Current Tariff queue entry cost structure is ineffective at incentivizing New Service Customers to enter earlier in queue window

Problem / Opportunity Statement
In 2009, PJM Tariff’s queue entry cost structure was modified to incentivize customers to make queue requests earlier in the queue window. Data show that despite increased cost requirement in the final queue month, PJM still receives about half of all queue submittals in the last month and about 1/3 of queue requests in the final days of the queue receipt window.

Why this warrants consideration in the PJM stakeholder process
The following are impacts of such a large influx of requests being received at the end of the queue:

- per Tariff section 36.1.5, in the last month of the queue, TOs, New Service Customers, and PJM have the least amount of time to process these requests and hold scoping meetings;
- PJM experiences a high rate of deficiencies with these late requests; and
- deficiency clearing time leads plus scheduling the large number of scoping meetings leads to delays in model building and the commencement of Feasibility Study analyses.

Document if the new work is to address specific technical issues and/or to address broader policy issues
There is no specific technical issue proposed by this new work. The new work would address broader policy issues to incentivize earlier queue submittals.

Include any outcomes that have occurred to-date as a result of the issue
Large volumes of queue submittals continue to be made at the end of the queue window. PJM’s Tariff provides the least amount of time for PJM to identify and for New Service Customers to clear deficiencies. TOs, New Service Customers, and PJM all have least amount of time to schedule and hold scoping meetings for a large number of requests.

Include potential additional consequences if no action is taken
Feasibility Study analyses start can be jeopardized making timely study completion a challenge.