# Issues With PJM Proposal for CETL Transparency and Stability

**H-P Energy Resources LLC** 

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## Stakeholders and Brattle Group Report

- Stakeholders have raised concerns with CETL transparency and stability.
- Two Brattle recommendations for CETL transparency:
  - Provide 4, 5 and 10 year CETL outlooks.
  - Make CETL models available.
- Three Brattle recommendations for CETL stability:
  - Identify successive CETL limiting elements with their CETL impacts.
  - Facilitate cost-effective transmission upgrades.
  - Deadband" for changing RTEP project status.

## PJM Proposal: Eliminate Objective CETL

Address CETL transparency by replacing objective CETL results with LDA import limits set by PJM's subjective judgment ("qualitative assessment")

Proposal eliminates transparency.

Address CETL stability by freezing LDA import limits until PJM finds "a continuing, fundamental change in transmission and/or capacity supply circumstances."

- Proposal would keep using inherently obsolete limit imports in order to solve stability concerns.
- Proposal eliminates transparency.

- Threshold questions as to what is being proposed and how the proposal would have changed the results of past RPM auctions if it had been in effect.
  - How, for example, would PJM have changed the LDA import limits in the last BRA?
  - When would PJM have retained or changed import limits in past BRAs?
- Proposal is inconsistent with PJM's guidance to the Commission on the legitimacy of CETL, and Commission orders accepting this PJM guidance.

- Subjective shaping of import limits will impact capacity prices - LDA import limit below or above CETL would cause either: (1) excessive RPM costs to consumers, or (2) inadequate revenues to RPM resources.
- Example:
  - Reducing MAAC import limit by 1,000 MW in 2013-14 BRA would have cost consumers ~ \$573 million.
  - Increasing MAAC import limit by 1,000 MW in 2013-14 BRA would have cost resources ~ \$671 million.

- Whenever PJM sets (or maintains) an LDA import limit above the CETL for a given RPM auction what happens?
  - Ignoring the difference means internal LDA resources plus CETL are inadequate under RPM construct and possibly 1-in-10 reliability standard.
  - Ordering upgrades raises questions: (1) what transmission upgrades would be ordered (supplanting RPM resources that otherwise would have cleared)?; (2) when would they be ordered?; (3) when might they be cancelled?; and (4) who pays for them?

- The Proposal is the diametric opposite of the Brattle Report recommendation for increased transparency – instead, transparency is eliminated.
- Gives PJM the inappropriate role of determining LDA import limits based on its view of "capacity supply circumstances."
- Breaks the critical linkage between RPM and RTEP contrary to PJM's past support of such linkage.
- Allows PJM to make subjective, non-transparent, unilateral rate decisions in violation of the Federal Power Act.

- Invites extensive litigation of every RPM auction through challenges to PJM's subjective judgments.
- Undermines the goal of incenting locational-based resources – PJM's future subjective judgments cannot support resource investment.
- Ensures unjust and unreasonable rates by using inherently obsolete LDA import limits.
  - Dozens of "new key transmission upgrades" for every BRA would now be ignored.
- Effectively eliminates the ability of merchant transmission to compete in RPM, contrary to PJM representations and Commission precedent.

## Summary and Path Forward

- Proposal goes in the opposite direction from the Brattle recommendations and is fundamentally flawed.
- PJM should come back to stakeholders with its perspective on which of the five (5) Brattle (and stakeholder) recommendations for CETL transparency and stability should be pursued, and why.



Consensus-supported recommendations should be refined by PJM and stakeholders.

Thank you.