IMM Reserve Market Proposal

MRC January 24, 2019 Joe Bowring Catherine Tyler



Consolidated Synchronized Reserve Market

- PJM and IMM share most aspects of the proposal to consolidate the synchronized reserve market.
- Strong must offer requirement enforced by PJM
 - IMM also includes must offer penalty
- Lower offer margin for cost-based reserve offers
 - IMM eliminates the offer margin altogether
- Penalties for nonperformance during reserve events
 - IMM penalty is stronger than status quo PJM penalty

IMM ORDC Proposal

- Simple ORDC: vertical demand with penalty factor
 - Consistent with precedent of other RTOs
 - Used for both synchronized and primary reserve
- No sloped curve, no extension beyond MRR
- Identical curves in day ahead market
- Max price equal to energy offer cap
 - \$1,000 per MWh, unless PJM has approved a higher costbased offer, per FERC rules
 - Increases at \$250 per MWh increments with higher approved cost-based offers, up to \$2,000 per MWh


Operator Actions


- Operators may increase the minimum reserve requirements under predefined conditions.
 - Change in the largest contingency (Synch., Primary)
 - Extreme weather (Synchronized, Primary)
 - Gas contingencies (Secondary)
- The increased requirements will have defined start and end times.
- PJM will post on its website:
 - The active minimum reserve requirements
 - The reason for any increased reserve requirements
 - The beginning and end times for the increased reserve Monitoring Analytics

Secondary (30 Minute) Reserves

- Eliminate Day Ahead Schedule Reserves
- Default requirement is zero
 - Consistent with no NERC requirement
- Secondary reserves may be created with an ORDC based on a PJM defined contingency
 - such as a gas contingency
 - defined under the operator actions provisions for increasing a minimum reserve requirement
- Penalty factor is \$1,000 to \$2,000 per MWh, as with synchronized and primary reserves.

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Reserve Subzones

- Additive reserve prices across products and zones, without a cap
- The IMM recommends multiple subzones, but PJM says it cannot model multiple subzones.
- The IMM proposal includes only one subzone.
- If PJM cannot model multiple subzones, it should not use a subzone for secondary reserves.
 - Secondary reserves only RTO wide

Scarcity Revenue True Up Mechanism

- IMM proposed true up mechanism returns energy market scarcity rents to customers during the four transition years.
- The true up mechanism continues until adequate capacity market changes
 - VRR curve capped at Net CONE
 - Forward looking E&AS offset
- True up delivery year capacity payments by scarcity rents calculated for the reference CT using actual delivery year energy prices to determine the accurate E&AS offset.

Settlement Rule Preventing Double Payment

- The IMM proposes a new settlement rule that a resource cannot receive payment for reserve MW in excess of its applicable economic maximum output limit for the dispatch interval.
- Pay the full value for metered energy produced, but would cap the settlement of reserve MW so that payment does not exceed the resource's stated capability.

 $Metered\ Energy\ MW + Reserve\ MW \leq Eco.\ Max.$

One Energy and Reserves Uplift Payment

- Market incentives do not require a five minute negative balancing reserve uplift payment.
- The IMM proposes one daily uplift calculation that prevents resources that follow dispatch from operating at a loss without creating overcompensation.
- The calculation should include costs and revenues in all short term markets (energy, regulation, reserves).
- Incorporating reserves in the existing Balancing Operating Reserve Credit accomplishes this.

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