

PJM Capacity Market Workshop Session #3:

Forward Clean Energy Market

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State clean-electricity standards <u>are</u> U.S. climate policy



- 30 states have a binding renewable portfolio standard that legally oblige (some part of) the power business to (buy or sell) a certain percentage of their electricity from qualifying, usually zero-carbon resources.
 - In PJM, 11 of the 14 jurisdictions and many cities/municipalities have set goals or standards
- We observe that goals are accelerating in many regions
- In-state preferences and technology carve-outs have resulted in an increasingly inefficient patchwork of policies

Where are our efforts focused in today's discussion?



MOPR

market needs to accommodate state resource decisions without causing the risk of double procurement for load.

Auctions for Policy Resources

Given several state programs driving toward decarbonization and customer preferences, can PJM run auctions for state-mandated and consumer-preferred clean capacity?

Capacity Procurement Levels

PJM has high reserve margins. Is there a way to achieve desired reliability more efficiently over time?

Additional Reliability Attribute Products

With anticipated increase in penetration of intermittent resources, are there additional reliability attributes that need to be procured?

MOPR

most urgent issue

Clean Capacity Auctions
in parallel but could take longer

Over-Procurement Issues existing forums Quadrennial Review, PC, LAS

Reliability Attribute Products

longer-term issue given current intermittent penetration

A Market-Based Model: Forward Clean Energy Market



Forward Clean Energy Market



- This concept grew out of the ISO-NE's "Integrating Markets & Public Policy" (IMAPP) process
- Adapted and further defined by Brattle Group for NRG
- Evolution and variations continue with ICCM
- A good idea whose time has come?



https://www.brattle.com/news-andknowledge/publications/how-states-citiesand-customers-can-harness-competitivemarkets-to-meet-ambitious-carbon-goalsthrough-a-forward-market-for-cleanenergy-attributes-expanded-report

Decarbonizing via a growing trade in clean energy



- A Forward Clean Energy Market is a trade in Clean Energy Attribute Credits ("CEAC")
 - 3-year forward annual auction
 - Uniform product definition where 1 unit = 1 MWh of production of clean energy
 - Can be enhanced by making them "dynamic," tied to the marginal emissions prevailing during the time of a CEAC's creation
- Demand bid expressed by a volume-and-price bid, anchored around:
 - the state's clean-energy procurement requirement and
 - the state's reference price
 - e.g., social cost of carbon or a legislative price cap, etc.
- Multiple states' participation + voluntary actors (cities & customers) allow for the market to scale up.

Policy Benefits of a FCEM



- RTO-operated, state demand-determined design can...
 - Address existing conflict among state goals and wholesale markets
 - Achieve and exceed state goals
 - Maintain compatibility among jurisdictional matters
- Direct line of sight to new clean energy investment to meet statutory goals
 - Achieve faster and cheaper decarbonization than alternatives through sloped demand curve + banking provisions prior to binding compliance requirement
- Less risk for consumers vs. long-term, ad hoc contracting

Policy Benefits of a FCEM (cont.)



- Strength in numbers distribution of risk to many buyers/sellers; avoids lumpiness.
 - State policies less dependent on individual project non-performance; projects not as subject to counterparty bankruptcy
 - Easier platform for smaller buyers (e.g., munis and/or corporations) from which to buy
- A more level playing field between existing and new resources who provide the same product (e.g., zero-carbon energy)
- Sends a stronger signal to developers to site projects where energy & capacity are most valuable

Questions?




Appendix



Auction Timing



- An annual auction, 3 years forward
 - Spot auction before compliance period to allow trade for residuals
 - Banking permitted to encourage early adoption/smoother pricing/project formation
 - Borrows from (and complementary with) existing capacity auctions




• 7-year "price lock" for new resources

Clearing the Market



Different buyers all have a different willingness to pay.


 A central market accommodates these and ensures that those willing to pay more are not simply paying more for less—but getting more because of that willingness to pay.



Source: Spees, et al. "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.

Illustrative sloped demand curve & reference price






Source: Spees, et al. "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.

Source: Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (updated 2016, revd for 2019 real dollars).

Cleaner, Faster, Cheaper






Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.

One (complicating but positive) enhancement





Source: Spees, et al. "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.