁴ Although we decline to preliminarily find that cost recovery agreements between the transmission owner and the large load customer (rather than the Eligible Customer) are necessary to ensure just and reasonable transmission rates, we continue to find that such agreements directly affect Commission-jurisdictional transmission rates. Therefore, to the extent a transmission owner and a large load customer enter into a cost recovery agreement (whether voluntarily or pursuant to state law) through which the large load customer guarantees contributions to the transmission owner's Commission-jurisdictional transmission revenue requirement, we find that such an agreement should be filed with the Commission.¹⁷⁵ To reduce duplicative credit requirements and transaction costs, we direct further briefing on whether it would be appropriate for such an agreement to substitute for the requirement on the Eligible Customer to enter into a cost recovery agreement with the transmission owner, if the agreement with the large load customer provided comparable or greater protection against cost shifting among transmission customers than an agreement between the transmission owner and the Eligible Customer would.

83. In addition to our preliminary finding that PJM's Tariff is unjust and unreasonable because it lacks a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement of this type, we also preliminarily find that the minimum contribution required pursuant to such an agreement should be based on the level of jurisdictional transmission service (in MW) requested by the Eligible Customer on behalf of the large load. That figure is in turn tied to how PJM and/or Transmission Owners will study the requested transmission service and determine any necessary Network Upgrades that must be developed to provide the requested transmission service. We note, however, that there may be other just and reasonable methods for determining this minimum contribution, including methods that account for potential timing differences between when costs are incurred to develop needed Network Upgrades and the pace at which the large load ramps toward energizing at its full level of requested service. We further preliminarily find that the cost recovery agreement should include a credit support (or other financial security) requirement sufficient to secure the obligations of the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load to pay the amounts owed pursuant to the cost recovery agreement. We find that a cost recovery agreement with a specified minimum financial contribution and financial security sufficient to secure such contribution is necessary to mitigate cost shifting if the

¹⁷⁴ See *supra* note 159.

¹⁷⁵ We emphasize that this finding is in no way intended to preempt or interfere with the ability of states to implement ratepayer protection measures designed to mitigate cost shifting among retail customers, such as through state-jurisdictional large load tariffs.

Eligible Customer ultimately takes less transmission service than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as planned or is not developed at all. We preliminarily find that an Eligible Customer may include a credit support or other financial security posted by a large load as part of a retail agreement to avoid creating duplicative credit support requirements. PJM should explain why such a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement is not necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates, or propose such a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement. To the extent that stakeholders believe that other mechanisms could address our cost shifting concerns, we seek further briefing as discussed below.¹⁷⁶

84. Lastly, we expect that any payments made by an Eligible Customer to a transmission owner pursuant to such a cost recovery agreement (or by a large load to a transmission owner pursuant to other voluntary agreement) will be appropriately credited toward transmission owners' transmission revenue requirements consistent with the Commission's cost-of-service regulations.¹⁷⁷ We preliminarily find that it appears reasonable for filers of formula rates to provide a separate workpaper in the annual informational filing describing how any payments made pursuant to a cost recovery agreement are reflected in the transmission owner's transmission formula rate.

C. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads

85. In response to the ANOPR, a number of commenters argue that certain large loads are able to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. Namely, commenters observe that flexible large loads¹⁷⁸ can quickly and verifiably adjust their consumption in response to system conditions or price signals.¹⁷⁹ Commenters in the ANOPR also observe that, where load studies and system planning consider the flexible nature of large loads, flexible large loads can potentially defer or reduce the need

¹⁷⁶ See *infra* P 107.

¹⁷⁷ See 18 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2025).

¹⁷⁸ For purposes of this order, "flexible" large loads are a subset of large loads, as used in this order, that are not co-located with generation, but are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.

¹⁷⁹ See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Land Trust Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; California DWR November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; Digital Energy Council November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Emerald November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

for Network Upgrades, among other potential benefits.¹⁸⁰ In recognition of this flexibility, many commenters support new transmission services that reflect the operational capabilities of flexible large loads, including interim NITS while Network Upgrades are constructed, and non-firm transmission service.¹⁸¹

86. We preliminarily find that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions. The transmission services available to Eligible Customers, including on behalf of flexible large loads, in PJM are NITS and firm and non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.¹⁸² While these remain just and reasonable options for an Eligible Customer to take on behalf of a flexible large load, based on the record before us, we preliminarily find that new transmission services should be available to reflect the operational reality that large loads may use the transmission system to differing extents and certain large loads are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.¹⁸³ The Commission found that Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load should be allowed to choose a transmission service that aligns with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for service with the benefits received.¹⁸⁴ As the record suggests, Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large load also may be willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions. As recognized in the ANOPR record, load

¹⁸⁰ See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; ELCON November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Emerald November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7; Institute for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; Land Trust Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; LS Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 19-20; OMS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13-14; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 50.

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 24-25; Calibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; Critical Loop November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; Digital Power Network November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 27-28; Splight November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4.

¹⁸² See *supra* P 19 (describing existing transmission services in PJM).

¹⁸³ See *supra* P 85.

¹⁸⁴ PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 199; PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 103.

flexibility can avoid inefficient and costly transmission system build-out.¹⁸⁵ In addition, transmission services that reflect that flexible large loads are willing and able to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions could help timely interconnect flexible large loads.¹⁸⁶ Entities in the PJM footprint acknowledge the importance of facilitating load flexibility.¹⁸⁷

87. Therefore, we are concerned that PJM's Tariff does not include transmission services that reflect the use of the transmission system by Eligible Customers on behalf of flexible large load, on both an interim and permanent basis. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without the transmission services described by the Commission in the PJM Co-Location Order being available to Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads, or propose appropriate Tariff revisions. Specifically, PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) an interim non-firm network transmission service while Network Upgrades are being constructed (i.e., interim NITS) and (2) permanent firm and non-firm contract demand transmission services (transmission service up to a specified MW quantity, i.e., the contract level, on a firm or non-firm basis).¹⁸⁸ Finally, we note that the Commission has found it just and reasonable that, in order for an Eligible Customer to

¹⁸⁵ See *supra* P 85; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 160, 177, 199 (finding that new transmission service options reflect a co-located load's ability to limit withdrawals from the transmission system and potentially avoid costly and inefficient transmission system buildout that may not be necessary).

¹⁸⁶ See *supra* P 85; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 201 (finding that the interim, non-firm transmission service will facilitate the "timely" provision of transmission service and that "[t]his willingness to curtail would potentially allow them to obtain service more quickly"), 205 (recognizing that parties argue that co-located loads may be able to receive transmission service faster with use of a new, limited transmission service product than they would if they selected NITS, to the extent that providing NITS would require Network Upgrades that the limited transmission service would not).

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23-24; Load Flexibility Parties November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-5; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4.

¹⁸⁸ In an order also issued today, the Commission established as just and reasonable certain rates, terms, and conditions for the new transmission services directed in the PJM Co-Location Order, which include portions of PJM's and the Transmission Owners' proposals submitted in the briefs, and directed further compliance filings. See *generally* PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209.

take interim NITS, firm contract demand transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service, an Eligible Customer must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to its approved level.¹⁸⁹

D. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load

88. In response to the ANOPR, a number of commenters agree that the ability to study new load and new generation together, when physically or electrically proximate, presents system benefits and can help address the challenges posed by large load additions.¹⁹⁰ Commenters argue that studies that consider large load and generation together present a more complete picture of the grid and can enable the identification of more accurate, efficient, and cost-effective transmission solutions by minimizing system impacts.¹⁹¹ As a result, this can speed up the interconnection process for both large loads and generation, and shorten energization timelines,¹⁹² which commenters contend reduces uncertainty for both parties¹⁹³ and “is necessary to match the pace of AI innovation in the United States.”¹⁹⁴ CEBA also highlights that cost and timeline factors drive developers to submit multiple requests for price and timing discovery, which inflates queue volumes,

¹⁸⁹ PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480.

¹⁹⁰ See e.g., DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; Google November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; International Energy Credit Association November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; Terraflux November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1.

¹⁹¹ AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13; ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-11; ENGIE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Entergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; Information Technology Industry Council November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2.

¹⁹² DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-11; Information Technology Industry Council November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; Verrus December 5 ANOPR Comments at 9.

¹⁹³ ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

¹⁹⁴ Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9.

distorts demand and supply forecasts, and causes significant delays when projects withdraw late after finding costs or energization timelines uneconomic.¹⁹⁵ Other benefits to a joint study identified by commenters include improving load forecasting and siting decisions¹⁹⁶ and reducing the need for critical supply chain components.¹⁹⁷

89. Commenters contend that current generator interconnection study processes may not adequately capture generation and load, including by failing to model known electrically proximate large load in base case assumptions, which may result in inaccurate studies and inefficient system build-out.¹⁹⁸ For example, Eolian states that in its experience developing a project in PJM, the failure of the generator interconnection study process to reflect reasonably expected load conditions on the grid models triggered overly costly Network Upgrades and caused the cancellation of generation project that could have reliably served adjacent load growth.¹⁹⁹

90. Commenters in the ANOPR proceeding argue that the current state of the generator interconnection queue is not meeting the expeditious time frame needed to match the pace of large load additions and ensure the safe and reliable interconnection of these loads.²⁰⁰ For example, Oracle states that one of the most significant and widespread delays it encounters when siting data centers in the U.S. is access to sufficient energy.²⁰¹ Similarly, Helion contends that more than half of U.S. developers now identify

¹⁹⁵ CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

¹⁹⁶ ELCON November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Maryland Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7.

¹⁹⁷ AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13.

¹⁹⁸ Base Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 18-19; Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2; Longroad November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

¹⁹⁹ Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 10.

²⁰⁰ *See, e.g.*, AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; esVolta November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12; Oracle May 1 ANOPR Comments at 4.

²⁰¹ Oracle November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1.

interconnection delays as the single biggest barrier to adding new generation capacity.²⁰² Commenters contend that if large load interconnection proceeds more quickly than new generation can come online, the result could be price increases for consumers.²⁰³

91. A number of commenters support expedited interconnection studies for new generation paired with load.²⁰⁴ Some commenters argue that one solution to generator interconnection delays may be the creation of time-limited or conditional interconnection service for generators serving large loads, which could require less time for initial generator interconnection studies and improve speed to power.²⁰⁵ For example, several commenters express support for SPP's HILLGA proposal as a model and urge the Commission to establish nationwide rules similar to that approach.²⁰⁶ Other commenters suggest reforms to expedite studies for new generation paired with large loads at existing points of interconnection that have already been studied, arguing it is unjust and unreasonable not to fully utilize existing infrastructure and proven reliability paths while new load waits for service.²⁰⁷

1. Jurisdiction

92. The Commission's statutory authority includes jurisdiction over the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, including the facilities used for

²⁰² Helion November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1 (citing *Third Way, Picking Up the PACE: A Comprehensive Analysis of Available Pathways to Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE)* (Nov. 2025)).

²⁰³ AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; OPSI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7, 11.

²⁰⁴ *See, e.g.*, DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; ENGIE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; International Energy Credit Association November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; Meta November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Ohio FEA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5.

²⁰⁵ AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 12; AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13; Google December 5 ANOPR Comments at 15; *see also* Duke November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21-22.

²⁰⁶ AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4; Crusoe December 5 ANOPR Comments at 7; Enchanted Rock November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Google November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; GridStor November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9.

²⁰⁷ Constellation June 5 ANOPR Comments at 8-9.

such sale and transmission.²⁰⁸ The Commission also has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the procedures and agreements applicable to generating facilities seeking to interconnect to a Commission-jurisdictional distribution facility or transmission facility.²⁰⁹ In the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission observed that a generator's interconnection to the interstate transmission system "does not fall outside of the Commission's jurisdiction merely because there is [c]o-[l]ocated [l]oad behind the generator's point of interconnection."²¹⁰ By the same token, the Commission retains jurisdiction over a generator's interconnection even where the generator plans to serve an electrically proximate large load.

93. We recognize that states have exclusive authority over resource planning and the generation mix within their boundaries.²¹¹ Nothing about our preliminary finding here, however, intrudes or is intended to intrude on that exclusive authority. Rather, we preliminarily find that it is necessary and appropriate to exercise our exclusive jurisdiction over generator interconnection to ensure the availability of generator interconnection processes specifically tailored to the unique operational characteristics of generating facilities dedicated to serving electrically proximate large loads and co-located loads, as defined below. The Commission has exercised this jurisdiction previously in requiring generator interconnection services that allow certain generating facilities to interconnect more quickly through the use of provisional interconnection service and surplus interconnection service,²¹² and has approved interconnection processes that allow

²⁰⁸ 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).

²⁰⁹ *Id.*; *Nat'l Ass'n of Regul. Util. Comm'rs v. FERC*, 475 F.3d at 1280-82 (affirming Order No. 2003 and observing that "interconnections appear to be relationships between parties with respect to electricity flowing over facilities. . . By establishing standard agreements [the Commission] has exercised its jurisdiction over the terms of those relationships."); *see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.*, 115 FERC ¶ 61,193 at P 36 ("[I]nterconnection is part and parcel of transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, and thus interconnection service is part and parcel of jurisdictional transmission service.").

²¹⁰ PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 171.

²¹¹ *See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC*, 125 F.4th at 238 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)).

²¹² *Reform of Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements*, Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043, at PP 438, 467 (2018), *order on reh'g & clarification*, Order No. 845-A, 166 FERC ¶ 61,137, *order on reh'g & clarification*, Order No. 845-B, 168 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2019); Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 1436; *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,083 (2025).

certain generating facilities to interconnect more quickly by replacing a retiring existing generating facility.²¹³

2. Definitions

94. For purposes of this order, it appears to be reasonable to use the term “electrically proximate large load” to mean a large load, as defined in this order,²¹⁴ that is sufficiently electrically close to the interconnection customer’s requested point of interconnection, such that the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is located no more than two substations away from the generating facility). We will consider proposed revisions to this definition that ensure it is appropriately tailored to PJM’s transmission system.

3. Tariff Provisions

95. We preliminarily find that PJM’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer to seek the generator interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving either: (1) an electrically proximate large load; or (2) a co-located load, as defined in the PJM Co-Location Order,²¹⁵ that has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads that are 50 MW or greater).²¹⁶ Specifically, we preliminarily find that PJM’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks a generator interconnection study process and/or generator interconnection service to reflect an interconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement to limit the generating facility’s output to minimize the impact on the transmission system while serving an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load. We are concerned that PJM’s Tariff lacks, for example, generator interconnection study procedures and generator interconnection services that reflect (a) an interconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement to limit a generating facility’s output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load; and/or (b) a generating facility with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection

²¹³ See, e.g., *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2026); *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator Inc.*, 167 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2019).

²¹⁴ See *supra* P 58.

²¹⁵ PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 164.

²¹⁶ We note that generator interconnection service in and of itself does not convey transmission service.

scheme,²¹⁷ that ensure that the injection does not exceed the limit in the existing or new interconnection agreement. Where a generating facility's output is matched to the demand of the electrically proximate large load or large co-located load or if the generating facility's output is limited to ensure no new injection, the impacts to the transmission system of interconnecting the generating facility to serve that electrically proximate large load or large co-located load may be limited,²¹⁸ thereby potentially reducing the need for Network Upgrades, which can accelerate the generator interconnection process.²¹⁹ In the absence of Tariff provisions accounting for these operational dynamics when an interconnection customer's generating facility is serving electrically proximate large loads or large co-located loads, new shovel-ready generating facilities may face unnecessary delays in reaching commercial operation under current generator interconnection processes and will be unable to serve the immediate demand of new large loads or large co-located loads.²²⁰

²¹⁷ PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480.

²¹⁸ In other words, because the generating facility and load are located so closely on the transmission system, if the generating facility's output matches the load's demand, then the transmission provider would need to study only the local impacts because the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the same as if they were located at the same substation.

²¹⁹ See, e.g., AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13 ("To the extent that a new large load and new generation or storage resource are geographically and electrically proximate, studying them together would reduce network upgrades, lower costs, and reduce the need for critical supply chain components."); DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10 (integrating the study of load and its supporting generation "reduces the need for network upgrades, optimizes the use of existing infrastructure, and accelerates the timeline for bringing both load and generation online"); Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 18 ("It is obvious from basic engineering principles that generation located near load requires less transmission infrastructure to serve that load than generation located distant from load."); GridStor November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5 ("Siting a large load near or at the same point of interconnection as a new generating facility could reduce the network upgrades needed to interconnect only the load or only the generating facility.").

²²⁰ See AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1; Base Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6 (asserting that a clear framework to study large loads paired with generation would resolve development bottlenecks); Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 18-19; Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2;

96. As commenters in the ANOPR proceeding have recognized, the status quo may result in inefficient and unnecessary development of infrastructure, which leads to unnecessarily higher Network Upgrade costs that may result in unjust and unreasonable rates.²²¹ The Commission has already determined in the PJM Co-Location Order that without the new transmission services that reflect the operational dynamics of co-location arrangements, there could be unnecessary, costly, and inefficient Network Upgrades, increasing Network Upgrade costs.²²² The same result may occur in the absence of new generator interconnection study procedures and generator interconnection services tailored to a new generating facility coming online for the express purpose of serving an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.²²³

97. SPP recognized this problem and submitted an FPA section 205 filing to implement a new, interim, generator interconnection service and related generator interconnection process, HILLGA, to facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are specifically identified for and limited to serving a HILL, which the Commission accepted.²²⁴ The Commission found that HILLGA “reasonably provides a flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a HILL in the

Google November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7 (calling for nationwide rules enabling proximate load-generation interconnection to “accelerate the pace at which new generation comes online”); Longroad November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8.

²²¹ See, e.g., AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13, AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Longroad November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; OPSI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11.

²²² PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 177 (“[F]or Eligible Customers taking service on behalf of Co-Located Loads that do not reserve transmission . . . requiring such Eligible Customers to take NITS on behalf of these Co-Located Loads may in some circumstances result in costly and inefficient transmission system buildout that may not be necessary if such Eligible Customers are willing and able to take a transmission service that requires fewer Network Upgrades to provide, and therefore may result in lower Network Upgrade costs, than would NITS.”).

²²³ See AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2 (stating that current processes produce insufficient/inefficient infrastructure and “potentially unsustainable price increases”); Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2, 10 (contending that a lack of coordinated study leads to unjust and unreasonable outcomes).

²²⁴ SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031.

same local area.”²²⁵ We do not expect or propose that PJM adopt an identical process to SPP’s HILLGA process, nor do we preliminarily find that the absence of Tariff provisions specifically mirroring SPP’s Tariff renders PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that the Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable without *any* uniquely tailored interconnection study process and/or generator interconnection service to recognize the reduced transmission system impacts that may result from the interconnection of a generating facility where the interconnection customer has committed, in an interconnection agreement, to limit the generating facility’s output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.²²⁶ To the extent that the interconnection customer’s generating facility is serving an electrically proximate large load, we believe that the generator interconnection service should be of an interim nature until the interconnection customer obtains Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) or Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS). To the extent that the interconnection customer’s generating facility is serving a large co-located load, it may be reasonable for the generator interconnection service to be permanent because there will be no injections onto the transmission system and therefore it does not present operational or planning risks for reliability.

98. Another potentially reasonable approach to address our concerns could be to develop a generator interconnection study process that would allow the use of existing ERIS or NRIS of an existing generator to connect a new generating facility and a new large load behind the same point of interconnection of the existing generator with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, that ensure that the net injection does not exceed the amount in the existing generator interconnection agreement.²²⁷ Such an approach could expedite the interconnection study process for a generator planning to serve an electrically proximate

²²⁵ *Id.* P 64.

²²⁶ While, as discussed above, we view such a process that permits generation to serve electrically proximate loads no more than two substations away from the generators to be reasonable, we understand the unique features of PJM’s transmission system may warrant consideration of a more limited definition of electrically proximate. *See* Duke November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21-22; DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-11 (asserting that studying large loads with electrically proximate generation streamlines interconnection and reduces upgrades); AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13-15.

²²⁷ *See* Constellation June 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2, 10-13.

(in this case at the same point of interconnection) large load.²²⁸ An additional potentially reasonable approach could be a new load-limited generator interconnection service that allows a new generating facility and new large co-located load seeking to interconnect behind the *same* new point of interconnection, with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, to ensure that there is no injection to the transmission system.²²⁹ It may be reasonable for such a load-limited generator interconnection service to be or not to be of an interim nature. We invite PJM and/or Transmission Owners, in responding to this order or in an FPA section 205 filing, to submit original proposals designed to address the concerns expressed herein and tailored to their unique circumstances.

99. We are concerned that the absence of generator interconnection study procedures and generator interconnection services facilitating the interconnection of a new generating facility that is being brought onto the transmission system in order to serve an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load will result in PJM's current generator interconnection process failing to keep pace with the new large loads seeking to be integrated onto PJM's transmission system.²³⁰ We preliminarily find that this outcome may be unjust and unreasonable because reliance on PJM's current generator interconnection processes for generating facilities serving electrically proximate large loads or large co-located loads could result in unnecessary interconnection delays, unnecessary Network Upgrades, and an otherwise inefficient expansion of the transmission system, imposing unnecessary delays and costs on transmission customers.

100. PJM should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without, for example, provisions that establish: (1) a new generator interconnection study process and new interim generator interconnection service that reflect an interconnection customer's

²²⁸ See *id.* at 5 (explaining that when new generation load pairings “are sited at an existing generator's Point of Interconnection and fall within the same study parameters reflected by that existing generator's interconnection, they benefit from studies and upgrades already completed for that existing generator and can come on more rapidly without jeopardizing reliability”).

²²⁹ See MISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13; *see also* MISO TOs April 3 ANOPR Comments at 13-14.

²³⁰ See Helion November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1 (noting interconnection delays are the biggest barrier to adding new generation); Oracle November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1 (noting significant delays in access to sufficient energy for data centers); OPSI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11 (explaining that expedited study encourages loads to bring their own generation); Enchanted Rock November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9.

commitment, in a generator interconnection agreement, to limit a generating facility's output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load; or (2) a generator interconnection study process that allows the use of the existing ERIS or NRIS of an existing generator to connect a new generating facility and a new large load behind the same point of interconnection of the existing generator with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, that ensures that the net injection does not exceed the amount in the existing generator interconnection agreement; or (3) a new generator interconnection service that allows a new generating facility and new large co-located load seeking to interconnect behind the same new point of interconnection with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, to ensure that there is no injection to the transmission system. We note that, with respect to numbers (2) or (3), these approaches could be either interim or permanent. These approaches may not be mutually exclusive.

101. Given that generator interconnection service in and of itself does not convey transmission service, we encourage PJM to consider, in responding to these concerns, what type of transmission service an Eligible Customer will need to take on behalf of the electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.²³¹ We note that, in the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission found that the Eligible Customer must take transmission service on behalf of co-located load that will not withdraw energy from the transmission system, even if it is 0 MW.²³²

E. Informational Report

102. The rapid addition and proliferation of large loads without commensurate additions of supply or demand-side resources presents resource adequacy concerns. As discussed above and highlighted in the ANOPR, the growth of demand, and the speed of such growth, is driven in large part by the interconnection of large loads. While not expressly contemplated in the ANOPR, commenters highlight the strain rapid demand growth is putting on resource adequacy in many regions.²³³ Indeed, the relative speed and concentration at which large loads are seeking to interconnect appears to be outpacing the addition of new generation, which in turn heightens reliability risks and

²³¹ See SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 34.

²³² PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 206.

²³³ See, e.g., Entergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 29-30; Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 24-26; R Street November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; South Dakota Commission November 13 ANOPR Comments at 5; Talen December 5 ANOPR Comments at 7.

drives up costs to ratepayers.²³⁴ We are concerned that PJM and load serving entities are unable to plan adequate generation to serve all load at the pace such load seeks to connect.

103. We recognize that RTOs/ISOs are engaging in efforts to more rapidly interconnect generation that is needed to serve this unprecedented growth in load. In particular, PJM's Reliability Resource Initiative and Expedited Interconnection Track have provided pathways for expedited interconnection for generation.²³⁵ Further, as detailed above and in informational reports submitted by PJM,²³⁶ PJM has ongoing stakeholder processes to address resource adequacy issues related to large load additions, including a voluntary "Bring Your Own New Generation" pathway for large loads, a "connect-and-manage" framework applicable to new large loads that do not bring commensurate new generating capacity, and a reliability backstop procurement.²³⁷ While we are encouraged by the implementation of such processes to ensure resource adequacy and faster interconnection and ongoing stakeholder discussions, we remain concerned that these efforts may fall short in light of generator retirements and tightening supply conditions.

104. Accordingly, we direct PJM to submit in Docket No. EL26-67-000, within 30 days of the date of issuance of this order, a detailed informational report on the current status of proposals under consideration in its stakeholder process to address the issue of resource adequacy to serve new large loads. We also strongly encourage new proposals to the extent necessary to address these concerns. The informational report must include a detailed schedule of key milestones, such as stakeholder or PJM Board votes, that includes the estimated date on which PJM expects to file any such proposals with the Commission. Additionally, as part of this informational report, we direct PJM to identify any problem statements, issue charges, or other ongoing stakeholder processes that aim to increase the pace of adding generating capacity in the PJM region. The informational

²³⁴ See, e.g., Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; David Gardiner & Associates November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Joint Consumer Advocates December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2; PSEG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; Southern California Edison December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3.

²³⁵ *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,084; *order on reh'g*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2025); PJM EIT Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,197.

²³⁶ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Jan. 20, 2026); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Supplemental Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Feb. 23, 2026); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Second Supplemental Informational Report, Docket No. EL25-49-000, et al. (filed Mar. 9, 2026).

²³⁷ See *supra* P 33.

report must include a detailed schedule of such initiatives, including timing of the stakeholder process and dates of any anticipated filings with the Commission.

IV. Briefing Questions

105. We note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take interconnection and/or transmission service from, the transmission system and may be at varying stages of that process. We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that process. We also understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service. We direct further briefing regarding how PJM and the Transmission Owners, in responding to the order to show cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements including: (1) what would be a reasonable implementation period to ensure minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements, and (2) how to allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing completion as of the date such Tariff provisions are filed with the Commission.

106. Today's order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new transmission services that recognize flexible large loads' ability and willingness to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions. As we assess this proposal, we also consider how these new transmission services might affect other parts of PJM's Tariff and/or processes. Specifically, what, if any, potential impacts on regional and local transmission planning would arise from the introduction of the new transmission services discussed herein? For example, when planning for load growth, how would transmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads' potential preference to take the new transmission services, including potential uncertainties around the type, location, and quantity of such expected loads?

107. Today's order preliminarily finds that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections. We find that there may be a variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts associated with Network Upgrades triggered by large loads. To that end, we direct respondents to include information regarding potential structures for agreements between the transmission owner/provider and an Eligible Customer to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifts among transmission customers related to Network Upgrade costs required for large loads. Further, please include information on what an appropriate minimum level of cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would be under any such agreements.

108. Today's order preliminarily finds that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies. The order directs PJM to explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions that: (1) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies in transmission service request studies, using models that are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for advanced transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and (2) if traditional Network Upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load of a sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., would not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request. As noted above, to the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements beyond those contemplated here, we seek further briefing.

109. Today's order preliminarily finds that PJM's Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to seek generator interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving such loads. Any filings or tariff changes submitted in response to this order should address the following questions:

- a. To what extent would PJM allow an interconnection customer's generating facility serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to participate in PJM's energy and ancillary services market, and if PJM were to allow them to participate, what restrictions or mitigation would PJM apply?
- b. To the extent that PJM plans for the electrically proximate large load or large co-located load associated with an interconnection customer's generating facility for resource adequacy purposes, would PJM account for the generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load in the resource adequacy construct? If applicable, would PJM allow the generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to participate in PJM's capacity market? If so, would PJM accredit these generating facilities using the same method as other PJM generating facilities?

The Commission orders:

(A) Pursuant to the authority contained in and subject to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by section 402(a) of the Department of Energy Organization Act and by the FPA, particularly section 206 thereof, and pursuant to the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure and the regulations under the FPA (18 C.F.R. Chapter I), the Commission hereby institutes a proceeding in Docket No. EL26-67-000 as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) PJM and the Transmission Owners are hereby directed, within 60 days of the date of the order, either: (1) to show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; or (2) to explain what changes to the Tariff they believe would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff.

(C) PJM is directed to submit an informational report within 30 days of the date of issuance of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.

(D) Any interested person desiring to be heard in Docket No. EL26-67-000 must file a notice of intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate, with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), within 21 days of the date of issuance of this order. The Commission encourages electronic submission of interventions in lieu of paper using the "eFiling" link at <http://www.ferc.gov>. Persons unable to file electronically may file by U.S. mail addressed to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20426, or by hand (including courier) delivery to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, MD 20852.

(E) Interested entities may respond within 30 days of PJM's and the Transmission Owners' filing, addressing either or both of: (1) whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what changes to the Tariff should be implemented as a replacement rate.

(F) The Secretary shall promptly publish in the Federal Register a notice of the Commission's initiation of the proceeding under section 206 of the FPA in Docket No. EL26-67-000.

(G) The refund effective date in Docket No. EL26-67-000 pursuant to section 206 of the FPA shall be the date of publication in the Federal Register of the notice discussed in Ordering Paragraph (F) above.

By the Commission. Chairman Swett is concurring with a separate statement attached.
Commissioner Rosner is concurring with a separate statement

attached.

Commissioner See is concurring with a separate statement attached.

Commissioner Chang is concurring with a separate statement attached.

Commissioner LaCerte is concurring with a separate statement attached.

(S E A L)

Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Secretary.

Appendix - Commenters in Docket No. RM26-4-000

Advanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA)
Advanced Energy United (AEU)
Advancing Modern Powerlines Coalition (together with Working for Advanced
Transmission Technologies Coalition, WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines)
Advocates for Consumer Regulated Electricity
AES Corporation (AES)
AI Supply Chain Alliance
Alexandre Figueras, on behalf of Monza Tech
Alliance for Tribal Clean Energy
Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.
Amazon Energy LLC (Amazon)
America's Power
American Chemistry Council
American Clean Power Association
American Conservation Coalition
American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE)
American Electric Power Service Corporation²³⁸
American Public Gas Association
American Public Power Association (APPA)
American Terawatt, Inc. (American Terawatt)
American Transmission Company LLC²³⁹
Americans for a Clean Energy Grid
Antora Energy, Inc.
Arevia Power
Arizona Public Service Company
Arkansas Public Service Commission
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma

²³⁸ American Electric Power Service Corporation submitted comments on behalf of its affiliates Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company, Wheeling Power Company, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc., AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Oklahoma Transmission Company, Inc., and AEP Southwestern Transmission Company, Inc.

²³⁹ American Transmission Company LLC submitted comments on behalf of itself and its corporate manager ATC Management Inc.

Base Power Company, Inc (Base Power).
Bloom Energy Corporation
Buckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye)
Calibrant Energy Holdings, LLC (Calibrant)
California Department of Water Resources State Water Project (California DWR)
California Independent System Operator Corporation
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
Center for Biological Diversity
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Clean Energy Buyers Association (CEBA)
ClearPath, Inc. (ClearPath)
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (Constellation)
Consumer Energy Alliance
Consumers Energy Company
Critical Loop, Inc. (Critical Loop)
Crusoe Energy Systems, Inc. (Crusoe)
CTC Global Corporation
Data Center Coalition (DCC)
David Gardiner & Associates
Delaware Division of the Public Advocate (together with Pennsylvania Office of
Consumer Advocate, Joint Consumer Advocates)²⁴⁰
Digital Energy Council
Digital Power Network
Distributed Capacity Parties²⁴¹
Dr. Elisa Nelson
DTE Electric Company (DTE)
Duke Energy Corporation (Duke)
EDF Power Solutions, Inc. (EDF Power)
Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON)
Electricity Customers Alliance (ECA)
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA)
Emerald AI (Emerald)
Enchanted Rock, LLC
Energy New England, LLC

²⁴⁰ The Illinois Attorney General joined the Joint Consumer Advocates in filing reply comments.

²⁴¹ Distributed Capacity Parties include: Cloverleaf Infrastructure; Spark Community Investment d/b/a Sparkfund; and Voltus, Inc.

Energy Trading Institute
ENGIE North America, Inc. (ENGIE)
Entergy Services, LLC (Entergy)²⁴²
Environmental Law & Policy Center
Eolian L.P. (Eolian)
Equinix, Inc.
esVolta, LP
ETX Upstream, LLC
Eversource Energy²⁴³
Exelon Corporation (Exelon)²⁴⁴
Fervo Energy Company (Fervo)
FirstEnergy Service Company²⁴⁵
Fluence
Front Door Technologies LLC
FuelCell Energy, Inc.
Georgia Public Service Commission
Geronimo Power, LLC (Geronimo)
Google LLC (Google)
Governors Josh Shapiro and Glenn Youngkin
GridCARE
GridStor LLC (GridStor)
Harvard Electricity Law Initiative

²⁴² Entergy submitted comments on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies, which include Entergy Arkansas, LLC, Entergy Louisiana, LLC, Entergy Mississippi, LLC, Entergy New Orleans, LLC, and Entergy Texas, Inc.

²⁴³ Eversource Energy submitted comments on behalf of its affiliates The Connecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, and Public Service Company of New Hampshire, and through its agent Eversource Energy Service Company.

²⁴⁴ Exelon submitted comments on behalf of itself and its affiliates Atlantic City Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power and Light Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric Power Company.

²⁴⁵ FirstEnergy Service Company submitted comments on behalf of itself and its affiliates American Transmission Systems, Inc., Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company, The Potomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company, and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company.

Helion Energy (Helion)
 Herbert Schrayschuen
 Heron Power Electronics Company
 Indiana Energy Association
 Indicated PJM Transmission Owners (PJM TOs)²⁴⁶
 Industrial Customer Organizations (Industrial Customers)²⁴⁷
 Information Technology Industry Council
 Infrastructure Masons, Inc. (Infrastructure Masons)
 Institute for Progress
 International Energy Credit Association
 Invenergy²⁴⁸
 Iron Mountain Data Centers, LLC

²⁴⁶ PJM TOs include: AEP on behalf of Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company, Wheeling Power Company, AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc., and AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc.; AMP Transmission, LLC; City of Cleveland, Department of Public Utilities, Division of Cleveland Public Power; City of Hamilton, OH; Dominion Energy Services, Inc. on behalf of Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia; Duke Energy Corporation on behalf of its affiliates Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc., and Duke Energy Business Services LLC; Duquesne Light Company; East Kentucky Power Cooperative; Exelon Corporation, on behalf of Atlantic City Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power & Light Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric Power Company; FirstEnergy Service Company, as agent for its affiliates American Transmission Systems, Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company, The Potomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; Rockland Electric Company; Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.; UGI Utilities Inc; and Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.

²⁴⁷ Industrial Customers include: the Industrial Energy Consumers of America, the American Forest & Paper Association, the PJM Industrial Customer Coalition, and the Coalition of MISO Transmission Customers

²⁴⁸ Invenergy includes: Invenergy Wind Development North America LLC, Invenergy Solar Development North America LLC, and Invenergy Thermal Development Holdings LLC.

ISO New England, Inc.
ITC Holdings Corp. (ITC)
Jason Miller, on behalf of VEIR Inc.
Kansas Corporation Commission (Kansas Commission)
L. Lynne Kiesling
L.M. Marlowe
Land Trust Alliance
Large Public Power Council
Lauren Hopkins
LEAN Energy US
Load Flexibility Parties²⁴⁹
Long Island Power Authority
Longroad Energy Holdings, LLC (Longroad)
Louisiana Public Service Commission
LS Power Development, LLC (LS Power)
Maine Office of the Public Advocate
Maryland Energy Administration
Maryland Public Service Commission (Maryland Commission)
Maven Solutions
MCC Economics and Finance
Meta Platforms, Inc.
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel
Microsoft, Inc. (Microsoft)
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
MISO Transmission Owners (MISO TOs)²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Load Flexibility Parties include: Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC d/b/a CPower, Enel North America, Inc., and Voltus, Inc.

²⁵⁰ MISO TOs include: Ameren Services Company, as agent for Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois and Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois; American Transmission Company LLC; Big Rivers Electric Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Citizens Electric Corporation; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; Cooperative Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services, LLC for Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative; Entergy Arkansas, LLC; Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, LLC; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; Entergy Texas, Inc.; Great River Energy; GridLiance Heartland LLC; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power & Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana; Lafayette Utilities System; MidAmerican Energy Company; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC; Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, and Northern States Power Company, a Wisconsin

Mississippi Public Service Commission
Missouri Public Service Commission (Missouri Commission)
Monitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor for
PJM (PJM IMM)
Nathan Peterson
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
National Congress of American Indians
National Grid PLC (National Grid)²⁵¹
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)
Nebraska Power Review Board (Nebraska Board)
New England States Committee on Electricity
New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners
New England Consumer-Owned Systems²⁵²

corporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.; Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Prairie Power, Inc.; Republic Transmission, LLC; Southern Illinois Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a CenterPoint Energy Indiana South); Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc

²⁵¹ National Grid submitted comments behalf of its affiliates: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; New England Power Company; New England Electric Transmission Corporation; New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation; New England Hydro-Transmission Electric Company, Inc.; and Massachusetts Electric Company.

²⁵² New England Consumer-Owned Systems include: Belmont Municipal Light Department, Block Island Utility District, Braintree Electric Light Department, Concord Municipal Light Plant, Danvers Electric Division, Georgetown Municipal Light Department, Groveland Electric Light Department, Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant, Hudson Light & Power Department, Littleton Electric Light & Water Department, Merrimac Municipal Light Department, Middleborough Gas & Electric Department, Middleton Electric Light Department, North Attleborough Electric Department, Norwood Municipal Light Department, Clear River Electric & Water District, Rowley Municipal Lighting Plant, Stowe Electric Department, Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant, Town of Wallingford, Connecticut Department of Public Utilities Electric Division, Westfield Gas and Electric Light Department, and Mid-Coast Regional Redevelopment Authority.

New England Public Systems²⁵³
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (New Mexico Commission)
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
New York State Department of State Utility Intervention Unit (NY UIU)
New York Public Service Commission
New York State Reliability Council
New York Transmission Owners²⁵⁴
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
North Carolina Utilities Commission
North Carolina Utilities Commission Public Staff
North Dakota Public Service Commission
Northeastern Rural Electric Membership Corporation
NRG Energy, Inc.
Office of the Illinois Attorney General (Illinois AG)
Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC)
Oklahoma Corporation Commission
Oklo Inc. (Oklo)
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (ODEC)
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC
ON Energy Storage, Inc.
OpenAI Inc.
Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle)
Organization of MISO States, Inc. (OMS)
Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI)
Paces AI Inc.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Paige Lambermont, on behalf of Competitive Enterprise Institute
Paul Statchen
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pennsylvania Commission)
Pew Charitable Trusts Energy Modernization Project
PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM)

²⁵³ New England Public Systems include: Connecticut Municipal Electric Cooperative, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, and Vermont Public Power Supply Authority.

²⁵⁴ New York Transmission Owners include: Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., New York Power Authority, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (d/b/a National Grid), Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Long Island Power Authority, and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.

Power for Tomorrow
 PPL Corporation²⁵⁵
 Prime Mover Institute
 PSEG Companies (PSEG)²⁵⁶
 Public Citizen, Inc.
 Public Interest Organizations (PIOs)²⁵⁷
 Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's Office of the Federal Energy Advocate (Ohio
 FEA)
 R Street Institute (R Street)
 Rewiring America
 MCC Economics Ltd.
 RWE Clean Energy, LLC
 Sarah McKinley
 Shell Energy North America (US), L.P.
 Sierra Club
 SMA Solar Technology AG
 Solar Energy Industries Association
 South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff
 South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (South Dakota Commission)
 Southeast Public Interest Organizations (Southeast PIOs)²⁵⁸
 Southern California Edison Company (Southern California Edison)
 Southern Companies²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵ PPL Corporation submitted comments on behalf of the PPL Companies, which include PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, Louisville Gas & Electric Company and Kentucky Utilities, and The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a Rhode Island Energy.

²⁵⁶ PSEG Companies include: Public Service and Gas Company, PSEG Power LLC, and PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, which are each wholly-owned, direct or indirect subsidiaries of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated.

²⁵⁷ PIOs include: Clean Air Task Force, Inc., Coalition for Affordable Utility Services and Energy Efficiency in Pennsylvania, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense Fund, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sustainable FERC Project, Sierra Club, and Southern Environmental Law Center.

²⁵⁸ Southeast PIOs include: Southern Environmental Law Center, Appalachian Voices, North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy.

²⁵⁹ Southern Companies include: Georgia Power Company, Alabama Power Company, and Mississippi Power Company.

Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
Southwest Power Pool Transmission Owner Group²⁶⁰
Splight Inc. (Splight)
State Entities²⁶¹
Steel Manufacturers Association
Switch, Ltd. (Switch)
Talen Energy Corporation (Talen)
Terraflux LLC (Terraflux)
Tesla, Inc.
Texas Blockchain Council
Thermal Battery Alliance
Tract Holding Company I, LLC (Tract)
Transmission Access Policy Study Group (TAPS)
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State)
Travis Fisher, on behalf of Cato Institute
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Chamber of Commerce)
U.S. Energy Storage Coalition
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking
Members²⁶²
U.S. Representatives²⁶³
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

²⁶⁰ Southwest Power Pool Transmission Owner Group includes: American Electric Power Service Corporation, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri West, Inc., Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, and Xcel Energy Services Inc., on behalf of Southwestern Public Service Company.

²⁶¹ State Entities include: Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, the Arizona Attorney General's Office, the Colorado Attorney General's Office, the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, the Maryland Office of People's Counsel, the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, the Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection, the New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate, the Oregon Attorney General, and the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers.

²⁶² Submitted by Frank Pallone, Jr. (Ranking Member) and Kathy Castor (Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy).

²⁶³ The U.S. Representatives that submitted comments include: Suhas Subramanyam, John W. Mannion, Mike Quigley, and Donald S. Beyer Jr.

U.S. Senators²⁶⁴

U.S. Senator Jon Ossoff

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Vantage Data Centers (Vantage)

Verrus

Virginia State Corporation Commission (Virginia Commission)

Vistra Corp. (Vistra)

Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission

WIRES

Wisconsin Electric Company

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

²⁶⁴ The U.S. Senators that submitted comments include: Edward J. Markey, Chris Van Hollen, Elizabeth Warren, Peter Welch, Raphael Warnock, Richard Blumenthal, and Adam B. Schiff.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket No. EL26-67-000

AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc.
Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
American Transmission Systems, Incorporated
Appalachian Power Company
Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duquesne Light Company
Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC
Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Kentucky Power Company
Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company
Kingsport Power Company
Linden VFT, LLC
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC
Monongahela Power Company
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC
NextEra Energy Transmission MidAtlantic Indiana, Inc.
Ohio Power Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative
PECO Energy Company
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation
The Potomac Edison Company
Potomac Electric Power Company
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Rockland Electric Company

Silver Run Electric, LLC
Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company
Transource West Virginia, LLC
UGI Utilities, Inc.
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
Wheeling Power Company

(Issued June 18, 2026)

SWETT, Chairman, *concurring*:

1. Today, we take historic action to push our country’s electric markets and economy into the future—a future of fair cost allocation, unprecedented transparency for the American ratepayer, respect for states’ rights, efficient markets and speed to power. Last October, Secretary Wright articulated the monumental, generational and “urgent” challenge FERC must solve for our country when he directed us to develop “reforms to ensure the timely and orderly interconnection of large loads to the transmission system.”¹ I strongly agree. And now, through this suite of six orders, we deliver.

2. Simply put, the show cause orders the Commission issues today to each of the six electric markets subject to its jurisdiction find that the status quo across much of the country is not good enough.² Nowhere close. The record prompted by the Secretary’s ANOPR leaves no doubt that most of the markets (and their existing rules) are inherently slow and prohibitive of the dexterity necessary to adapt to and power societal evolution—whether brought about by technological innovation or sustaining the great industrial economy that anchors America.

3. I wholeheartedly, fully concur with these orders, which we carefully crafted to execute upon the problems the Secretary identified in a manner that is quick, efficient,

¹ Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System*, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); see Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 23, 2025) (Secretary’s Letter).

² *Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (*CAISO*); *ISO New Eng. Inc.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2026) (*ISO-NE*); *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2026) (*MISO*); *N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,216 (2026) (*NYISO*); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (*PJM*); *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2026) (*SPP*) (collectively, Orders to Show Cause).

and legally durable. I write separately to highlight certain considerations underlying the Commission's procedural approach to delivering on the ANOPR and to today's orders.

4. Based on my analysis of the extensive record and numerous ongoing substantive stakeholder interactions, I have determined that the most productive way to “build upon the[] principles”³ in the ANOPR and “work expeditiously”⁴ towards a solution is to issue individualized orders to show cause to each market.⁵ That is so for two main reasons.

5. First, the record the Commission collected in response to the challenges identified in the ANOPR and subsequent resulting developments indicate that an approach that honors the ANOPR principles but accounts for widening regional variation may now be more efficient than a one-size-fits-all rule.⁶ The world has changed a great deal since last October. The ANOPR itself, including the articulated principles, appears to have shifted the playing field and prompted great progress across several electric markets. This change (and the Commission's alignment with the Secretary) is well illustrated by a number of landmark orders approving several market new constructs that we issued since October, which together operationalize the Secretary's principles and laid groundwork for meaningful reform and today's actions.⁷ While working to develop those orders, the

³ Secretary's Letter at 2.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ See *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (“[A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. . . . [T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, *ad hoc* litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); *Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC*, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that the decision whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication lies within the broad discretion of the agency.”).

⁶ “[T]he Commission may rely on ‘generic’ or ‘general’ findings of a systemic problem to support imposition of an industry-wide solution.” *Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n of Am. v. FERC*, 285 F.3d 18, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). However, the Commission “has long allowed different regional transmission organizations to follow different rules, in recognition of regional variations including potential differences in ‘geographic size and location.’” *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC*, 138 F.4th 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted).

⁷ See *id.* P 2 & nn.6-11.

Commission has simultaneously devoted significant attention to evaluating the various procedural paths through which we might comprehensively deliver.

6. Individual show cause proceedings will allow the Commission to ensure that solutions to the problems the Secretary identified are tailored to the specific, varied circumstances and market constructs of each region. Indeed, a careful review of today's six orders reveals the many ways in which those orders are customized for each market's unique circumstances and progress (or lack thereof) towards serving large load. To name just a few examples, the orders recognize ongoing stakeholder processes in various regions and are adapted to existing tariff provisions concerning large and co-located loads; account for regional variances in allocating rights and responsibilities among RTOs/ISOs and the transmission owners; leave room for each market to tailor operational requirements for large loads that are particular to their region; and otherwise account for incumbent regional differences on topics such as cost allocation and cost transparency, study processes, and network upgrade procedures.

7. Proceeding via show cause proceedings will also allow the markets (and their respective transmission owners) to explain, in the first instance, how to address the Commission's concerns. These entities have the deepest understanding of their respective regions and are best positioned to implement solutions we identified, in the most expeditious manner. The Commission will promptly evaluate their responses to today's orders, and, with input from stakeholders, swiftly establish appropriate reforms.

8. Second, proceeding via individual show cause orders will allow the Commission to act more quickly than through traditional rulemaking. Notice-and-comment rulemaking may not capitalize upon individual market progress prompted since October and would be unduly time-consuming,⁸ as it also inevitably would require the additional steps of accommodating the regional variations of the approach we take today. Rulemaking efforts can be particularly inefficient when, as here, they risk incubating uncertainty after progress has begun, and diverting scarce stakeholder resources away from other endeavors, such as the development of market-specific reforms submitted to the Commission under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA). (To be clear, we very much encourage 205 submissions encapsulating the principles we articulate in the 206s, and with all due deliberate haste.)

9. Furthermore, rulemaking requires a lengthy series of steps before the proposed reforms would actually take effect—e.g., a NOPR, then a final rule, then potential orders on rehearing, and then a “compliance” process in which affected parties make filings (or, more likely, multiple rounds of filings) explaining how they intend to implement the rule.

⁸ See, e.g., Comments of Talen Energy Corporation, Docket No. RM26-4, at 5-6 (filed Nov. 21, 2025).

By their nature, these procedures take time. For example, the compliance process for the Commission's Order No. 2023⁹ (which matured out of an ANOPR issued in July 2021 and a NOPR issued in June 2022) still is not fully complete as of June 2026. The compliance process for Order No. 2222¹⁰ (NOPR issued in November 2016) could be considered completed in May 2026; however, even with that timing, not all of the RTO/ISOs have yet fully implemented their Commission-accepted market rules. I provide these examples not to suggest that the completion of a rulemaking process on the interconnection of large loads would take this long,¹¹ but rather to make clear the scope of the years-long delays in implementation that might be expected if the Commission elected to proceed via a NOPR. By contrast, we expect that individual show cause proceedings for each of the RTO/ISOs will enable the Commission to spearhead lasting reform much more expeditiously.

10. The six markets together cover nearly two-thirds of load subject to Commission-jurisdictional rates, and therefore focusing initially on those regions is a prudent first step. But I am under no illusion that the challenges discussed in today's orders are somehow unique to the RTO/ISO regions. Our actions today do not foreclose the possibility of a future rulemaking, and nor do they prevent us from acting on filings made under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. I encourage transmission providers and other stakeholders outside RTO/ISO regions to make individual filings to address the issues we discuss today.

11. FERC is no longer the sleepy, responsive agency of the past—our country cannot afford for it to be. This is a time for the best thinkers we have to collaborate on solving our biggest problems, and thus it is my great honor to deliver a solution that honors the Secretary's goals.

⁹ *Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements*, Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, *order on reh'g*, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, *errata notice*, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024).

¹⁰ *Participation of Distributed Energy Res. Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by Reg'l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators*, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2222-B, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021).

¹¹ I do not mean to suggest that the public utilities subject to compliance under these rulemakings—or the Commission itself—have been derelict. The time-consuming nature of the compliance process is a natural consequence of complex, nuanced efforts toward tariff reform. As Chairman, I will continue to evaluate Commission directives to ensure that obligations on regulated entities are not unduly burdensome and to make certain that Commission action during the compliance process is as timely as possible.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

Laura V. Swett
Chairman

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket No. EL26-67-000

AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc.
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Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
American Transmission Systems, Incorporated
Appalachian Power Company
Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duquesne Light Company
Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC
Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Kentucky Power Company
Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company
Kingsport Power Company
Linden VFT, LLC
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC
Monongahela Power Company
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC
NextEra Energy Transmission MidAtlantic Indiana, Inc.
Ohio Power Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative
PECO Energy Company
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation
The Potomac Edison Company
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Rockland Electric Company

Silver Run Electric, LLC
Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company
Transource West Virginia, LLC
UGI Utilities, Inc.
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
Wheeling Power Company

(Issued June 18, 2026)

ROSNER, Commissioner, *concurring*:

1. The electric industry is in the midst of changes not seen in a generation. Compared to more traditional load growth, the large loads seeking to connect to the grid today are larger, sometimes by orders of magnitude, and more concentrated. They also exhibit different operational characteristics, such as the ability to quickly change their energy consumption, sometimes in seconds. Often, these large loads seek to connect to the grid as quickly as possible. And because of these dynamics, large loads are rapidly driving the need for new transmission infrastructure and energy supply. This creates new challenges that, if unaddressed, could jeopardize the reliability and affordability of the grid on which we all depend.

2. Today, we are taking an important step toward addressing these challenges. We are opening a dialogue with each of the six RTO/ISOs on a series of reforms that are tailored to address the unique reliability and affordability challenges posed by large load growth and the infrastructure buildout needed to serve dramatically growing demand. Informed by the record developed in response to the Secretary of Energy's October 2025 ANOPR,¹ and by innovative proposals that stakeholders have filed with the Commission under FPA section 205, today's orders are aimed at ensuring that the grid remains reliable and affordable for *all* customers, especially residential customers. It is also crucial that we unlock the immense economic opportunity that once-in-a-generation growth represents. While each order's specific focus varies according to the progress that each RTO/ISO has made, our actions today fit broadly into four key pillars that, taken together, provide a foundation for durable reform. Today, we are: (1) Protecting Consumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering Innovation (*see Figure 1*). I write separately to explain how.

¹ U.S. Dep't of Energy, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, Direction that the Commission Initiate Rulemaking Procedures and Proposal Regarding the Interconnection of Large Loads Pursuant to the Secretary's Authority Under Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Oct. 23, 2025).

3. **Protecting Consumers:** Today’s orders include key protections that promote affordability. First, today’s orders require “Cost Recovery Agreements”, which are designed to ensure that large loads pay their fair share of the costs incurred to serve them, regardless of whether the large load comes online as planned. Thus, if new infrastructure is built to accommodate a data center, and that data center doesn’t show up, residential customers are not left on the hook to pay the costs. Cost Recovery Agreements prevent those costs from being shifted to residential customers. Depending on how they are structured, Cost Recovery Agreements can also address the potentially uneven pacing of new infrastructure costs, where grid upgrade costs may hit customer bills *before* the large load is fully online and energized. Data centers have committed to paying their own way.² Today, with “Cost Recovery Agreements,” we are taking steps to ensure that those commitments are honored. I note, however, that the door remains open to other creative, regionally-specific ideas to protect consumers. If there are other ways to accomplish that goal, I welcome those proposals.

4. Another win for consumers is requiring RTO/ISOs to consider grid enhancing technologies (GETs), including dynamic line ratings, when adding new large loads to the grid. GETs are technologies that squeeze more juice out of the existing grid, reducing the need for expensive upgrades and speeding up the time connect. Ensuring that RTO/ISOs consider GETs in the planning process—and if GETs are not used, explain why—not only helps new large loads get connected more quickly, but is also a commonsense step towards saving *all* consumers money. Put differently, today’s orders will help us understand if we are leaving efficiencies on the table, an outcome we cannot afford.

5. **Safeguarding Reliability:** Today’s orders safeguard reliability. They help ensure that RTO/ISOs use study procedures and operational requirements that reflect large loads’ unique characteristics and the reliability impacts of connecting them to the grid. Those novel characteristics and reliability impacts are well-documented, and it is not clear if existing study procedures or operational requirements account for them. Clear, comprehensive, and specifically tailored study procedures and operational requirements are needed, such as enhanced data reporting and telemetry to increase visibility into how these loads interact with the grid, and today’s orders represent progress towards this goal.

6. Finally, although not part of today’s orders, I want to highlight NERC’s ongoing efforts to establish registration criteria for large computational loads and to develop reliability standards.³ NERC’s goal is to finish the first phase of this critical work this

² See Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

³ NERC, *Large Loads Action Plan Q1 2026 Update* (Apr. 2026), <https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/initiatives/large-loads-action-plan/llap-quarterly->

year. It is essential that NERC meet this deadline. I encourage all stakeholders to participate in NERC's process.

7. **Enhancing Transparency:** Today's orders provide regulators—the Commission and, critically, our state partners—and customers with data on how connecting large loads to the grid affects bills. Today's orders embody a commonsense approach: if a Network Upgrade is built to connect a large load to the grid, consumers should know who that upgrade was built for and what it cost.

8. Transparency is important because “who pays?” has been and continues to be a fraught and contentious question for large load interconnection. Stakeholders, including state regulators and the ratepayers that they represent, must know the costs, for whom they are being incurred, and how they are being allocated, to know that everyone is paying their fair share. Today's orders ensure that this information is public, accessible, and clear. State regulators in more than half of the country have enacted large load tariffs.⁴ Our action today helps them as they continue their critically important work.

9. The Commission's action today also addresses speculative load interconnection requests, which clog up load interconnection queues, divert resources, and distort forecasts. Under current rules, data centers can (and are incentivized to) “shop around” their prospective projects with different utilities to identify the fastest and cheapest location to connect. This wastes time and resources studying projects that are not real. Worse yet, it can inflate expected load growth by modeling projects that do not materialize, leading to double counting, inaccurate market signals, and unnecessarily high prices for consumers. Today, we target speculative projects by establishing escalating readiness requirements for distinct phases of the study process to deter duplicative or speculative requests for transmission service. I strongly encourage RTO/ISOs to pursue other improvements to load forecasts, such as using objective screening criteria like physical site control, to ensure that the data used to plan the grid is as accurate as possible.⁵

update-q1-2026.pdf.

⁴ See, e.g., National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Supplemental Comments at 2-6; Edison Electric Institute Supplemental Comments at App. 9-13.

⁵ See Comm'r David Rosner, *Letter to the RTOs/ISOs on Large Load Forecasting* (Sept. 18, 2025), <https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/chairman-rosners-letter-rtosisos-large-load-forecasting>.

10. **Fostering Innovation:** As I have said, to meet the moment, “a business-as-usual approach . . . will not suffice.”⁶ Building new infrastructure is difficult and costly, which delays efforts to connect large loads to the grid quickly, reliably, and cost effectively. This is doubly true when generation and load are planned and studied separately. Today’s orders push beyond this status quo.

11. First, today’s orders promote flexible transmission services—that is, non-firm service to a co-located load that is willing and able to limit withdrawals from the grid—in every RTO/ISO (*see Figure 2*). As we explained when we first created these transmission services in PJM for co-located loads, customers willing to embrace flexibility can reduce the need for Network Upgrades and generating capacity to serve a co-located load, which speeds up connecting to the grid *and* reduces costs for the co-located load *as well as* other retail customers.

12. Second, today’s orders recognize that extending these same transmission services to large loads that are *not* co-located but that may also be willing to limit their withdrawals from the grid can unlock even more efficiency. Just as for co-located loads, legalizing flexible transmission service options for more large load customers can speed interconnection, avoid constructing unnecessary transmission upgrades, reduce strain on the grid, and make power bills cheaper for everyone.

13. Finally, today’s orders embrace yet another innovation. Load and generation need not be co-located to reduce the number of Network Upgrades; in other words, literal co-location is not the only way to facilitate faster, more efficient, and more cost-effective connections to the grid. Rather, where a large load and an associated generator are *electrically proximate* (i.e., close together) *and studied together*, the reliability impacts on the grid may be more limited than if the load and generator are studied separately. Just like with co-location, more limited impacts on the grid mean, all else equal, fewer Network Upgrades, which makes connecting to the grid faster, more efficient, and cheaper for both the large load *and the associated generator*. That last point is key. To add new supply to the grid, we must create incentives for “Bring Your Own *New* Generation.” Today’s orders make BYONG faster and more efficient.

14. SPP has been a leader in showing how to push beyond the status quo. With its innovative HILLGA proposal, approved by the Commission in January,⁷ SPP leveraged the opportunity for speed and efficiency by studying load and generation together, and by creating a limited, expedited interconnection service to connect faster. By matching the generator’s output to the electrically proximate large load’s demand, the impacts to the

⁶ *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2026), (Rosner, Comm’r, concurring) at P 3.

⁷ *See Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026).

grid are less than they otherwise would be, minimizing the need for time-consuming and costly Network Upgrades needed to connect. HILLGA is one solution that works for SPP, but today's orders direct other regions to follow SPP's lead in ways that work for them. Today's orders add a key tool by ensuring that all RTO/ISOs can study load and generation together.

15. The Commission's action today is an important step forward, but the Commission cannot accomplish this work alone. States are essential partners in this work. The Commission's actions here respect the long-standing jurisdictional line between federal and state authority provided by Congress and repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court. States retain exclusive jurisdiction to allocate the costs of FERC-jurisdictional transmission charges among their retail ratepayers, including co-located loads. States also hold the keys to energy infrastructure permits, so we rely on their decisions to ensure that needed transmission and generation get built. At a time when some large loads are retail customers that can consume as much energy as a small city, it is imperative that we work within our respective jurisdictions, but that we collaborate. I look forward to continued collaboration.

16. Today's orders *begin* an important dialogue with RTO/ISOs. As a potential next step, today's orders invite RTO/ISOs to respond by submitting proposals under FPA section 205. I cannot encourage this enough. I also encourage public utilities outside of RTO/ISOs across the country to do the same. The electric industry is rapidly evolving with regions experiencing and addressing these challenges in different ways. Many of the examples on which the actions in today's orders are based on stakeholders thinking creatively to develop solutions, and I welcome other new, innovative, and regionally tailored proposals that build on the four key pillars set forth today: (1) Protecting Consumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering Innovation. Only by working together can we rise to the occasion and meet this once-in-a-generation moment to deliver the reliable and affordable energy on which we all depend. It will not be easy, but I remain optimistic and look forward to the path ahead.


For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

David Rosner
Commissioner

Figure 1


Four Pillars – FERC’s Response to the Large Load ANOPR

Protect Consumers




- Prevent cost-shifting with mandatory contracts
- Reduce infrastructure costs with smarter studies
- Boost efficiency with Grid Enhancing Technologies

Enhance Transparency





- Provide transparency in transmission costs
- Improve load forecasting practices
- Increase disclosure of utility investments

Safeguard Reliability



- Establish new large load impact studies
- Accelerate interconnection for system stability
- Continue NERC standards development process

Foster Innovation




- Accelerate co-located and proximate loads
- Leverage advanced load flexibility
- Complete studies faster (60 to 90 days)



Figure 2

Large Load Interconnection: Transmission & Interconnection Service Innovation



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket No. EL26-67-000

AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc.
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Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duquesne Light Company
Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC
Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Kentucky Power Company
Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company
Kingsport Power Company
Linden VFT, LLC
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC
Monongahela Power Company
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC
NextEra Energy Transmission MidAtlantic Indiana, Inc.
Ohio Power Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Rockland Electric Company

Silver Run Electric, LLC
Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company
Transource West Virginia, LLC
UGI Utilities, Inc.
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
Wheeling Power Company

(Issued June 18, 2026)

SEE, Commissioner, *concurring*:

1. Growing electricity demand underscores America's economic strength and the opportunities that come with it. And with new opportunities come new challenges. The pace and scale of emerging large loads create new circumstances that require us to adapt in how we build and manage the grid. Large and flexible loads can materially change system operations, for instance, as well as near-term planning needs, upgrade requirements, and how we allocate costs. Most existing systems were not designed to accommodate those changes—especially not at the pace needed to support AI growth and advanced manufacturing that are central to America's economic competitiveness. As a result, uncertainty over the operative rules and delays in interconnecting large loads can undermine reliability and investment and add unacceptable and avoidable costs.
2. Today, the Commission takes strong action within our jurisdictional sweep to address these and other challenges that large load growth poses to the interstate transmission system. Today's orders support both just and reasonable rates and speed to (reliable) power. I'm deeply grateful for the many commenters who shared their insight and ideas in this action. They let us build a record that highlights the need for clearer processes, better information, and faster analysis while our country moves new large load additions online. As we press forward in these dockets, I will be looking to continue building on the momentum already underway across the country to craft more practical, region-specific solutions that support timely action while protecting consumers. Our continued ability to deliver reliable and affordable electricity requires nothing less.
3. Today's orders speak for themselves. I write separately to briefly highlight two principles baked throughout them and that I believe must remain central as the Commission evaluates further steps.
4. First, these issues extend beyond the Commission. Creating efficient, predictable large load interconnection processes is a joint and overlapping task for us, other federal agencies, the States, and the RTOs/ISOs and utilities. My animating principle here is that we must use FERC's statutory authority to bring clarity to the parts of this national issue we own, and to complement and aid others as they tackle theirs. The very procedure the

Commission deploys today reflects that goal: Recognizing the value in region-specific approaches, we are directing individual action in each of the RTO/ISO regions and encouraging—strongly—proposals under section 205 of the Federal Power Act from transmission providers or other entities that are molded to their unique system needs.

5. Most critically, exercising our authority fully without hamstringing our regulatory and industry partners means respecting the States. States make many of the key decisions that affect how we manage large loads. States bring indispensable expertise over local conditions, siting needs, retail structures, and the resource decisions within their borders. And they have been hard at work pursuing the retail implications and other State-specific concerns that large load interconnection presents.¹ All this effort flows from the States' statutorily preserved role in regulating the power system. Today's order understands that limit—our power “extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”² It also embraces the value in a statutory lens that views large load issues as an area of shared federal-State responsibility. As we require clear study and operational parameters for large load interconnection, we should remember that the nation's energy landscape is not monolithic. State and regional diversity is a strength, and today's orders know that the best solutions reflect differing system characteristics. Our action today is designed to support further State efforts in this urgent and fast-moving space, not override them.

6. Second, affordability must be at the forefront as we protect consumers from unnecessary costs in a time of rising demand. True, the Commission lacks authority over all the factors that drive electricity costs at the retail level. Today's orders recognize that. In response, the orders strive to aid the States in their front-line affordability duties by getting into their hands all relevant information about Commission-jurisdictional costs. As these matters move forward, I am particularly interested in continued feedback from the States on what information they most need to assess cost implications as new loads come online. Are the cost transparency measures we identify today sufficient, or are additional or more granular data needed for States to appropriately suballocate transmission costs among retail customers? Tools like alternative cost allocation structures, greater clarity in transmission service agreements, accounting for States' large-load-specific tariffs, and direct assignment in appropriate cases may help States ensure that retail consumers do not bear costs incommensurate with the benefits they receive.

¹ See EEI Supplemental Comments at Appendix 9 – 13 (listing pending and approved State large load tariffs).

² 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).

7. Moving to areas where the Commission has a more direct role in ensuring cost responsibility, we need to pull all the levers we have to keep rates fair and transparent. Today we reaffirm our responsibility to assign jurisdictional costs to the customers who drive or benefit from grid upgrades, not shift them onto families and small businesses. For instance, today's orders seek to reduce large-load driven network upgrade costs through alternative transmission technologies, or ATTs (also commonly called Grid Enhancing Technologies). In determining how best to meet the needs of this historic large load growth, technologies that can improve system capability faster than traditional upgrades and at lower costs deserve a hard look. ATTs may not be the best tool in every circumstance, but where they are they can support timely interconnections and avoid potentially tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in unnecessary network upgrade costs that would otherwise flow into transmission customers' bills.

8. So our approach today supports continuing the Commission's policy to roll most network upgrade costs—including those in the large load space—into the embedded-cost rate most transmission customers pay. But it includes an asterisk that this policy works for ratepayers only so long as we remain committed to pursuing technological innovations that keep those costs at a responsible and accountable level. Today's order thus calls for transmission providers to sufficiently evaluate ATTs to assess if and how they can meet large loads' interconnection needs. The answer may be yes or no in a given case. But if the transmission provider opts for traditional network upgrades, they must *demonstrate* why ATTs are not feasible or would not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for the large load interconnection customer. In short, the goal is to respect transmission providers' engineering judgments while protecting against upgrade costs when ATTs could solve transmission needs faster and with a lower bill.

9. I am also sensitive to novel questions about cost shifting that interconnecting large load may present. Today's findings on cost recovery agreements between transmission owners and Eligible Customers are an important step in mitigating the risks of stranded assets if large loads prove speculative. We are also reducing unnecessary redundancy by allowing an Eligible Customer to meet its financial security requirements by relying on credit support or other financial security a large load customer may have posted under a retail agreement. As we gain more experience studying transmission service requests on behalf of large loads, it may become appropriate to further streamline financial security arrangements. Perhaps, for instance, cost -recovery agreements between a transmission owner and a large load customer itself could satisfy an Eligible Customer's financial security requirements. As we move forward, I'll be looking to ensure cost-recovery agreements contain fair and transparent measures to ensure the right costs get on the right bills. (Relatedly, the discussion about the full nature of transmission-related charges in our concurrent PJM Order on Rehearing, Clarification, Compliance, and Paper Hearing³

³ *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2026).

may prove relevant here: Real-world experience with new transmission services for co-located load may clarify if future action becomes needed to address potential cost shifts as Eligible Customers take new transmission services on behalf of large loads.⁴)

10. More generally, as we gain more experience as an industry and a country in getting large loads connected to the grid, I welcome bold proposals to keep affordability central. Large load growth presents a real opportunity to build a stronger, more capable, and more reliable electric system that can benefit all ratepayers. Meeting that opportunity at the pace we need and at an acceptable cost requires innovative thinking and fast action. I commend the States in their continued work in these areas. I urge the RTOs and ISOs to continue their good work as they respond quickly to today's orders. I also remain committed to moving forward within the Commission's statutory zone with clarity and decisiveness. I am proud to support the Commission's important steps today. And we all have more work ahead.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.



Lindsay S. See
Commissioner

⁴ See *id.* P 456.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

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(Issued June 18, 2026)

CHANG, Commissioner, *concurring*:

1. In a series of orders today, the Commission initiates separate proceedings under Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206 to explore the impact of the increasing growth of large loads in Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and Independent System Operator (ISO) regions. The preliminary findings in these orders, and the associated proposed reforms to RTO/ISO and transmission owner tariffs, could significantly change how loads procure, use, and pay for transmission service, with ramifications for RTO/ISO operations, planning, and markets. I write separately to emphasize the importance of building actionable records in these proceedings, particularly with respect to our consideration of customer protection, transmission service, and alternative transmission technology reforms.

I. Overview of Today's Orders

2. In each of today's orders to show cause, the Commission identifies a series of issues raised by the ongoing growth of large loads, directs briefing on whether existing tariffs remain just and reasonable in light of those developments, and describes possible solutions to those issues if the Commission ultimately concludes that the relevant tariffs are unjust and unreasonable. Each order is directed to a specific RTO/ISO and relevant transmission owners that play a role in interconnecting large loads to the Commission-jurisdictional transmission system. The Commission does not pursue the broad assertion of jurisdictional authority contemplated in the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which I hope assuages concerns raised by our state colleagues that the Commission ought not encroach upon matters properly left to their jurisdiction.¹

¹ I will do my part to ensure that the Commission continues to be a collaborative partner to our state counterparts, other federal agencies, and the industry as we seek to address this wide-ranging challenge. Accordingly, I welcome feedback from our state colleagues and others if they believe the Commission's preliminary findings raise jurisdictional concerns.

3. Broadly summarized, each order seeks regional input on a specific list of issues: (1) the clarity and consistency of existing rules governing how each RTO/ISO and its relevant transmission owners analyze the impact of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads; (2) whether each RTO/ISO tariff requires reforms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among wholesale transmission customers; (3) whether each RTO/ISO tariff (other than PJM) requires additional clarity regarding the provisions addressing co-located generation and load arrangements; (4) the potential extension of new firm and non-firm transmission services to co-located load, load with behind the meter generation, and other flexible loads; and (5) the need for reforms, modeled on Southwest Power Pool, Inc.'s High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment concept, to facilitate a process through which a generator may temporarily serve a co-located or electrically proximate load until interconnection and transmission service is available. The Commission also invites each region to submit FPA section 205 filings that can address each issue identified in the orders, thereby resolving the Commission's concerns.

II. The Commission Needs Good Records to Ensure Reasoned Decision-Making

4. I first want to emphasize that the Commission needs active participation from interested stakeholders to develop thorough records in each region. The Commission cannot make reasoned decisions about whether reforms might be needed without an accurate understanding of the existing processes, which differ by region. Because the Commission is acting via FPA section 206 rather than generically through a rulemaking, the issues addressed by these orders will be subject to *ex parte* restrictions across the RTOs/ISO regions, including with our state colleagues whose regulation can and will directly affect the individual transmission owners that need to comply with the orders issued today. This will limit the Commission's ability to engage in informal fact-finding and discussions with regional stakeholders, and thus, it is even more essential that the record in each region fully reflects the views of all interested parties.

5. Second, I highlight three issues below that will be especially important to the success of this effort, and I hope that interested parties will take particular care in helping the Commission address those issues. Importantly, I recognize that the record established in each RTO/ISO region will (and should) differ, which will allow the Commission to ensure any required changes to an RTO/ISO's tariff are appropriately tailored to that region's needs.

III. The Commission Needs to Pursue Meaningful Customer Protection

6. The FPA is fundamentally a customer protection statute,² and the Commission has an obligation to ensure that the rates that wholesale and transmission customers pay are

² See, e.g., *Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC*, 450 F.2d 1341,

just and reasonable. Rapid large load growth has strained planning and resource procurement processes around the country, as transmission owners, load serving entities, and generators accelerate the building of new infrastructure needed to serve these new loads. As we develop the new infrastructure, many have raised concerns about whether these costs are being fairly assigned to new and existing customers, whose benefits must be commensurate with the costs they pay. While individual states have been exploring or using various approaches to protect *retail* customers against unjustified cost shifts, the Commission to date has not initiated any proactive exploration of how to protect *wholesale* customers against unjustified cost shifts. I am laser-focused on this issue because we should not create unjustified costs for consumers in our efforts to connect and serve large loads.

7. In today's orders, the Commission launches an inquiry into whether existing RTO/ISO tariffs include adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of undue cost shifting among transmission customers. To address this risk, the Commission preliminarily identifies a two-part solution: (1) that each RTO/ISO post public information about the amount of new large loads seeking to connect to the RTO's/ISO's transmission system, any Network Upgrades identified in the local transmission planning process to serve those loads, and the costs of those Network Upgrades; and (2) that each RTO/ISO adopt a *pro forma* cost recovery agreement to help ensure that Eligible Customers serving large loads bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service. I strongly support this effort to provide additional transparency regarding jurisdictional transmission service requests and the costs associated with providing transmission service to the requesting parties, as the Commission cannot effectively execute its statutory responsibilities without sufficient understanding of the costs that feed into jurisdictional rates.

8. Exploring how agreements between transmission owners and Eligible Customers can protect *wholesale* customers against cost shifts is important. However, as I have previously explained, bilateral agreements that simply provide transmission revenue contributions untethered from any assessment of the actual cost of providing transmission service induced by individual large loads may be insufficient to adequately protect other customers against unjustified cost shifts.³ It is therefore important that the resulting regulatory and rate design are not limited to a pre-defined solution set, and that parties provide the Commission with comprehensive records outlining various and innovative

1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the FPA's "primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and charges").

³ *E.g.*, *PECO Energy Co.*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2025) (Comm'r Chang, *concurring*); *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2026) (Comm'r Chang, *concurring*).

approaches to protect customers. I am encouraged by the continued development of the ANOPR record on this subject,⁴ innovative solutions being developed at the state level,⁵ and a growing body of thoughtful analyses and proposed approaches to provide customer protection for costs driven by large load growth.⁶ Without prejudging any particular proposed solution, the Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region to ensure we establish the right cost shift protections for wholesale customers, including but not limited to the commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.⁷

9. I support initiating our own review of customer protection approaches, rather than simply relying on voluntary commitments that may fall short of optimal protection, because the Commission has the opportunity and obligation to get this issue right. I therefore encourage interested parties to assist the Commission in that effort by clearly and comprehensively explaining the benefits and tradeoffs of alternative customer protection approaches. How power infrastructure costs will be assigned across Eligible Customers that serve large loads and other customers is at the core of the efforts we initiate today.

IV. The Commission Needs to Understand the Implications of Extending New Transmission Services to Additional Loads and Regions

10. The orders also preliminarily find that the Commission should extend the transmission services developed in the PJM co-location proceeding – Interim NITS, Firm Contract Demand, and Non-Firm Contract Demand – to new types of load and new

⁴ *E.g.*, *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Trans. Sys.*, Supplemental Comments of FirstEnergy Svc. Co., Docket No. RM26-4-000 (filed June 5, 2026); *id.*, Comment of the Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Apr. 15, 2026); *id.*, Supplemental Comments of WIRES, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Mar. 30, 2026).

⁵ *E.g.*, Utility Dive, *Microsoft seeks Nevada tariff to shield ratepayers from data center costs* (June 8, 2026), available at <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/microsoft-seeks-nevada-tariff-to-shield-ratepayers-from-data-center-costs/822250/>.

⁶ *E.g.*, Travis Kavulla, *How Will Data Centers Pay for Power?*, American Affairs (May 2026), available at <https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2026/05/how-will-data-centers-pay-for-power/>; Electricity Customer Alliance, *A Customer-Centric Agenda for the Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n* (Jan. 2026), available at <https://lnkd.in/em-apfuQ>; Grid Strategies, *Federal Transmission Pricing Vol. 2, Options for Ensuring Affordability in an Era of High Load Growth* (June 2026), available at <https://gridstrategiesllc.com/project/federal-transmission-pricing>.

⁷ Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

regions. These new transmission services represent a fundamental paradigm shift from the traditional network service and point-to-point transmission service models established in Order No. 888 that have been used across the country for the last three decades. While these services have the potential to facilitate more efficient use and build out of the transmission system, they also contemplate running the system “tighter” than we have done in the past, potentially with more loads on the system served by co-located or behind-the-meter generation, and potentially more use of batteries, load control systems, and backup resources to manage demand during system peaks or other stressed conditions. While it is important to identify innovative solutions that can adapt to the needs of the system, the Commission and grid operators must also be careful not to implement changes that create unforeseen reliability risks. Ultimately, we must find the proper balance (and I would argue we are exploring a *new* balance) between costs of investments versus reliability.

11. The Commission’s experience in the PJM co-location proceeding highlights the complexities and challenges of introducing these new transmission services, which have significant ramifications for system operations, transmission planning, grid reliability, market dispatch, resource adequacy, and cost allocation. As the Commission considers whether to expand these transmission services to new types of load and new regions, I encourage commenters to address what impacts the introduction of new firm and non-firm transmission products would have in their regions, as well as any relevant characteristics that might distinguish their regions from the Commission’s findings in the PJM co-location docket. Ultimately, this topic will have direct long-term impacts on how future transmission systems will be planned and configured, how efficiently future power markets will operate, and how customers will respond to prices and system needs. Therefore, I am specifically interested in understanding how extending the new transmission services might affect individual suppliers or customers, as well as how existing systems or processes might be affected by these new services. I am open to understanding how these services might be helpful to a region or that they may create problems not yet anticipated.

V. The Orders Recognize the Importance of Evaluating Advanced Transmission Technologies

12. Lastly, today we preliminarily find that each RTO/ISO’s tariff is unjust and unreasonable because the tariff lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies as potential solutions to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load. Specifically, it is important for RTO/ISOs and transmission owners to evaluate whether alternative transmission technologies are feasible in reducing the cost of transmission system upgrades or allow for a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request. As many transmission owners have explored various alternative

technologies in pilot projects,⁸ it is time to roll out all available technologies to reduce risks and costs for customers, as well as help the industry continue to develop new technologies that can increase the robustness of our transmission system while protecting customers from higher costs.

VI. Conclusion

13. Today's orders address some of the most consequential issues currently in the industry and before the Commission. I hope that these proceedings provide vehicles through which the Commission can provide much-needed clarity and direction, and it is imperative that we build strong and comprehensive records on each issue in each region to inform our decision-making. I therefore encourage all interested parties to fully engage and help the Commission navigate these complex, multi-faceted challenges. Our success will ultimately be measured by our shared ability to deliver reliable and affordable power to all customers, to ensure new loads can interconnect in a timely fashion while paying their fair share of system costs, and to protect existing customers against adverse reliability or economic impacts.

⁸ See, e.g., *Increasing Mkt. and Planning Efficiency Through Improved Software, Effective Congestion Mitigation with Transmission Topology Optimization at Alliant Energy and ATC*, Docket No. AD10-12-016, *available at* <https://www.ferc.gov/media/effective-congestion-mitigation-transmission-topology-optimization-alliant-energy-and-atc> (Alliant and ATC were able to save customers approximately \$24 million over a 12-month period through the use of topology optimization); Pablo Ruiz and Derek Brown, "Reliable and Efficient Congestion Mitigation Using Transmission Reconfigurations," NewGrid and Evergy presentation (Oct. 2022), *available at* <https://www.spp.org/Documents/67968/SAG%20Meeting%20Materials%2020221007.zip> (identifying reconfigurations, had they been implemented, which could eliminate 98% of overloads and reduce congestion costs by 85% for congestion patterns associated with 10 significant constraints on Evergy's system); Pacific Gas & Electric Press Release, *PG&E and Smart Wires Enhance Grid Reliability, Capacity for Data Centers in San Jose* (May 28, 2025), *available at* <https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-details/2025/PGE-and-Smart-Wires-Enhance-Grid-Reliability-Capacity-for-Data-Centers-in-San-Jose/default.aspx> (describing PG&E's deployment of advanced power flow control devices were able to mitigate thermal overloads by up to 34%, enabling an additional 100 MW of firm power delivery over existing lines at a congested substation).

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Judy Chang", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Judy W. Chang
Commissioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket No. EL26-67-000

AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc.
AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc.
Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
American Transmission Systems, Incorporated
Appalachian Power Company
Atlantic City Electric Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duquesne Light Company
Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC
Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Kentucky Power Company
Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company
Kingsport Power Company
Linden VFT, LLC
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC
Monongahela Power Company
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC
NextEra Energy Transmission MidAtlantic Indiana, Inc.
Ohio Power Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative
PECO Energy Company
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation
The Potomac Edison Company
Potomac Electric Power Company
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Rockland Electric Company
Silver Run Electric, LLC

Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company
Transource West Virginia, LLC
UGI Utilities, Inc.
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
Wheeling Power Company

(Issued June 18, 2026)

LACERTE, Commissioner, *concurring*:

1. I support today's fleet of show cause orders. We are at an inflection point in the history of American energy infrastructure. The extraordinary and rapid growth of large loads in RTOs and ISOs is faster than the current system can handle. This order charts a course for addressing the potential gaps and shortcomings in PJM's Tariff that need to be resolved to appropriately respond to this growth, as informed by careful review of the thousands of pages of comments received in response to the advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR).¹ I write separately to underscore my expectation for RTOs and ISOs, including PJM, to timely submit their robust, thoughtful, and region-specific proposals to address the concerns that we have preliminarily identified in their respective tariffs and agreements. By harnessing your region-specific expertise and creativity to bring tailored solutions to the table, together we can efficiently, reliably, and affordably integrate large load, co-located load and generation and/or storage, as well as electrically proximate large load onto the transmission system. I also support the use of alternative transmission technologies to unlock every megawatt of existing capacity from our current transmission system. We have the technology. We should use it now to enable faster interconnection of large loads, lower costs to customers, and help prevent cost shifting.

2. To that end, and in light of our action in today's orders, I also ask the state public utility commissions—whether they have already approved large load retail tariffs, are in the process of crafting large load retail tariffs, or have yet to embark on this essential tariff design process—to take a hard look and ensure their large load retail tariff provisions insulate ratepayers from the negative impacts of data center growth. Additionally, I expect PJM to design proposals in response to this show cause order that dovetail with the efforts on the retail side to implement the Ratepayer Protection Pledge,

¹ *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System*, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000, (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); *see also* Letter from Chris Wright, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Energy (Oct. 23, 2025) (Secretary's Letter).

protect customers, and ensure that large loads cover the costs they incur to integrate with the grid.

3. The stakes here could not be higher and every gambler knows that the secret to surviving is knowing what to throw away and knowing what to keep.² Today's orders do exactly that—adopting thoughtful proposals that position our nation for success, driving meaningful change, and rejecting the gridlock, half-measures, and failure to plan that have gone on for far too long. The data center odyssey that we embarked upon first with PJM, then SPP, we now aggressively extend to all the RTO/ISO regions.³ Enabling the swift and efficient interconnection of large loads to the transmission system while maintaining affordability, reliability, commitment to open access, competitive principles and cooperative federalism, will only be achieved through consistent, coordinated action and persistence. But without that first step,⁴ there is no direction, no forward momentum, no journey, and no way to arrive at our future destination. In the show cause orders we issue today, the Commission takes a series of long strides towards our ultimate large load interconnection destination: we make preliminary findings that the RTO/ISO tariffs, including PJM may be unjust and unreasonable and/or unduly discriminatory or preferential because they lack features necessary to timely, reliably, and safely interconnect and serve new large loads in a way that produces just and reasonable rates.

4. I commend each commentor for their robust and ongoing responses to the concerns that Secretary Wright and the Commission raised in the ANOPR proceeding. The comments helped us identify the common issues, common solutions, and individual differences among the RTOs/ISOs. We heard a plea for broad flexibility and regionally tailored solutions. And we will strive to work towards those solutions, not through top-down, one-size-fits-all mandates, but through consideration of region-specific proposals. And we endeavor to support an appeal for federal policies that build upon rather than disrupt current and planned developments, reflecting state and local processes and stakeholder efforts. Through these individually tailored and region-specific show cause orders, we are delivering to ensure that our transmission system can accommodate new large loads in a timely, safe, and reliable manner. And, importantly, in a manner that

² Kenny Rogers, *The Gambler* (United Artists Records 1978).

³ *Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System*, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045 at P 2 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act) (citing PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; *Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026); *Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); *Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025)).

⁴ Admittedly, we are further down the road in some regions as compared with others.

ensures benefits and protection for all customers. Affordability remains a top concern as we proceed forward.

5. The collective voices in the ANOPR comments have shaped our decision to issue six separate individually tailored and region-specific show cause orders, rather than a proposed final rule *at this time*. But the success of the next phase of this journey rests with you, PJM, and your stakeholders. We are directing you to expeditiously bring forward for our consideration your novel, region-specific solution(s). Time is of the essence. By inviting you to proceed under FPA section 205, we are giving you significant perks: the benefits of first wielder of the pen and the relatively capacious standard under FPA section 205 that allows us to accept a potentially broad range of proposals provided they are shown to be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.⁵ We are even giving you flexibility to propose the implementation date for your innovative proposals. But such freedom comes with great and concomitant responsibility.

6. This is not a time to be cavalier and dodge the urgent need to meet the moment. While this is a long journey, even so, we must continue to move at breakneck pace to win the AI race. So let me be direct. If you choose not to submit timely, reasonable, non-discriminatory or preferential, comprehensive, and substantiated proposal(s), as directed and as required under our applicable statutes, your deficient response will not go unnoticed. I am prepared to play jurisdictional hardball, if needed.⁶ This Commission has appropriately exercised considerable restraint in asserting the full scope of our jurisdiction in these orders. However, the Commission has very broad jurisdiction over transmission that we will not hesitate to utilize as necessary to ensure that we meet our objectives in all show cause proceedings, including this PJM proceeding we initiate here. If we find your Tariff is in fact unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory or

⁵ See, e.g., *NRG Power Mktg, LLC v. FERC*, 862 FERC 108, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (FERC may not employ a rate design that follows “a completely different strategy” than, or is “methodologically distinct” from, a proposed rate) (internal quotations omitted); *Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC*, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a proposal under FPA section 205 “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most accurate”); *City of Winnfield v. FERC*, 744 F.2d 871, at 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (comparing the respective authorities of the Commission and public utilities under sections 205 and 206).

⁶ 16 U.S.C. § 824(b); *New York v. FERC*, 535 U.S. 17 (2002) (“There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s *transmission* jurisdiction to the wholesale market[.]”) (emphasis in original); *id.* at 20 (stating that “the FPA authorizes FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer[.]”).

preferential, any failure on your end to provide a sufficient FPA filing or filings to address the large-load-related concerns that we have identified will result in the Commission dictating the solutions for you. I say this not as a threat, but as a statement of duty. While you may not like our remedies—I have often said that the federal government generally does not come up with the best solutions—this is an outcome we are prepared to pursue given the gravity of the moment and our statutory obligation. Notwithstanding our readiness to step in, it greatly benefits everyone for you to come up with an approach tailored to your region.

7. I will end my concurrence where I began: We have heard your concerns, and, let me underscore, now is the time for you to heed ours. This is an extraordinarily consequential proceeding. The stakes for reliability, for affordability, and for the American ratepayer could not be higher. We owe it to the public to get this right. I look forward to reviewing and acting as expeditiously as possible on your responses to this show cause order, which I expect will include an FPA section 205 proposal or proposals.

8. For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

David LaCerte
Commissioner