

NERC Lessons Learned:

“Back Office EMS Support Tools Impact Real-Time Situational Awareness”

“External Model Data Causing State Estimator to Not Converge”

“Loss of Communication to Multiple SCADA RTUs at a Switching Center”

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- Title
 - *Back Office EMS Support Tools Impact Real-Time Situational Awareness*
- Source of Lesson Learned
 - Reliability*First*
- Date Published
 - June 5, 2018

- A registered entity identified that half of the contingency lists in the energy management system (EMS) were disabled
- Contingency lists from the real-time environment were modified inadvertently by an engineer performing a back-office study

- After receiving a call from the reliability coordinator (RC), a transmission operator determined that contingency analysis results were incorrect
- Previous EMS snapshots were reviewed to determine when the problem began
 - While investigating, the entity discovered that half of the working contingency lists were disabled

- An operations support engineer accidentally opened a window containing the real-time contingency lists while performing a separate study
 - The contingency list was edited in the real-time case while the user was under the impression that it was a study case
 - Since only one user had control of the real-time environment, the EMS system didn't notify the operator that real-time changes were being made

- Re-initialization was performed to enable all contingency lists
- Entity's EMS support staff instructed not to release control of the real-time case in the future
 - Prevents users from making changes to the real-time case without being notified by the system
- Entity trained its operations support staff regarding application separation between study and real-time cases

- When implementing changes on EMS applications, monitor other EMS applications to ensure that there aren't unintended changes being made to them
- Train operations support personnel on the risks posed by making setting changes on EMS environments
- Continue to work with RCs and TOs who can verify changes made to the entity's system

- Title
 - *External Model Data Causing State Estimator to Not Converge*
- Source of Lesson Learned
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- Several entities in the ReliabilityFirst (RF) Region have experienced state estimator (SE) outages
- The neighboring entities changed the system topology but the receiving entities didn't update their SE representation

- The SE was unable to solve because the ICCP data didn't match with the older model
- The entities executed the emergency operation procedures and contacted the respective RC and neighboring TOPs to confirm
 - Each entity contacted the respective RC and neighboring TOPs to help determine any overloads or contingencies in the system

- The entity experiencing the issue engaged Operations Support personnel to troubleshoot why the SE didn't converge
 - Data points can be inaccurate, bad data, or data that is not represented correctly in the external model
 - During the troubleshooting, they need to look for internal and external data points

- After determining that data points or external models were incorrect, the entities:
 - Removed bad data points from the model
 - Froze external data and reverted to the last known good solution
 - Discarded any unreasonable data points by placing data bounds and limits
 - Increased the number of measurements in unsolved areas
 - EMS models updated to monitor the impact of events and outages outside of the footprint

- Any change to the BES should be communicated to neighboring entities in advance so they can update their EMS models
- External models should display sufficient explicit details regarding system topology

- Title
 - *Loss of Communication to Multiple SCADA RTUs at a Switching Center*
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- Grid Operations lost communications with multiple substation remote terminal units (RTU) when a pre-existing configuration error was expressed
- The event had wide reaching impact to control center operations and field personnel

- Communication with a total of 87 RTUs was lost, including 34 Bulk Electric System RTUs
 - The affected substations had operating voltages ranging from 4 kV to 500 kV
 - Substation control and data acquisition functionality were both lost
 - The total event duration was 78 minutes

- Two months prior to this event, a Regional switching center that contained the EMS platform for the area's RTU communication was relocated
 - The power for this EMS platform was routed through an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)

- A transformer that supplied the primary station service power was taken out of service for maintenance
 - A UPS general alarm occurred and was acknowledged by the Regional switching center and the transmission dispatcher
 - A dispatch request was never issued due to distractions with other scheduled switching
 - The UPS ran on battery for approximately 5.5 hours until the proper voltage could not be maintained

- The UPS restart switch was in the factory default manual position and was not switched to the “auto” position when installed
 - In the manual position, the main circuit breaker will trip from a momentary loss of arc power and battery power will be used
 - The auto position will ensure that the main circuit breaker remains closed and the UPS transfers to an alternate power supply

- Future installations of similar UPS systems have been flagged
- Mandatory operation response to alarms of this nature have been reinforced
- Switched to auto position to ensure that the main circuit breaker remained closed and the UPS transferred to an alternate power supply

- Contact substation operators after a UPS alarm triggers with an unknown cause
- The contractors startup checklist should include all necessary settings, including switch positions
 - Must stay informed on features introduced by new equipment
- More planning when removing an important power source is necessary