July 18, 2019

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, N.E. Room 1A
Washington, D.C.  20426

Re:    PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER19-___-000

Dear Secretary Bose:

       Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“Commission”) Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 35 (2011), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) hereby submits proposed revisions to PJM’s Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) to (1) enable Capacity Market Sellers\(^1\) to request removal of the Capacity Resource status from an Existing Generation Capacity Resource and (2) require Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception to the Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) must offer requirement on the basis that an Existing Generation Capacity Resource is physically unable to satisfy the requirements of Capacity Performance to include a documented plan to become capable of participating in RPM, along with possible removal of a resource’s Capacity Resource status if the Capacity Market Seller does not adhere to such plan. PJM requests that the Commission issue an order accepting the enclosed revisions by no later than September 16, 2019, sixty (60) days from the date of this filing, with an effective date of September 23, 2019.

\(^1\) All capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meaning as contained in PJM’s Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region (“RAA”), Tariff and Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“Operating Agreement”).
If accepted, the proposed rules will apply beginning with the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.

I. BACKGROUND

Under PJM’s current rules, and with limited exception,\(^2\) Capacity Market Sellers of Existing Generation Capacity Resources must offer into the RPM Auctions unless a resource is granted an exception to this offer requirement.\(^3\) The purpose of this rule is to ensure that Capacity Market Sellers do not withhold available resources from the RPM Auctions and potentially exert market power. Notwithstanding, there are limited circumstances that could excuse a Capacity Market Seller from offering a Capacity Resource into the RPM Auctions. These limited exceptions are available when a Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resource demonstrates that it (i) is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant Delivery Year; (ii) has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity, or (iii) was interconnected to the Transmission System as an Energy Resource and not subsequently converted to a Capacity Resource.\(^4\) A resource is deemed to be physically unable to participate due to (a) resource retirements, (b) physical operational restrictions, (c) regulatory orders resulting in the retirement of resources, or (d) delayed in-service for resources that are not yet in service but previously cleared an RPM Auction.\(^5\) In addition, an exception to the RPM must offer requirement is also permitted when a Capacity Market Seller demonstrates that an Existing Generation Capacity Resource is reasonably

\(^2\) Intermittent Resources, Capacity Storage Resources, Demand Resources, and Energy Efficiency Resources are categorically exempt from the must-offer requirement. Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c).

\(^3\) See Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(a).

\(^4\) See Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g).

\(^5\) Id.
expected to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.\(^6\)

This filing amends two aspects of the existing RPM must offer requirement. First, the proposed changes establish a documented process that enables Capacity Market Sellers to voluntarily request removal of the Capacity Resource status from an Existing Generation Capacity Resource. Second, this proposal limits the number of times a Capacity Market Seller may request an exception to the RPM must offer requirement for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource on the basis that it is unable to meet the requirements of Capacity Performance before such resource no longer qualifies as a Capacity Resource.\(^7\) Relatedly, the proposed rule requires Capacity Market Sellers of Existing Generation Capacity Resources that seek such an exception to the must offer requirement to include a documented plan as part of a request for an exception to the must offer requirement that outlines the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for such resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of Capacity Performance. As further described in section III(b), infra, the failure to submit a documented plan as part of an exception request, or a lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to adhere to such plan, would result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status.

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\(^6\) Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c).

\(^7\) This proposal stems from an issue charge related to the must offer exception process and is intended to only address Generation Capacity Resources that are subject to the must offer requirement. Thus, categorically exempt resources that are not subject to the must offer requirement (Intermittent Resources, Capacity Storage Resources, Demand Resources, and Energy Efficiency Resource) are not impacted by this filing. Stakeholders are considering Capacity Interconnection Rights more generally under a new problem statement and PJM may file to amend those rules at a later date. See PJM Capacity Interconnection Rights Issue Charge, available at: https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/20190627/20190627-item-04-cir-issue-charge.ashx
This proposal ensures that all Capacity Resources must adhere to the RPM must offer rule and are not allowed to circumvent this requirement by seeking numerous requests for exceptions to the must offer requirement on the ground that the resource is not physically capable of participating in the RPM Auctions. In addition, consistent with the existing rules for resources that fail to meet operational standards or deactivate, this proposal also provides that the Capacity Interconnection Rights ("CIRs") associated with a generation unit that is no longer a Capacity Resource cannot be indefinitely retained.

II. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

This filing is the culmination of over one year of vigorous stakeholder engagement and consideration. The problem statement and accompanying issue charge for this topic was first reviewed at the February 7, 2018 Market Implementation Committee meeting. Thereafter, PJM worked with its stakeholders at the Market Implementation Committee meetings. The stakeholder discussions lead to the instant proposal, which was cooperatively developed with the Independent Market Monitor for PJM ("Market Monitor"), along with input from PJM stakeholders.

Ultimately, the revisions were endorsed by PJM Members with sector-weighted vote of 3.74 out of 5 at the April 25, 2019 Markets and Reliability Committee ("MRC") meeting. After endorsement at the MRC, the Members Committee endorsed the proposal with a 4.0 out of 5 sector-weighted vote on June 27, 2019.
III. THE PROPOSED REVISIONS ADD PROCESSES FOR REMOVING CAPACITY RESOURCE STATUS FROM EXISTING GENERATION CAPACITY RESOURCES.

A. PJM Proposes a Process to Allow Existing Generation Capacity Resources to become an Energy Resource.

The Tariff already provides that a Capacity Market Seller may remove a resource from Capacity Resource status, but it does not provide a process for doing so.\(^8\) To provide clarity and delineate a specific process for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource to become an Energy Resource, this proposal includes rules that explicitly outline the requisite steps for a Capacity Market Seller to remove the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource. Capacity Market Sellers of certain Existing Generation Capacity Resources that are not capable of meeting the Capacity Performance requirements may evaluate options for continued capacity market participation. In certain instances, Capacity Market Sellers may wish to continue the operation of a generation unit that was initially granted Capacity Resource status, but no longer wish to participate in the capacity market because no reasonable amount of investment would allow the unit to satisfy the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. In those cases, Capacity Market Sellers may wish to maintain the resource’s ability to participate in the energy market as an Energy Resource while no longer being subject to the RPM must offer requirement. While this is the most likely scenario for a Capacity Market Seller to seek removal

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\(^8\) See Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6. While this section suggests that a Capacity Market Seller may remove the Capacity Resource status from a Generation Capacity Resource, it is silent on what documentation, along with the requisite timelines, such Capacity Market Seller must submit to PJM and the Market Monitor. In addition, there are currently no clear review standards for PJM or the Market Monitor when evaluating a request by an Existing Generation Capacity Resource to become an Energy Resource.
of a Capacity Resource status, other scenarios may also cause a Capacity Market Seller to request removal of Capacity Resource status.  

Under the proposed rule, a Capacity Market Seller must notify PJM and the Market Monitor of a request to remove the Capacity Resource status from an Existing Generation Capacity Resource.  

Specifically, the Capacity Market Seller will be required to provide a preliminary written notification with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions of such request to PJM and the Market Monitor by September 1 prior to the applicable BRA or 240 days prior to the commencement of the applicable Incremental Auction. Thereafter, the Capacity Market Seller would be required to either confirm or withdraw its preliminary request to remove the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource by December 1 prior to the BRA or 120 days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. These timelines are identical to the existing rules with respect to the notification requirement for Capacity Market Sellers to request an exception to the must offer requirement for the deactivation of Capacity Resources.  

Basing the notification process on the existing deactivation rule is appropriate given that the deactivation of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource and a request to become an Energy Resource both result in the permanent removal of a generation unit from the capacity market.  

Upon request for removal of a Capacity Resource status, PJM will post on its website the aggregated MWs of all Existing Generation Capacity Resources that requested removal of the

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9 See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 145 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2013) (granting waiver request to remove Capacity Resource status to allow for participation in a state regulated net metering program). In support of this request for waiver, PJM indicated that it may develop a process to allow an Existing Generation Capacity Resource to become an Energy Resource, which PJM addresses with this filing. Id. at P 7.  

10 Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g).  

11 Id.
Capacity Resource status, consistent with the existing postings for RPM must offer exceptions related to deactivating resources.\footnote{Id.} Further, PJM will incorporate the loss of Capacity Resource status in the appropriate models and reliability studies, including those used in the development of the auction planning parameters. The Market Monitor will analyze the effects of the proposed removal of the Existing Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status with respect to potential market power concerns and notify the Capacity Market Seller and PJM of its determination no later than 90 days before the applicable RPM Auction. Subsequently, PJM will consider the Market Monitor’s advice and input before making the final decision of whether or not to approve the removal of the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource.

After approval of a request to remove the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, the Capacity Market Seller would no longer be required to offer such resource into the RPM Auctions. In addition, since the Existing Generation Capacity Resource would no longer be classified as a Capacity Resource,\footnote{See Tariff, Part VI, section 230.1 and 230.2. CIRs are only accredited for Generation Capacity Resources on the system. When a unit’s Capacity Resource status is removed, the corresponding CIRs should also be removed.} the corresponding CIRs would be removed consistent with the existing process for a deactivating resource.\footnote{See Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3.} Specifically, the CIRs would be terminated one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect. During this intervening period, the Capacity Market Seller will have the ability to transfer the CIRs to another holder or preserve the CIRs by submitting a new Generation Interconnection Request, consistent with the process used for deactivation contained in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3.
230.3. This process provides Capacity Market Sellers with sufficient time to reallocate the CIRs to another Capacity Resource, while ensuring that the CIRs are not unduly held in perpetuity for a resource that no longer retains its Capacity Resource status.

**B. The Proposal Amends Rules for Obtaining an Exception to the Must Offer Requirement.**

In addition to the aforementioned process to remove the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, this proposal amends the existing rules so that Capacity Market Sellers cannot continuously receive exceptions to the must offer requirement for a resource that is physically unable to participate in the RPM Auctions. The existing rules effectively allow Capacity Market Sellers to seek and obtain exceptions to the must offer requirement indefinitely so long as the Existing Generation Capacity Resource is reasonably deemed to be physically unable to participate as a Capacity Performance Resource.\(^\text{15}\)

Since the underlying purpose of the must offer requirement is to ensure that Capacity Market Sellers do not withhold Capacity Resources from the RPM Auctions, rules that prevent Capacity Market Sellers from circumventing this requirement are appropriate. This includes the proposed rule that limits the number of times Capacity Market Sellers may seek an exception to the must offer requirement. More particularly, Capacity Market Sellers may only request a one-time\(^\text{16}\) exception to the must offer requirement on the basis that the resource is physically unable to meet the Capacity Performance requirements, with a possible one year extension. In addition, Capacity Market Sellers would be required to submit a documented plan that provides the steps that will be taken to make the Existing Generation Capacity Resource capable of satisfying the

\(^{15}\) Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A.

\(^{16}\) This one time exception refers to the Base Residual Auction and associated Incremental Auctions for a relevant Delivery Year.
requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource, along with evidence of a corresponding corporate commitment of such plan, as part of an exception request. The documented plan outlines the planned steps to make the resource capable of meeting the Capacity Performance requirements. PJM and the Market Monitor will then use this plan to evaluate whether sufficient steps are being taken during the intervening period and consider any extenuating circumstances that may merit a one year extension.

The timing of this proposed rule is appropriate given that all Capacity Resources must now be capable of meeting the requirements of Capacity Performance. Previously, PJM was still transitioning to all Capacity Performance Resources so it was reasonable for Capacity Market Sellers to request exceptions to the must offer requirement as they evaluated whether to invest in additional upgrades to make the resources physically capable of meeting the requirements of Capacity Performance. However, now that PJM has fully transitioned to the Capacity Performance construct, Existing Generation Capacity Resources should all be capable of meeting the Capacity Performance requirements.

If a Capacity Market Seller demonstrates to PJM that their resource is physically unable to participate as a Capacity Performance Resource for extended periods of time, and therefore incapable of taking on a capacity obligation after the transition years of Capacity Performance, such resource should not be permitted to retain its Capacity Resource status. Rather, such resource should be limited to participation in PJM markets as an Energy Resource. As a result of becoming an Energy Resource, such resources should not retain CIRs. These additional provisions will ensure that Capacity Market Sellers do not thwart the must offer requirement by continuously seeking exceptions and without providing a plan for how the resource will become physically capable.
1. One Time Exception Request to the Must Offer Requirement is Sufficient.

In developing these additional safeguards, PJM and stakeholders determined that a one-time request for an exception to the must offer requirement, with a possible one year extension of such plan, is reasonable. One exception for a future Delivery Year three years in advance equates to four years of development time for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource to become physically capable of meeting the requirements of Capacity Performance. To account for any possible delays in the development of necessary upgrades, an additional one year extension to the plan timeline will be permissible if the delay was not caused by the Capacity Market Seller. Since a Capacity Market Seller is required to request an exception to the must offer requirement 120 days prior to the relevant BRA, a Capacity Market Seller effectively could have over five years to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.

Based on PJM’s experience in reviewing must offer exception requests, including plans submitted along with those requests, PJM and stakeholders determined five years is sufficient time to complete necessary upgrades to an Existing Generation Capacity Resources.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, the vast majority of new resources interconnecting into PJM reach commercial operation within five years an Interconnection Service Agreement is executed. This suggests that upgrades to Existing Generation Capacity Resources could also be completed in the same or less time than the amount of time it takes for Planned Generation Capacity Resources to reach

\textsuperscript{17} Examples of upgrades to Existing Generation Capacity Resources include dual fuel capital investment, weatherization investments, emission controls, or new gas pipeline to obtain firm fuel service for the resource. Capacity Market Sellers have historically demonstrated their inability to meet Capacity Performance requirements by providing estimated timelines to complete necessary upgrades and become physically capable. It is based on these previous exception requests that five years is ample time for a resource to be upgraded to meet the requirements of Capacity Performance.
commercial operation. If a Capacity Market Seller requests an exception to the must offer requirement without a documented plan, then the Existing Generation Capacity Resource would lose its Capacity Resource status effective with the Delivery Year for which the exception was requested. Similarly, the Existing Generation Capacity Resource would also lose its Capacity Resource status effective with the Delivery Year the exception to the must offer requirement request is made if a Capacity Market Seller does not complete the necessary upgrades in accordance with their documented plan.

2. The Potential Termination of CIRs is Appropriate.

In conjunction with the loss of Capacity Resource status, such resources’ CIRs would also be subject to termination one year after the Capacity Resource status change takes effect under the proposed revisions. Consistent with the existing process for termination of CIRs for resources that deactivate, this additional year before the termination of CIRs provides Capacity Market Sellers sufficient time to submit a new Generation Interconnection Request or transfer the CIRs within one year of the loss of Capacity Resource.

The prolonged retention of CIRs for resources that are physically unable to participate as Capacity Resources, with no plan to become physically capable, is unreasonable because annual baseline reliability assessment and associated upgrades necessary to maintain the transmission system, which are paid by load customers, are based on the amount of CIRs in the geographic area. Thus, the excess CIRs that are not used for capacity injections may result in potentially inaccurate Regional Transmission Expansion Plan upgrades. In addition, new resources seeking to become Capacity Resources are studied for generator deliverability based
on the existing CIRs already granted on the system. In some locations that may already have existing resources with large quantities of CIRs, adding new Capacity Resources would require the new resource owner to incur significant costs necessary to upgrade the transmission system to interconnect and ensure deliverability.

Such outcomes are reasonable when all Existing Generation Capacity Resources in the geographic area actively participate in RPM as Capacity Resources because it ensures that the transmission system is sufficiently capable of delivering all potential resource injections in the area. However, it is unreasonable to indefinitely retain CIRs when a resource does not have a reasonable expectation of becoming physically capable of meeting Capacity Performance requirements, and therefore incapable of taking on a capacity obligation. As noted above, the retention of CIRs that are not being used could result in new resource seeking to interconnect to incur significant and, arguably, unnecessary transmission upgrade costs since not all Capacity Resources with CIRs may be participating in RPM. This could lead to an overbuilt transmission system or deter new Capacity Resources from being built at all. Thus, the termination of CIRs when a resource loses its Capacity Resource status is appropriate and prudent.

Any potential arguments that CIRs cannot be terminated because they are contractual rights are flawed and unavailing. CIRs are created by a contractual right as part of an interconnection service provided by the Interconnection Service Agreement. Specifically, PJM’s Interconnection Service Agreement, which grants CIRs, explicitly provides that they are subject to the terms of the Tariff:


19 The Commission has consistently held that interconnection service does not constitute a property right. See Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreement, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 493 (Apr. 19, 2018); see also Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., 167 FERC ¶ 61,146 at P 69 (May 15, 2019).
Pursuant to and subject to the applicable terms of the Tariff, the Interconnection Customer shall have Capacity Interconnection Rights at the Point(s) of Interconnection specified in this Interconnection Service Agreement in the amount of ___ MW.\textsuperscript{20}

Based on this language, Capacity Market Sellers are on notice when they enter into the Interconnection Service Agreement that the use and retention of CIRs would be subject to the terms of the Tariff. It is also reasonable to assume that the terms of the Tariff are not static and will evolve over time. Here, it is appropriate to include a process in the Tariff for relinquishing CIRs that are associated with the loss of Capacity Resource status. Such relinquishment of CIRs is subject to the same process that currently exists in the event of a deactivation. That is, just as when a Capacity Resource deactivates, Capacity Market Sellers of Existing Generation Capacity Resources would be allowed to submit a new Generation Interconnection Request and use the existing CIRs or transfer the CIRs to another entity for up to one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect.\textsuperscript{21} Only if the Capacity Market Seller does not submit a new Generation Interconnection Request or transfer the CIRs within one year of the loss of Capacity Resource status would the CIRs be terminated. Under this proposal, Capacity Market Sellers will be economically incented to transfer the CIRs or develop new resources, rather than retaining the CIRs for resources that are not physically capable of meeting the requirements of Capacity Performance. Further, the proposed process to terminate CIRs for resources that are unable to become physically capable of meeting the requirements of being a Capacity

\textsuperscript{20} Tariff, Attachment O.

\textsuperscript{21} See Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3. The holder of any transferred CIRs must also submit a new Generation Interconnection Request within one year of the Capacity Resource status change.
Performance Resource is not new and simply mirrors the existing CIR termination process for Capacity Resources that deactivate.  

IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE TARIFF

A. Proposed Changes to Establish the Process for Voluntary Removal of Capacity Resource Status

The proposed revisions amend Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g) and require Capacity Market Sellers to provide a preliminary notification of a request to remove the Capacity Resource status by September 1 prior to the applicable BRA or 240 days prior to the commencement of the applicable Incremental Auction. Thereafter, the Capacity Market Seller would be required to either confirm or withdraw its preliminary request to remove the Capacity Resource status of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource by December 1 prior to the BRA or 120 days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. The requirement that Capacity Market Sellers shall provide a preliminary and final notification of removing a Capacity Resource status tracks the existing process and language in this same section for deactivation requests.

In addition, PJM is including language that specifies that the Market Monitor will analyze potential market power issues of a proposed Capacity Resource status removal. Upon the Market Monitor’s determination, PJM will make the final determination of whether a resource may be removed from Capacity Resource status based on the existing deadlines that currently

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22 Similarly, resources that fail to meet the operational standards of operating at the capacity level also results in the termination of CIRs. In those cases, however, there is no one year period for such CIRs to be transferred or utilized in another queue prior to the termination of CIRs. See Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.1 and 230.3.2.

23 Given that an Order on this filing is not expected prior to September 1, 2019, PJM also proposes to allow Capacity Market Sellers to submit the preliminary notification of a Capacity Resource status removal by November 1, 2019 for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year Base Residual Auction.
apply for the must offer exception requests. Finally, the proposed language makes clear that the termination of CIRs for resources that lose their Capacity Resource status will be reflected through an amendment to the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participant agreement.

Based on the foregoing, the proposed amendment makes the following revisions to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g), as shown in blackline and in pertinent part below:

A Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit a preliminary request in writing, along with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions upon which the Capacity Market Seller is relying in its analysis of whether to remove the Capacity Resource status of such resource to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than (a) the September 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction, and (b) two hundred forty (240) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. For the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit such preliminary request by no later than November 1, 2019. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of any such preliminary requests, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received notification of preliminary requests, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Thereafter, as applicable, such Capacity Market Seller shall, by no later than (a) the December 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, or (b) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction, notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing that it is either (a) withdrawing its preliminary request and explaining the changes to its analysis that support its decision to withdraw, or (b) confirming its preliminary decision to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of such notification, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a revised summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received requests to remove its Capacity Resource status, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall analyze the effects of the proposed removal of a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status with regard to potential market power issues and shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination of the request to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status, and whether a market power issue has been identified, by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. Such notice shall include the specific market power impact resulting from the proposed removal of the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status, as well as an initial assessment of any steps that could be taken to mitigate the market power impact.

A Capacity Market Seller may only remove the Generation Capacity Resource from PJM Capacity Resource status if (i) the Market Monitoring Unit has determined that the Generation Capacity Resource meets the applicable criteria set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6 and this section 6.6 and the Office of the Interconnection agrees with this determination, or (ii) the Commission has issued an order terminating the Capacity Resource status of the resource, or (iii) it is required as set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c). Nothing herein shall require a Market Seller to offer its resource into an RPM Auction prior to seeking to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status, subject to satisfaction of this section 6.6. A Generation Capacity Resource that is removed from Capacity Resource status shall no longer qualify as an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, and the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall be subject to termination in accordance with the rules described in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g., FERC filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement.

If the Capacity Market Seller disagrees with the Market Monitoring Unit’s determination of its request to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status or its request for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, it must notify the Market Monitoring Unit in writing, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, of the same by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. After the Market Monitoring Unit has made its determination of whether a resource may be removed from Capacity Resource status, has satisfied the RPM must-offer requirement or whether the resource meets one of the exceptions thereto, and has notified the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of the same pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C.4, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve or deny the exception request. The exception request is subject to public comment and consideration by the Commission.
request shall be deemed to be approved by the Office of the Interconnection, consistent with the determination of the Market Monitoring Unit, unless the Office of the Interconnection notifies the Capacity Market Seller and Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences, that the exception request is denied.²⁴

B. Proposed Revisions Concerning Must Offer Exception Requests for Resources that Are Physically Unable to Meet the Requirements of Capacity Performance.

The proposed revisions also amend Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c) to effectuate the proposed requirement that Capacity Market Sellers may only submit a request for an exception to the must offer requirement one time. In addition, as part of the exception request, the Capacity Market Seller must submit a documented plan that includes a timeline for applicable design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, along with evidence of corporate commitment to supporting such a plan.

A request for an exception to the must offer requirement on the ground that the resource is physically unable to participate in the RPM Auction without such a plan would result in the loss of Capacity Resource status for the Existing Generation Capacity Resource effective with the associated Delivery Year for which the exception was requested. For instance, a must offer exception granted for the 2020 BRA would cover the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. Capacity Resource status would be removed at the start of the 2023/2024 Delivery Year (i.e., June 1, 2023) and any associated CIRs would terminate by June 1, 2024, unless they were transferred or used in a subsequent Generation Interconnection Request prior to this date. Similarly, a Capacity Market Seller that does not complete, or fails to make a good faith effort to complete, the

²⁴ It is noted that PJM replaced the term “Market Participant,” which was the language endorsed by stakeholders, with “wholesale market participant” because it more accurately refers to the party that signs a wholesale market participation agreement.
necessary upgrades consistent with the timeline provided will also result in the loss of Capacity Resource status for the Existing Generation Capacity Resource beginning with the Delivery Year associated with the must offer exception request. On the other hand, if a delay occurs that is not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline would be permissible upon request.

Just as when a Capacity Market Seller elects to remove the Capacity Resource status, any accompanying CIRs that are terminated would need to be properly reflected in the relevant Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. Thus, this proposal includes a provision that specifies PJM would report the amended agreement reflecting the terminated CIRs in the same manner as originally reported (e.g. FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). Further, PJM would file such agreement with the Commission unexecuted in the event a party to the original agreement does not sign the amended agreement.

Based on the foregoing, the proposed amendment adds the following language to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c) as shown in blackline below:

**Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception for a Base Residual Auction shall include a documented plan with the submission of their request showing the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for the resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Such plan shall include (i) a timeline for design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, as applicable, where such timeline shall not exceed one Base Residual Auction exception, and (ii) evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment). Periodic updates on the progress, shall be provided by the Capacity Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit for their review by no later than (i) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for subsequent Incremental Auctions for the applicable Delivery Years, and (ii) the December 1**

25 An example of such a delay could be a regulatory setback in obtaining necessary construction permits.
that last precedes subsequent Base Residual Auctions. The Capacity Market Seller shall also immediately notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit of any material changes to the plan that may occur. Upon request by a Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline shall be permissible only for delays not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, and that could not have been remedied through the exercise of due diligence by the Capacity Market Seller. In no event may an exception be requested by the Capacity Market Seller for more than two Base Residual Auctions.

Failure to submit a documented plan, or lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource in accordance with a documented plan, shall result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status effective with the first future Delivery Year for which the resource was granted an exception, no earlier than the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g. FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. The required change in Capacity Resource status shall only apply to those Generation Capacity Resources that are shown to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.\footnote{\textit{It is noted that PJM replaced the term “Market Participant,” which was the language endorsed by stakeholders, with “wholesale market participant” because it more accurately refers to the party that signs a wholesale market participation agreement.}}

\textbf{C. Proposed Changes Regarding the Loss of Capacity Interconnection Rights}

As explained, \textit{supra}, the loss of Capacity Resource status should also result in the termination of CIRs so that transmission planning studies can accurately account for the Capacity Resources in a given location. To specify that the loss of Capacity Resource status could result in the termination of CIRs, the proposed revisions use the existing process pertaining to the loss of CIRs for Capacity Resources that deactivate. More particularly, a Capacity Market Seller would have one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect to
submit a new Generation Interconnection Request that contemplates the use of the same CIRs or transfer the CIRs to another holder (the transferee of such CIRs must also submit a new Generation Interconnection Request within the one year window). Absent such action by the Capacity Market Seller, the CIRs will be terminated one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect.

To effectuate these changes, the proposed revisions amend Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3 as shown in blackline below:

In the event of the Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource (in accordance with Tariff, Part V and any Applicable Standards) or removal of Capacity Resource status (in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A), any Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall terminate one year from the Deactivation Date or one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect, unless the holder of such rights (including any holder that acquired the rights after Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status) has submitted a new Generation Interconnection Request up to one year after the Deactivation Date or up to one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect, which contemplates use of the same Capacity Interconnection Rights. The Interconnection Customer must provide written notification to the Transmission Provider that it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights on or before the date the Interconnection Customer executes the System Impact Study Agreement associated with the Generation Interconnection Request for which it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, Interconnection Customers in the New Services Queue prior to May 1, 2012 must provide written notice of intent to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights when it executes its Facilities Study Agreement or, if it has already executed its Facilities Study Agreement, then by November 1, 2012. Such notification of transfer of Capacity Interconnection Rights shall be posted on Transmission Provider’s public website. Such new Generation Interconnection Request may include a request to increase Capacity Interconnection Rights in addition to the replacement of the previously deactivated amount, or amount removed from Capacity Resource status, as a single Generation Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider may perform thermal, short circuit, and/or stability studies, as necessary and in accordance with its manuals, due to any changes in the electrical characteristics of any newly proposed equipment, or where there is a change in Point of Interconnection, which may result in the loss of a portion or all of the Capacity Interconnection Rights as determined by such studies.
Upon execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement reflecting its new Interconnection Request, the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights will retain only such rights that are commensurate with the size in megawatts of the replacement generation, not to exceed the amount of the holder’s Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with the facility upon Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status. Any desired increase in Capacity Interconnection Rights must be requested in the new Generation Interconnection Request and be accredited through the applicable procedures in Tariff, Part IV and Tariff, Part VI of the Tariff. In the event the new Interconnection Request to which this section refers is or is deemed to be terminated and/or withdrawn for any reason at any time, the pertinent Capacity Interconnection Rights shall not terminate until the end of the one year period from the Deactivation Date, or the end of the one year period from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect.

V. INCLUSION OF NON-SUBSTANTIVE REVISIONS CONTAINED WITHIN TARIFF, PART VI, SECTION 230 AS PART OF THIS FILING.

In addition to the proposed substantive revisions described above, PJM also submits minor and non-substantive revisions to correct certain formatting issues and modify incorrect references located within the sections of the Tariff that are being revised as part of this filing. For example, rather than the reference “section 230.3.1 of the Tariff” as it currently exists in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.2, PJM proposes to change the reference to “Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.1” in order to provide consistent references to PJM’s Tariff. These technical revisions are part of PJM’s ongoing efforts to continually review and make non-controversial and non-substantive revisions to the Governing Documents in order to ensure consistency and accuracy of the relevant definitions and provisions.

27 Although these non-substantive revisions in Tariff, Part VI, section 230 were not included as part of the stakeholder endorsement, it is in the interest of administrative efficiency to include such non-substantive revisions that are contained within the same sections of the Tariff that are already being revised as part of this filing.
VI. PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATES

PJM proposes an effective date of September 23, 2019 for the proposed Tariff sections referenced herein. PJM requests that the Commission issue an order on this filing by September 16, 2019, sixty (60) days from the date of this filing.

VII. DESCRIPTION OF SUBMITTAL

This filing consists of the following:

1. This transmittal letter;
2. Attachment A – Revisions to the Tariff in redline format; and
3. Attachment B – Revisions to the Tariff in clean format.

VII. CORRESPONDENCE

The following individuals are designated for inclusion on the official service list in this proceeding and for receipt of any communications regarding this filing:

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VIII. SERVICE

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM Members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically. In accordance with the Commission’s regulations,\(^{28}\) PJM will post a copy of this filing to the FERC filings.

\(^{28}\) See 18C.F.R §§ 35.2(e) and 385.2010(f)(3).
section of its internet site, located at the following link:  http://www.pjm.com/documents/ferc-manuals/ferc-filings.aspx  with a specific link to the newly-filed document, and will send an e-mail on the same date as this filing to all PJM Members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region\(^29\) alerting them that this filing has been made by PJM and is available by following such link. If the document is not immediately available by using the referenced link, the document will be available through the referenced link within 24 hours of the filing. Also, a copy of this filing will be available on the FERC’s eLibrary website located at the following link:  http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp  in accordance with the Commission’s regulations and Order No. 714.

**IX. CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, PJM respectfully requests that the Commission accept the proposed revisions to PJM’s Tariff by no later than September 16, 2019, effective September 23, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

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*On behalf of*  
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

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\(^29\) PJM already maintains updates and regularly uses e-mail lists for all PJM Members and affected state commissions.
Attachment A

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Marked / Redline Format)
230.3 Loss of Capacity Interconnection Rights:

230.3.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Capacity Interconnection Rights, the Generation Capacity Resource associated with the rights must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with RAA, Schedule 9 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region and the PJM Manuals. Generation Capacity Resources that meet these operational standards shall retain their Capacity Interconnection Rights regardless of whether they are available as a Generation Capacity Resource or are making sales outside the PJM Region.

230.3.2 Failure to Meet Operational Standards:

This Section 230.3.2 shall apply only in circumstances other than Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource. In the event a Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the operational standards set forth in Tariff, Part VI, Section 230.3.1 of the Tariff for any consecutive three-year period (with the first such period commencing on the date the Interconnection Customer must demonstrate commercial operation of the generating unit(s) as specified in the Interconnection Service Agreement), the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such Generation Capacity Resource will lose its Capacity Interconnection Rights in an amount commensurate with the loss of generating capability. Any period during which the Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the standards set forth in Section 230.3.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of a force majeure event as defined in Tariff, Attachment O, section 9.4 of Attachment O, Tariff, Appendix 2 of the Tariff shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights exercises due diligence to remedy the event. A Generation Capacity Resource that loses Capacity Interconnection Rights pursuant to this section may continue Interconnection Service, to the extent of such lost rights, as an Energy Resource in accordance with (and for the remaining term of) its Interconnection Service Agreement and/or applicable terms of the Tariff.

230.3.3 Replacement of Generation:

In the event of the Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource (in accordance with Tariff, Part V and any Applicable Standards), or removal of Capacity Resource status (in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A), any Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall terminate one year from the Deactivation Date, or one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect, unless the holder of such rights (including any holder that acquired the rights after Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status) has submitted a new Generation Interconnection Request up to one year after the Deactivation Date, or up to one year from the date the Capacity Resource status changes take effect, which contemplates use of the same Capacity Interconnection Rights. The Interconnection Customer must provide written notification to the Transmission Provider that it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights on or before the date the Interconnection Customer executes the System Impact Study Agreement associated with the Generation Interconnection Request for which it intends to utilize such Capacity
Interconnection Rights. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, Interconnection Customers in the New Services Queue prior to May 1, 2012 must provide written notice of intent to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights when it executes its Facilities Study Agreement or, if it has already executed its Facilities Study Agreement, then by November 1, 2012. Such notification of transfer of Capacity Interconnection Rights shall be posted on Transmission Provider’s public website. Such new Generation Interconnection Request may include a request to increase Capacity Interconnection Rights in addition to the replacement of the previously deactivated amount, or amount removed from Capacity Resource status, as a single Generation Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider may perform thermal, short circuit, and/or stability studies, as necessary and in accordance with its manuals, due to any changes in the electrical characteristics of any newly proposed equipment, or where there is a change in Point of Interconnection, which may result in the loss of a portion or all of the Capacity Interconnection Rights as determined by such studies.

Upon execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement reflecting its new Interconnection Request, the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights will retain only such rights that are commensurate with the size in megawatts of the replacement generation, not to exceed the amount of the holder’s Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with the facility upon Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status. Any desired increase in Capacity Interconnection Rights must be requested in the new Generation Interconnection Request and be accredited through the applicable procedures in Tariff, Part IV and Tariff, Part VI of the Tariff. In the event the new Interconnection Request to which this section refers is or is deemed to be terminated and/or withdrawn for any reason at any time, the pertinent Capacity Interconnection Rights shall not terminate until the end of the one year period from the Deactivation Date, or the end of the one year period from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect.
6. MARKET POWER MITIGATION

6.1 Applicability

The provisions of the Market Monitoring Plan (in Tariff, Attachment M and Attachment - M Appendix, and this section 6) shall apply to the Reliability Pricing Model Auctions.

6.2 Process

(a) [Reserved for Future Use]

(b) In accordance with the schedule specified in the PJM Manuals, following PJM’s conduct of a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12, but prior to the Office of the Interconnection’s final determination of clearing prices and charges pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) apply the Market Structure Test to any LDA having a Locational Price Adder greater than zero and to the entire PJM region; (ii) apply Market Seller Offer Caps, if required under this section 6; and (iii) recompute the optimization algorithm to clear the auction with the Market Seller Offer Caps in place.

(c) Within seven days after the deadline for submission of Sell Offers in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall file with FERC a report of any determination made pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h), Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.5(a)(ii), or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.7(c) identified in such sections as subject to the procedures of this section. Such report shall list each such determination, the information considered in making each such determination, and an explanation of each such determination. Any entity that objects to any such determination may file a written objection with FERC no later than seven days after the filing of the report. Any such objection must not merely allege that the determination was in error, and must provide support for the objection, demonstrating that the determination overlooked or failed to consider relevant evidence. In the event that no objection is filed, the determination shall be final. In the event that an objection is filed, FERC shall issue any decision modifying the determination no later than 60 days after the filing of such report; otherwise, the determination shall be final. Final auction results shall reflect any decision made by FERC regarding the report.

6.3 Market Structure Test

(a) [Reserved for Future Use]

(b) Market Structure Test.

A constrained LDA or the PJM Region shall fail the Market Structure Test, and mitigation shall be applied to all jointly pivotal suppliers (including all Affiliates of such suppliers, and all third-party supply in the relevant LDA controlled by such suppliers by contract), if, as to the Sell Offers that comprise the incremental supply determined pursuant to section 6.3(c) below that are based on Generation Capacity Resources, there are not more than three jointly pivotal suppliers. The Office
of the Interconnection shall apply the Market Structure Test. The Office of the Interconnection shall confirm the results of the Market Structure Test with the Market Monitoring Unit.

(c) Determination of Incremental Supply

In applying the Market Structure Test, the Office of the Interconnection shall consider all (i) incremental supply (provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall consider only such supply available from Generation Capacity Resources) available to solve the constraint applicable to a constrained LDA offered at less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price; or (ii) supply for the PJM Region, offered at less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price, provided that supply in this section includes only the lower of cost-based or market-based offers from Generation Capacity Resources. Cost-based clearing prices are the prices resulting from the RPM auction algorithm using the lower of cost-based or price-based offers for all Capacity Resources.

6.4 Market Seller Offer Caps

(a) The Market Seller Offer Cap, stated in dollars per MW/day of unforced capacity, applicable to price-quantity offers within the Base Offer Segment for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Avoidable Cost Rate for such resource, less the Projected PJM Market Revenues for such resource, stated in dollars per MW/day of unforced capacity, provided, however, that the default Market Seller Offer Cap for any Capacity Performance Resource shall be the product of (the Net Cost of New Entry applicable for the Delivery Year and Locational Deliverability Area for which such Capacity Performance Resource is offered times the average of the Balancing Ratios in the three consecutive calendar years (during the Performance Assessment Intervals in such calendar years) that precede the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year), however, for the Base Residual Auction for the 2021/2022 Delivery Year, the Balancing Ratio used in the determination of the default Market Seller Offer Cap shall be 78.5 percent, and provided further that the submission of a Sell Offer with an Offer Price at or below the revised Market Seller Offer Cap permitted under this proviso shall not, in and of itself, be deemed an exercise of market power in the RPM market. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, a Capacity Market Seller may seek and obtain a Market Seller Offer Cap for a Capacity Performance Resource that exceeds the revised Market Seller Offer Cap permitted under the prior sentence, if it supports and obtains approval of such alternative offer cap pursuant to the procedures and standards of subsection (b) of this section 6.4. A Capacity Market Seller may not use the Capacity Performance default Market Seller Offer Cap, and also seek to include any one or more categories of the Avoidable Cost Rate defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8 below. The Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Opportunity Cost for such resource, if applicable, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.7. Nothing herein shall preclude any Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit from agreeing to, nor require either such entity to agree to, an alternative market seller offer cap determined on a mutually agreeable basis. Any such alternative offer cap shall be filed with the Commission for its approval. This provision is duplicated in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.3.

(b) For each Existing Generation Capacity Resource, a potential Capacity Market Seller must provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection data and
documentation required under section 6.7 below to establish the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to each resource by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Capacity Market Seller must promptly address any concerns identified by the Market Monitoring Unit regarding the data and documentation provided, review the Market Seller Offer Cap proposed by the Market Monitoring Unit, and attempt to reach agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit on the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit in writing, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, whether an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit has been reached or, if no agreement has been reached, specifying the level of Market Seller Offer Cap to which it commits by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall review the data submitted by the Capacity Market Seller, make a determination whether to accept or reject the requested unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit of its determination in writing, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If the Market Monitoring Unit does not provide its determination to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by the specified deadline, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, the Office of the Interconnection will make the determination of the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap, which shall be deemed to be final. If the Capacity Market Seller does not notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of the Market Seller Offer Cap it desires to utilize by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, it shall be required to utilize a Market Seller Offer Cap determined using the applicable default Avoidable Cost Rate specified in section 6.7(c) below.

(c) Nothing in this section precludes the Capacity Market Seller from filing a petition with FERC seeking a determination of whether the Sell Offer complies with the requirements of the Tariff.

(d) For any Third Incremental Auction for Delivery Years through the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year. For any Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 or 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource offering as a Base Capacity resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year. For any Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year or any subsequent Delivery Year, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource offering as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to the greater of the Net Cost of New Entry times the Balancing Ratio for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year or 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year.
6.5 Mitigation

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply market power mitigation measures in any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for any LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or the PJM Region that fails the Market Structure Test.

(a) Mitigation for Generation Capacity Resources.

i) Existing Generation Capacity Resource

Mitigation will be applied on a unit-specific basis and only if the Sell Offer of Unforced Capacity from an Existing Generation Capacity Resource: (1) is greater than the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to such resource; and (2) would, absent mitigation, increase the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the relevant auction. If such conditions are met, such Sell Offer shall be set equal to the Market Seller Offer Cap.

ii) Planned Generation Capacity Resources

(A) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including External Planned Generation Capacity Resources) shall be presumed to be competitive and shall not be subject to market power mitigation in any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for which such resource qualifies as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, but any such Sell Offer shall be rejected if it meets the criteria set forth in subsection (C) below, unless the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from FERC for use of such offer prior to the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

(B) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including Planned External Generation Capacity Resources) shall be deemed competitive and not be subject to mitigation if: (1) collectively all such Sell Offers provide Unforced Capacity in an amount equal to or greater than two times the incremental quantity of new entry required to meet the LDA Reliability Requirement; and (2) at least two unaffiliated suppliers have submitted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in such LDA. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Capacity Market Seller, together with Affiliates, whose Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources in that modeled LDA are pivotal, shall be subject to mitigation.

(C) Where the two conditions stated in subsection (B) above are not met, or the Sell Offer is pivotal, the Sell Offer shall be rejected if it exceeds 140 percent of: 1) the average of location-adjusted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources from the same asset class as such Sell Offer, submitted (and not rejected) (Asset-Class New Plant Offers) for such Delivery Year; or 2) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for such
Delivery Year, the average of Asset-Class New Plant Offers for all prior Delivery Years; or 3) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for any prior Delivery Year, the Net CONE applicable for such Delivery Year in the LDA for which such Sell Offer was submitted. For purposes of this section, asset classes shall be as stated in section 6.7(c) below as effective for such Delivery Year, and Asset-Class New Plant Offers shall be location-adjusted by the ratio between the Net CONE effective for such Delivery Year for the LDA in which the Sell Offer subject to this section was submitted and the average, weighted by installed capacity, of the Net CONEs for all LDAs in which the units underlying such Asset Class New Plant Offers are located. Following the conduct of the applicable auction and before the final determination of clearing prices, in accordance with Section 6.2(b) above, each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer is so rejected shall be notified in writing by the Office of the Interconnection by no later than one (1) Business Day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction and allowed an opportunity to submit a revised Sell Offer that does not exceed such threshold within one (1) Business Day of the Office of the Interconnection’s rejection of such Sell Offer. If such revised Sell Offer is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection then shall clear the auction with such revised Sell Offer in place. Pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, Section II.F, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify in writing each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer has been determined to be non-competitive and subject to mitigation, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, by no later than one (1) Business Day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

(b) Mitigation for Demand Resources

The Market Seller Offer Cap shall not be applied to Sell Offers of Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources.

6.6 Offer Requirement for Capacity Resources

(a) To avoid application of subsection (h) below, all of the installed capacity of all Existing Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region shall be offered by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to this RPM must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6. The Unforced Capacity of such resources is determined using the EFORd value that is submitted by the Capacity Market Seller in its Sell Offer, which shall not exceed the maximum EFORd for that resource as defined in section 6.6(b). If a resource should be included on the list of Existing Generation Capacity Resources subject to the RPM must-offer requirement that is maintained by the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C.1, but is omitted therefrom whether by mistake of the Market Monitoring Unit or failure of the Capacity
Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource to provide information about the resource to the Market Monitoring Unit, this shall not excuse such resource from the RPM must-offer requirement.

(b) For each Existing Generation Capacity Resource, a potential Capacity Market Seller must timely provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection all data and documentation required under this section 6.6 to establish the maximum EFORd applicable to each resource in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. The maximum EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM Auctions held prior to the date on which the final EFORds used for a Delivery Year are posted, is the greater of (i) the average EFORd for the five consecutive years ending on the September 30 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction, or (ii) the EFORd for the 12 months ending on the September 30 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller may request an alternate maximum EFORd for Sell Offers submitted in such auctions if it has a documented, known reason that would result in an increase in its EFORd, by submitting a written request to the Market Monitoring Unit and Office of the Interconnection, along with data and documentation required to support the request for an alternate maximum EFORd, by no later one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. The Capacity Market Seller must address any concerns identified by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection regarding the data and documentation provided and attempt to reach agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit on the level of the alternate maximum EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. As further described in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination of the requested alternate maximum EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. By no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing whether it agrees with the Market Monitoring Unit on the alternate maximum EFORd or, if no agreement has been reached, specifying the level of alternate maximum EFORd to which it commits. If a Capacity Market Seller fails to request an alternate maximum EFORd prior to the specified deadlines, the maximum EFORd for the applicable RPM Auction shall be deemed to be the default EFORd calculated pursuant to this section.

The maximum EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for Third Incremental Auction, and for Conditional Incremental Auctions held after the date on which the final EFORd used for a Delivery Year is posted, is the EFORd for the 12 months ending on the September 30 that last precedes the submission of such offers.

(c) [Reserved for Future Use]

(d) In the event that a Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit cannot agree on the maximum level of the alternate EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM
Auctions held prior to the date on which the final EFORds used for a Delivery Year are posted, the Office of the Interconnection shall make its own determination of the maximum level of the alternate EFORd based on the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, per Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.8, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual for the applicable Delivery Year, and shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of such determination.

(e) Nothing in this section precludes the Capacity Market Seller from filing a petition with FERC seeking a determination of whether the EFORd complies with the requirements of the Tariff.

(f) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller may submit an EFORd that it chooses for an RPM Auction held prior to the date on which the final EFORd used for a Delivery Year is posted, provided that (i) it has participated in good faith with the process described in this section 6.6 and in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C, (ii) the offer is no higher than the level defined in any agreement reached by the Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit that resulted from the foregoing process, and (iii) the offer is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection subject to the criteria set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Manuals.

(g) A Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls an existing generation resource in the PJM Region that is capable of qualifying as an Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for an RPM Auction may not avoid the rule in subsection (a) or be removed from Capacity Resource status by failing to qualify as a Generation Capacity Resource, or by attempting to remove a unit previously qualified as a Generation Capacity Resource from classification as a Capacity Resource for that RPM Auction. However, generation resource may qualify for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, as shown by appropriate documentation, if the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resource demonstrates that it: (i) is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant Delivery Year; (ii) has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity, or (iii) was interconnected to the Transmission System as an Energy Resource and not subsequently converted to a Capacity Resource.

In order to establish that a resource is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction as set forth in (i) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that:

A. It has a documented plan in place to retire the resource prior to or during the Delivery Year, and has submitted a notice of Deactivation to the Office of the Interconnection consistent with Tariff, Part V, section 113.1, without regard to whether the Office of the Interconnection has requested the Capacity Market Seller to continue to operate the resource beyond its desired deactivation date in accordance with Tariff, Part V, section 113.2 for the purpose of maintaining the reliability of the PJM Transmission System and the Capacity Market Seller has agreed to do so;

B. Significant physical operational restrictions cause long term or permanent changes to the installed capacity value of the resource, or the resource is under major repair that will
extend into the applicable Delivery Year, that will result in the imposition of RPM performance penalties pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD;

C. The Capacity Market Seller is involved in an ongoing regulatory proceeding (e.g. – regarding potential environmental restrictions) specific to the resource and has received an order, decision, final rule, opinion or other final directive from the regulatory authority that will result in the retirement of the resource; or

D. A resource considered an Existing Generating Capacity Resource because it cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction, but which is not yet in service, is unable to achieve full commercial operation prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction. The Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer certifying that the resource will not be in full commercial operation prior to the referenced Delivery Year.

In order to establish that a resource has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity as set forth in (ii) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has entered into a unit-specific bilateral transaction for service to load located outside the PJM Region, by a demonstration that such resource is identified on a unit-specific basis as a network resource under the transmission tariff for the control area applicable to such external load, or by an equivalent demonstration of a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale. The Capacity Market Seller additionally shall identify the megawatt amount, export zone, and time period (in days) of the export.

A Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from PJM Capacity Resource status and/or seeks approval for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, for any reason other than the reason specified in Paragraph A above, shall first submit such request in writing, along with all supporting data and documentation, to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

In order to obtain an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement for the reason specified in Paragraph A above, a Capacity Market Seller shall first submit a preliminary exception request in writing, along with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions upon which the Capacity Market Seller is relying in its analysis of whether to retire such resource, to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than (a) November 1, 2013 for the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, (b) the September 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the 2018/2019 and subsequent Delivery Years, and (c) two hundred forty (240) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of any such preliminary exception requests, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received notification of preliminary exception requests, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
Thereafter, as applicable, such Capacity Market Seller shall by no later than (a) the December 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, or (b) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction, either (a) notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing that it is withdrawing its preliminary exception request and explaining the changes to its analysis of whether to retire such resource that support its decision to withdraw, or (b) demonstrate that it has met the requirements specified under Paragraph A above. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of such notification, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a revised summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received requests for exceptions to the RPM must-offer requirement for the reason specified in Paragraph A above, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

A Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit a preliminary request in writing, along with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions upon which the Capacity Market Seller is relying in its analysis of whether to remove the Capacity Resource status of such resource to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than (a) the September 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction, and (b) two hundred forty (240) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. For the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit such preliminary request by no later than November 1, 2019. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of any such preliminary requests, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received notification of preliminary requests, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Thereafter, as applicable, such Capacity Market Seller shall, by no later than (a) the December 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, or (b) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction, notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing that it is either (a) withdrawing its preliminary request and explaining the changes to its analysis that support its decision to withdraw, or (b) confirming its preliminary decision to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of such notification, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a revised summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received requests to remove its Capacity Resource status, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall analyze the effects of the proposed removal of a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status with regard to potential market power issues and shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination of the request to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from
Capacity Resource status, and whether a market power issue has been identified, by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. Such notice shall include the specific market power impact resulting from the proposed removal of the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status, as well as an initial assessment of any steps that could be taken to mitigate the market power impact.

A Capacity Market Seller may only remove the Generation Capacity Resource from PJM Capacity Resource status if (i) the Market Monitoring Unit has determined that the Generation Capacity Resource meets the applicable criteria set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.6.6 and this section 6.6 and the Office of the Interconnection agrees with this determination, or (ii) the Commission has issued an order terminating the Capacity Resource status of the resource, or (iii) it is required as set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c). Nothing herein shall require a Market Seller to offer its resource into an RPM Auction prior to seeking to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status, subject to satisfaction of this section 6.6. A Generation Capacity Resource that is removed from Capacity Resource status shall no longer qualify as an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, and the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall be subject to termination in accordance with the rules described in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g., FERC filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement.

If the Capacity Market Seller disagrees with the Market Monitoring Unit’s determination of its request to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status or its request for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, it must notify the Market Monitoring Unit in writing, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, of the same by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. After the Market Monitoring Unit has made its determination of whether a resource may be removed from Capacity Resource status, has satisfied the RPM must-offer requirement or whether the resource meets one of the exceptions thereto, and has notified the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of the same pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C.4, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve or deny the exception request. The exception request shall be deemed to be approved by the Office of the Interconnection, consistent with the determination of the Market Monitoring Unit, unless the Office of the Interconnection notifies the Capacity Market Seller and Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences, that the exception request is denied.

If the Market Monitoring Unit does not timely notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination of the request to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status or for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall make the determination whether the request shall be approved or denied, and will notify the Capacity Market Seller of its determination in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences.
After the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection have made their determinations of whether a resource meets the criteria to qualify for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Capacity Market Seller must notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection whether it intends to exclude from its Sell Offer some or all of the subject capacity on the basis of an identified exception by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences. PJM does not make determinations of whether withholding of capacity constitutes market power. A Generation Capacity Resource that does not qualify for submission into an RPM Auction because it is not owned or controlled by the Capacity Market Seller for a full Delivery Year is not subject to the offer requirement hereunder; provided, however, that a Capacity Market Seller planning to transfer ownership or control of a Generation Capacity Resource during a Delivery Year pursuant to a sale or transfer agreement entered into after March 26, 2009 shall be required to satisfy the offer requirement hereunder for the entirety of such Delivery Year and may satisfy such requirement by providing for the assumption of this requirement by the transferee of ownership or control under such agreement.

If a Capacity Market Seller doesn’t timely seek to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status or timely submit a request for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Generation Capacity Resource shall only be removed from Capacity Resource status, and may only be approved for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, upon the Capacity Market Seller requesting and receiving an order from FERC, prior to the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, directing the Office of the Interconnection to remove the resource from Capacity Resource status and/or granting an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement or a waiver of the RPM must-offer requirement as to such resource.

(h) Any existing generation resource located in the PJM Region that satisfies the criteria in the definition of Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, that is not offered into such Base Residual Auction, and that does not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any subsequent Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.

All generation resources located in the PJM Region that satisfy the criteria in the definition of Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for an Incremental Auction for a particular Delivery Year, but that did not satisfy such criteria as of the date that on which bidding commenced in the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, that is not offered into that Incremental Auction, and that does not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any subsequent Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.
All Existing Generation Capacity Resources that are offered into a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for a particular Delivery Year but do not clear in such auction, that are not offered into each subsequent Incremental Auction, and that do not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year subsequent to such failure to offer; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.

Any such Existing Generation Capacity Resources may also be subject to further action by the Market Monitoring Unit under the terms of Tariff, Attachment M and Tariff, Attachment M – Appendix.

(i) In addition to the remedies set forth in subsections (g) and (h) above, if the Market Monitoring Unit determines that one or more Capacity Market Sellers’ failure to offer part or all of one or more existing generation resources, for which the Office of the Interconnection has not approved an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, into an RPM Auction as required by this Section 6.6 would result in an increase of greater than five percent in any Zonal Capacity Price determined through such auction, and the Office of the Interconnection agrees with that determination, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply to FERC for an order, on an expedited basis, directing such Capacity Market Seller to participate in the relevant RPM Auction, or for other appropriate relief, and PJM will postpone clearing the auction pending FERC’s decision on the matter. If the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the Market Monitoring Unit’s determination and does not apply to FERC for an order directing the Capacity Market Seller to participate in the auction or for other appropriate relief, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and to seek appropriate relief.

6.6A Offer Requirement for Capacity Performance Resources

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the installed capacity of every Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is capable (or that reasonably can become capable) of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be offered as a Capacity Performance Resource by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each such Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to the Capacity Performance Resource must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6.

(b) Determinations of EFORd and Unforced Capacity made under this section 6.6 as to a Generation Capacity Resource shall govern the offers required under this section as to the same Generation Capacity Resource.

(c) Exceptions to the requirement in subsection (a) shall be permitted only for a resource which the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates is reasonably expected to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Intermittent
Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception for a Base Residual Auction shall include a documented plan with the submission of their request showing the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for the resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Such plan shall include (i) a timeline for design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, as applicable, where such timeline shall not exceed one Base Residual Auction exception, and (ii) evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment). Periodic updates on the progress, shall be provided by the Capacity Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit for their review by no later than (i) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for subsequent Incremental Auctions for the applicable Delivery Years, and (ii) the December 1 that last precedes subsequent Base Residual Auctions. The Capacity Market Seller shall also immediately notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit of any material changes to the plan that may occur. Upon request by a Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline shall be permissible only for delays not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, and that could not have been remedied through the exercise of due diligence by the Capacity Market Seller. In no event may an exception be requested by the Capacity Market Seller for more than two Base Residual Auctions.

Failure to submit a documented plan, or lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource in accordance with a documented plan, shall result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status effective with the first future Delivery Year for which the resource was granted an exception, no earlier than the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g. FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. The required change in Capacity Resource status shall only apply to those Generation Capacity Resources that are shown to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.

(d) A resource not exempted or excepted under subsection (c) hereof that is capable of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource and does not offer into an RPM Auction as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be subject to the same restrictions on subsequent offers, and other possible remedies, as specified in section 6.6.

6.7 Data Submission
(a) Potential participants in any PJM Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall submit, together with supporting documentation for each item, to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the posted date for the conduct of such auction, a list of owned or controlled generation resources by PJM transmission zone for the specified Delivery Year, including the amount of gross capacity, the EFORd and the net (unforced) capacity. A potential participant intending to offer any Capacity Performance Resource at or below the default Market Seller Offer Cap described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.4(a) must provide the associated offer cap and the MW to which the offer cap applies.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) below, potential participants in any PJM Reliability Pricing Model Auction in any LDA or Unconstrained LDA Group that request a unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate shall, in addition, submit the following data, together with supporting documentation for each item, to the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction:

i. If the Capacity Market Seller intends to submit a non-zero price in its Sell Offer in any such auction, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a calculation of the Avoidable Cost Rate and Projected PJM Market Revenues, as defined in subsection (d) below, together with detailed supporting documentation.

ii. If the Capacity Market Seller intends to submit a Sell Offer based on opportunity cost, the Capacity Market Seller shall also submit a calculation of Opportunity Cost, as defined in subsection (d), with detailed supporting documentation.

(c) Potential auction participants identified in subsection (b) above need not submit the data specified in that subsection for any Generation Capacity Resource:

i. that is in an Unconstrained LDA Group or, if this is the relevant market, the entire PJM Region, and is in a resource class identified in the table below as not likely to include the marginal price-setting resources in such auction; or

ii. for which the potential participant commits that any Sell Offer it submits to such resource shall not include any price above: (1) the applicable default level identified below for the relevant resource class, less (2) the Projected PJM Market Revenues for such resource, as determined in accordance with this Tariff.

Nothing herein precludes the Market Monitoring Unit from requesting additional information from any potential auction participant as deemed necessary by the Market Monitoring Unit, including, without limitation, additional cost data on resources in a class that is not otherwise expected to include the marginal price setting resource as outlined in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.G. Any Sell Offer submitted in any auction that is inconsistent with any agreement or commitment made pursuant to this subsection shall be rejected, and the Capacity Market Seller shall be required to resubmit a Sell Offer that complies with such agreement or commitment within one (1) Business Day of the Office of the Interconnection’s rejection of such Sell Offer. If the Capacity Market Seller does not timely resubmit its Sell Offer, fails to request a unit-specific
Avoidable Cost Rate by the specified deadline, or if the Office of the Interconnection determines that the information provided by the Capacity Market Seller in support of the requested unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate or Sell Offer is incomplete, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have submitted a Sell Offer that complies with the commitments made under this subsection, with a default offer for the applicable class of resource or nearest comparable class of resource determined under this subsection (c)(ii). The obligation imposed under section 6.6(a) above shall not be satisfied unless and until the Capacity Market Seller submits (or is deemed to have submitted) a Sell Offer that conforms to its commitments made pursuant to this subsection or subject to the procedures set forth in section 6.4 above and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.H.

The default retirement and mothball Avoidable Cost Rates (“ACR”) referenced in this subsection (c)(ii) are as set forth in the tables below for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year through the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Capacity Market Sellers shall use the one-year mothball Avoidable Cost Rate shown below, unless such Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria set forth in section 6.7(e) below, in which case the Capacity Market Seller may use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate. PJM shall also publish on its Web site the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rates. A Capacity Market Seller may not use the default Market Seller Offer Cap contained in the ACR tables in this subsection, and also seek to include any one or more categories of the Avoidable Cost Rate defined section 6.8 below.

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<td>CT - 3rd Gen. Aero (P&amp;W FT-8 TwinPak)</td>
<td>$33.34</td>
<td>$49.16</td>
<td>$34.63</td>
<td>$51.06</td>
<td>$36.04</td>
<td>$53.14</td>
<td>$33.93</td>
<td>$50.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 3rd Gen. Frame F</td>
<td>$26.96</td>
<td>$38.83</td>
<td>$28.00</td>
<td>$40.33</td>
<td>$29.14</td>
<td>$41.98</td>
<td>$27.43</td>
<td>$39.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>$29.92</td>
<td>$37.98</td>
<td>$31.08</td>
<td>$39.45</td>
<td>$32.35</td>
<td>$41.06</td>
<td>$30.44</td>
<td>$38.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Steam</td>
<td>$74.20</td>
<td>$90.33</td>
<td>$77.07</td>
<td>$93.83</td>
<td>$80.21</td>
<td>$97.66</td>
<td>$75.51</td>
<td>$91.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commencing with the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the default retirement and mothball Avoidable Cost Rates referenced in section (c)(ii) above, and post them on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction. To determine the applicable ACR rates, the Office of the Interconnection shall use the actual rate of change in the historical values from the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs or a comparable index approved by the Commission (“Handy-Whitman Index”) to the extent they are available to update the base values for the Delivery Year, and for future Delivery Years for which the updated Handy-Whitman Index values are not yet available the Office of the Interconnection shall update the base values for the Delivery Year using the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change. The ACR rates shall be expressed in dollar values for the applicable Delivery Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maximum Avoidable Cost Rates by Technology Class</th>
<th>(Expressed in 2011 Dollars for the 2011/2012 Delivery Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Mothball ACR ($/MW-Day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine - Industrial Frame</td>
<td>$24.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Fired</td>
<td>$136.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$29.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine - Aero Derivative</td>
<td>$26.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>$25.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>$68.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Steam</td>
<td>$63.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumped Storage</td>
<td>$20.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To determine the default retirement and mothball ACR values for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall multiply the base default retirement and mothball ACR values in the table above by a factor equal to one plus the most recent annual average rate of change in the July Handy-Whitman Indices for the 2011 to 2013 calendar years to determine updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values. The updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values shall then be multiplied by a factor equal to one plus the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change in the applicable Handy-Whitman Index, taken to the fourth power, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website.

To determine the default retirement and mothball ACR values for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall multiply the updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values from the immediately preceding Delivery Year by a factor equal to one plus the most recent annual average rate of change in the July Handy-Whitman Index. These values become the new adjusted base default retirement and mothball ACR values, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website. These resulting adjusted base values for the Delivery Year shall be multiplied by a factor equal to one plus the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change in the
applicable Handy-Whitman Index, taken to the fourth power, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website.

PJM shall also publish on its website the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rates.

After the Market Monitoring Unit conducts its annual review of the table of default Avoidable Cost Rates included in section 6.7(c) above in accordance with the procedure specified in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.H, it will provide updated values or notice of its determination that updated values are not needed to Office of the Interconnection. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that the values should be updated, the Office of the Interconnection shall file its proposed values with the Commission by no later than October 30th prior to the commencement of the offer period for the first RPM Auction for which it proposes to apply the updated values.

(d) In order for costs to qualify for inclusion in the Market Seller Offer Cap, the Capacity Market Seller must provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection relevant unit-specific cost data concerning each data item specified as set forth in section 6 by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If cost data is not available at the time of submission for the time periods specified in section 6.8 below, costs may be estimated for such period based on the most recent data available, with an explanation of and basis for the estimate used, as may be further specified in the PJM Manuals. Based on the data and calculations submitted by the Capacity Market Sellers for each existing generation resource and the formulas specified below, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Market Seller Offer Cap for each such resource, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

i. Avoidable Cost Rate: The Avoidable Cost Rate for an existing generation resource shall be determined using the formula below and applied to the unit’s Base Offer Segment.

ii. Opportunity Cost: Opportunity Cost shall be the documented price available to an existing generation resource in a market external to PJM. In the event that the total MW of existing generation resources submitting opportunity cost offers in any auction for a Delivery Year exceeds the firm export capability of the PJM system for such Delivery Year, or the capability of external markets to import capacity in such year, the Office of the Interconnection will accept such offers on a competitive basis. PJM will construct a supply curve of opportunity cost offers, ordered by opportunity cost, and accept such offers to export starting with the highest opportunity cost, until the maximum level of such exports is reached. The maximum level of such exports is the lesser of the Office of the Interconnection’s ability to permit firm exports or the ability of the importing area(s) to accept firm imports or imports of capacity, taking account of relevant export limitations by location. If, as a result, an opportunity cost offer is not accepted from an existing generation resource, the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to Sell Offers relying on such generation resource shall be the Avoidable Cost Rate less the Projected Market Revenues for such resource (as defined in section 6.4 above). The default Avoidable Cost Rate shall be the one year mothball Avoidable Cost Rate set forth in the
tables in section 6.7(c) above unless Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria delineated in section 6.7(e) below.

iii. Projected PJM Market Revenues: Projected PJM Market Revenues are defined by section 6.8(d) below, for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied.

(e) In order for the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate set forth in the table in section 6.7(c) to apply, by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, a Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer representing that the Capacity Market Seller will retire the Generation Capacity Resource if it does not receive during the relevant Delivery Year at least the applicable retirement Avoidable Cost Rate because it would be uneconomic to continue to operate the Generation Capacity Resource in the Delivery Year without the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate, and specifying the date the Generation Capacity Resource would otherwise be retired.

6.8 Avoidable Cost Definition

(a) Avoidable Cost Rate:

The Avoidable Cost Rate for a Generation Capacity Resource that is the subject of a Sell Offer shall be determined using the following formula, expressed in dollars per MW-year:

$$\text{Avoidable Cost Rate} = [\text{Adjustment Factor} \times (\text{AOML} + \text{AAE} + \text{AFAE} + \text{AME} + \text{AVE} + \text{ATFI} + \text{ACC} + \text{ACLE}) + \text{ARPIR} + \text{APIR} + \text{CPQR}]$$

Where:

- **Adjustment Factor** equals 1.10 (to provide a margin of error for understatement of costs) plus an additional adjustment referencing the 10-year average Handy-Whitman Index in order to account for expected inflation from the time interval between the submission of the Sell Offer and the commencement of the Delivery Year.

- **AOML (Avoidable Operations and Maintenance Labor)** consists of the avoidable labor expenses related directly to operations and maintenance of the generating unit for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AOML are those incurred for: (a) on-site based labor engaged in operations and maintenance activities; (b) off-site based labor engaged in on-site operations and maintenance activities directly related to the generating unit; and (c) off-site based labor engaged in off-site operations and maintenance activities directly related to generating unit equipment removed from the generating unit site.

- **AAE (Avoidable Administrative Expenses)** consists of the avoidable administrative expenses related directly to employees at the generating unit for twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be
provided. The categories of expenses included in AAE are those incurred for: (a) employee expenses (except employee expenses included in AOML); (b) environmental fees; (c) safety and operator training; (d) office supplies; (e) communications; and (f) annual plant test, inspection and analysis.

- **AAE (Avoidable Fuel Availability Expenses)** consists of avoidable operating expenses related directly to fuel availability and delivery for the generating unit that can be demonstrated by the Capacity Market Seller based on data for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided, or on reasonable projections for the Delivery Year supported by executed contracts, published tariffs, or other data sufficient to demonstrate with reasonable certainty the level of costs that have been or shall be incurred for such purpose. The categories of expenses included in AAE are those incurred for: (a) firm gas pipeline transportation; (b) natural gas storage costs; (c) costs of gas balancing agreements; and (d) costs of gas park and loan services. AFAE expenses are for firm fuel supply and apply solely for offers for a Capacity Performance Resource

- **AME (Avoidable Maintenance Expenses)** consists of avoidable maintenance expenses (other than expenses included in AOML) related directly to the generating unit for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AME are those incurred for: (a) chemical and materials consumed during maintenance of the generating unit; and (b) rented maintenance equipment used to maintain the generating unit.

- **AVE (Avoidable Variable Expenses)** consists of avoidable variable expenses related directly to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AVE are those incurred for: (a) water treatment chemicals and lubricants; (b) water, gas, and electric service (not for power generation); and (c) waste water treatment.

- **ATFI (Avoidable Taxes, Fees and Insurance)** consists of avoidable expenses related directly to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in ATFI are those incurred for: (a) insurance, (b) permits and licensing fees, (c) site security and utilities for maintaining security at the site; and (d) property taxes.

- **ACC (Avoidable Carrying Charges)** consists of avoidable short-term carrying charges related directly to the generating unit in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. Avoidable short-term carrying charges shall include short-term carrying charges for maintaining reasonable levels of inventories of fuel and spare parts that result from short-term operational unit decisions as measured by industry best practice standards. For the purpose of determining ACC,
short term is the time period in which a reasonable replacement of inventory for normal, expected operations can occur.

- **ACLE (Avoidable Corporate Level Expenses)** consists of avoidable corporate level expenses directly related to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. Avoidable corporate level expenses shall include only such expenses that are directly linked to providing tangible services required for the operation of the generating unit proposed for Deactivation. The categories of avoidable expenses included in ACLE are those incurred for: (a) legal services, (b) environmental reporting; and (c) procurement expenses.

- **CPQR (Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk)** consists of the quantifiable and reasonably-supported costs of mitigating the risks of non-performance associated with submission of a Capacity Performance Resource offer (or of a Base Capacity Resource offer for the 2018/19 or 2019/20 Delivery Years), such as insurance expenses associated with resource non-performance risks. CPQR shall be considered reasonably supported if it is based on actuarial practices generally used by the industry to model or value risk and if it is based on actuarial practices used by the Capacity Market Seller to model or value risk in other aspects of the Capacity Market Seller’s business. Such reasonable support shall also include an officer certification that the modeling and valuation of the CPQR was developed in accord with such practices. Provision of such reasonable support shall be sufficient to establish the CPQR. A Capacity Market Seller may use other methods or forms of support for its proposed CPQR that shows the CPQR is limited to risks the seller faces from committing a Capacity Resource hereunder, that quantifies the costs of mitigating such risks, and that includes supporting documentation (which may include an officer certification) for the identification of such risks and quantification of such costs. Such showing shall establish the proposed CPQR upon acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection.

- **APIR (Avoidable Project Investment Recovery Rate) = PI * CRF**

Where:

- **PI** is the amount of project investment completed prior to June 1 of the Delivery Year, except for Mandatory Capital Expenditures (“CapEx”) for which the project investment must be completed during the Delivery Year, that is reasonably required to enable a Generation Capacity Resource that is the subject of a Sell Offer to continue operating or improve availability during Peak-Hour Periods during the Delivery Year.
• CRF is the annual capital recovery factor from the following table, applied in accordance with the terms specified below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Units (Years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life of Plant (Years)</th>
<th>Levelized CRF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory CapEx</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Plus Alternative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unless otherwise stated, Age of Existing Unit shall be equal to the number of years since the Unit commenced commercial operation, up to and through the relevant Delivery Year.

Remaining Life of Plant defines the amortization schedule (i.e., the maximum number of years over which the Project Investment may be included in the Avoidable Cost Rate.)

**Capital Expenditures and Project Investment**

For any given Project Investment, a Capacity Market Seller may make a one-time election to recover such investment using: (i) the highest CRF and associated recovery schedule to which it is entitled; or (ii) the next highest CRF and associated recovery schedule. For these purposes, the CRF and recovery schedule for the 25 Plus category is the next highest CRF and recovery schedule for both the Mandatory CapEx and the 40 Plus Alternative categories. The Capacity Market Seller using the above table must provide the Market Monitoring Unit with information, identifying and supporting such election, including but not limited to the age of the unit, the amount of the Project Investment, the purpose of the investment, evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment), and detailed information concerning the governmental requirement (if applicable). Absent other written notification, such election shall be deemed based on the CRF such Seller employs for the first Sell Offer reflecting recovery of any portion of such Project Investment.

For any resource using the CRF and associated recovery schedule from the CRF table that set the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in any Delivery Year, such Capacity Market Seller must also provide to the Market Monitoring Unit, for informational purposes only, evidence of the actual expenditure of the Project Investment, when such information becomes available.

If the project associated with a Project Investment that was included in a Sell Offer using a CRF and associated recovery schedule from the above table has not entered into commercial operation prior to the end of the relevant Delivery Year, and the resource’s Sell Offer sets the clearing price for the relevant LDA, the Capacity Market Seller shall be required to elect to either (i) pay a charge that is equal to the difference between the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for such LDA for the relevant Delivery Year and what the clearing price would have been absent the
APIR component of the Avoidable Cost Rate, this difference to be multiplied by the cleared MW volume from such Resource (“rebate payment”); (ii) hold such rebate payment in escrow, to be released to the Capacity Market Seller in the event that the project enters into commercial operation during the subsequent Delivery Year or rebated to LSEs in the relevant LDA if the project has not entered into commercial operation during the subsequent Delivery Year; or (iii) make a reasonable investment in the amount of the PI in other Existing Generation Capacity Resources owned or controlled by the Capacity Market Seller or its Affiliates in the relevant LDA. The revenue from such rebate payments shall be allocated pro rata to LSEs in the relevant LDA(s) that were charged a Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year, based on their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in the relevant LDA(s). If the Sell Offer from the Generation Capacity Resource did not set the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the relevant LDA, no alternative investment or rebate payment is required. If the difference between the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for such LDA for the relevant Delivery Year and what the clearing price would have been absent the APIR amount does not exceed the greater of $10 per MW-day or a 10% increase in the clearing price, no alternative investment or rebate payment is required.

**Mandatory CapEx Option**

The Mandatory CapEx CRF and recovery schedule is an option available, beginning in the third BRA (Delivery Year 2009-10), to a resource that must make a Project Investment to comply with a governmental requirement that would otherwise materially impact operating levels during the Delivery Year, where: (i) such resource is a coal, oil or gas-fired resource that began commercial operation no fewer than fifteen years prior to the start of the first Delivery Year for which such recovery is sought, and such Project Investment is equal to or exceeds $200/kW of capitalized project cost; or (ii) such resource is a coal-fired resource located in an LDA for which a separate VRR Curve has been established for the relevant Delivery Years, and began commercial operation at least 50 years prior to the conduct of the relevant BRA.

A Capacity Market Seller that wishes to elect the Mandatory CapEx option for a Project Investment must do so beginning with the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year in which such project is expected to enter commercial operation. A Sell Offer submitted in any Base Residual Auction for which the Mandatory CapEx option is selected may not exceed an offer price equivalent to 0.90 times the then-current Net CONE (on an unforced-equivalent basis).

**40 Plus Alternative Option**

The 40 Plus Alternative CRF and recovery schedule is an option available, beginning in the third BRA (Delivery Year 2009-10), for a resource that is a gas- or oil-fired resource that began commercial operation no less than 40 years prior to the conduct of the relevant BRA (excluding, however, any resource in any Delivery Year for which the resource is receiving a payment under Tariff, Part V. Generation Capacity Resources electing this 40 Plus Alternative CRF shall be treated as At Risk Generation for purposes of the sensitivity runs in the RTEP process). Resources electing the 40 Plus Alternative option will be modeled in the RTEP process as “at-risk” at the end of the one-year amortization period.

A Capacity Market Seller that wishes to elect the 40 Plus Alternative option for a Project Investment must provide written notice of such election to the Office of the Interconnection no
later than six months prior to the Base Residual Auction for which such election is sought; provided however that shorter notice may be provided if unforeseen circumstances give rise to the need to make such election and such seller gives notice as soon as practicable.

The Office of the Interconnection shall give market participants reasonable notice of such election, subject to satisfaction of requirements under the PJM Operating Agreement for protection of confidential and commercially sensitive information. A Sell Offer submitted in any Base Residual Auction for which the 40 Plus Alternative option is selected may not exceed an offer price equivalent to the then-current Net CONE (on an unforced-equivalent basis).

**Multi-Year Pricing Option**

A Seller submitting a Sell Offer with an APIR component that is based on a Project Investment of at least $450/kW may elect this Multi-Year Pricing Option by providing written notice to such effect the first time it submits a Sell Offer that includes an APIR component for such Project Investment. Such option shall be available on the same terms, and under the same conditions, as are available to Planned Generation Capacity Resources under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(c).

- **ARPIR (Avoidable Refunds of Project Investment Reimbursements)** consists of avoidable refund amounts of Project Investment Reimbursements payable by a Generation Owner to PJM under Tariff, Part V, section 118 or avoidable refund amounts of project investment reimbursements payable by a Generation Owner to PJM under a Cost of Service Recovery Rate filed under Tariff, Part V, section 119 and approved by the Commission.

  (b) For the purpose of determining an Avoidable Cost Rate, avoidable expenses are incremental expenses directly required to operate a Generation Capacity Resource that a Generation Owner would not incur if such generating unit did not operate in the Delivery Year or meet Availability criteria during Peak-Hour Periods during the Delivery Year.

  (c) Variable costs that are directly attributable to the production of energy shall be excluded from a Market Seller’s generation resource Avoidable Cost Rate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Seller that included variable costs attributable to the production of energy in a generation resource’s Avoidable Cost Rate prior to April 15, 2019 shall not include such costs in such generation resource’s Maintenance Adders or Operating Costs for any Delivery Year for which it has already included such costs in the generation resource’s Avoidable Cost Rate. A Market Seller implicated by this paragraph may continue including such variable costs attributable to the production of energy in its Avoidable Cost Rate for each generation resource for any Delivery Year for which it already did so prior to April 15, 2019.

  (d) Projected PJM Market Revenues for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied shall include all actual unit-specific revenues from PJM energy markets, ancillary services, and unit-specific bilateral contracts from such Generation Capacity Resource, net of energy and ancillary services market offers for such resource. Net energy market revenues shall be based on the non-zero market-based offers of the Capacity.
Market Seller of such Generation Capacity Resource unless one of the following conditions is met, in which case the cost-based offer shall be used: (x) the market-based offer for the resource is zero, (y) the market-based offer for the resource is higher than its cost-based offer and such offer has been mitigated, or (z) the market-based offer for the resource is less than such Capacity Market Seller’s fuel and environmental costs for the resource which shall be determined either by directly summing the fuel and environmental costs if they are available, or by subtracting from the cost-based offer for the resource all costs developed pursuant to the Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals that are not fuel or environmental costs.

The calculation of Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be equal to the rolling simple average of such net revenues as described above from the three most recent whole calendar years prior to the year in which the BRA is conducted.

If a Generation Capacity Resource did not receive PJM market revenues during the entire relevant time period because the Generation Capacity Resource was not integrated into PJM during the full period, then the Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years within the full period in which such Resource received PJM market revenues.

If a Generation Capacity Resource did not receive PJM market revenues during the entire relevant time period because it was not in commercial operation during the entire period, or if data is not available to the Capacity Market Seller for the entire period, despite the good faith efforts of such seller to obtain such data, then the Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be calculated based upon net revenues received over the entire period by comparable units, to be developed by the MMU and the Capacity Market Seller.
Attachment B

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Clean Format)
230.3 Loss of Capacity Interconnection Rights:

230.3.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Capacity Interconnection Rights, the Generation Capacity Resource associated with the rights must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with RAA, Schedule 9 and the PJM Manuals. Generation Capacity Resources that meet these operational standards shall retain their Capacity Interconnection Rights regardless of whether they are available as a Generation Capacity Resource or are making sales outside the PJM Region.

230.3.2 Failure to Meet Operational Standards:

This section 230.3.2 shall apply only in circumstances other than Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource. In the event a Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the operational standards set forth in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.1 for any consecutive three-year period (with the first such period commencing on the date the Interconnection Customer must demonstrate commercial operation of the generating unit(s) as specified in the Interconnection Service Agreement), the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such Generation Capacity Resource will lose its Capacity Interconnection Rights in an amount commensurate with the loss of generating capability. Any period during which the Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the standards set forth in section 230.3.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of a force majeure event as defined in Tariff, Attachment O, section 9.4, Tariff, Appendix 2 shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights exercises due diligence to remedy the event. A Generation Capacity Resource that loses Capacity Interconnection Rights pursuant to this section may continue Interconnection Service, to the extent of such lost rights, as an Energy Resource in accordance with (and for the remaining term of) its Interconnection Service Agreement and/or applicable terms of the Tariff.

230.3.3 Replacement of Generation:

In the event of the Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource (in accordance with Tariff, Part V and any Applicable Standards), or removal of Capacity Resource status (in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A), any Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall terminate one year from the Deactivation Date, or one year from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect, unless the holder of such rights (including any holder that acquired the rights after Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status) has submitted a new Generation Interconnection Request up to one year after the Deactivation Date, or up to one year from the date the Capacity Resource status changes take effect, which contemplates use of the same Capacity Interconnection Rights. The Interconnection Customer must provide written notification to the Transmission Provider that it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights on or before the date the Interconnection Customer executes the System Impact Study Agreement associated with the Generation Interconnection Request for which it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, Interconnection Customers in
the New Services Queue prior to May 1, 2012 must provide written notice of intent to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights when it executes its Facilities Study Agreement or, if it has already executed its Facilities Study Agreement, then by November 1, 2012. Such notification of transfer of Capacity Interconnection Rights shall be posted on Transmission Provider’s public website. Such new Generation Interconnection Request may include a request to increase Capacity Interconnection Rights in addition to the replacement of the previously deactivated amount, or amount removed from Capacity Resource status, as a single Generation Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider may perform thermal, short circuit, and/or stability studies, as necessary and in accordance with its manuals, due to any changes in the electrical characteristics of any newly proposed equipment, or where there is a change in Point of Interconnection, which may result in the loss of a portion or all of the Capacity Interconnection Rights as determined by such studies.

Upon execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement reflecting its new Interconnection Request, the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights will retain only such rights that are commensurate with the size in megawatts of the replacement generation, not to exceed the amount of the holder’s Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with the facility upon Deactivation or removal of Capacity Resource status. Any desired increase in Capacity Interconnection Rights must be requested in the new Generation Interconnection Request and be accredited through the applicable procedures in Tariff, Part IV and Tariff, Part VI. In the event the new Interconnection Request to which this section refers is or is deemed to be terminated and/or withdrawn for any reason at any time, the pertinent Capacity Interconnection Rights shall not terminate until the end of the one year period from the Deactivation Date, or the end of the one year period from the date the Capacity Resource status change takes effect.
6. MARKET POWER MITIGATION

6.1 Applicability

The provisions of the Market Monitoring Plan (in Tariff, Attachment M and Attachment - M Appendix and this section 6) shall apply to the Reliability Pricing Model Auctions.

6.2 Process

(a) [Reserved for Future Use]

(b) In accordance with the schedule specified in the PJM Manuals, following PJM’s conduct of a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12, but prior to the Office of the Interconnection’s final determination of clearing prices and charges pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) apply the Market Structure Test to any LDA having a Locational Price Adder greater than zero and to the entire PJM region; (ii) apply Market Seller Offer Caps, if required under this section 6; and (iii) recompute the optimization algorithm to clear the auction with the Market Seller Offer Caps in place.

(c) Within seven days after the deadline for submission of Sell Offers in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall file with FERC a report of any determination made pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h), Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.5(a)(ii), or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.7(c) identified in such sections as subject to the procedures of this section. Such report shall list each such determination, the information considered in making each such determination, and an explanation of each such determination. Any entity that objects to any such determination may file a written objection with FERC no later than seven days after the filing of the report. Any such objection must not merely allege that the determination was in error, and must provide support for the objection, demonstrating that the determination overlooked or failed to consider relevant evidence. In the event that no objection is filed, the determination shall be final. In the event that an objection is filed, FERC shall issue any decision modifying the determination no later than 60 days after the filing of such report; otherwise, the determination shall be final. Final auction results shall reflect any decision made by FERC regarding the report.

6.3 Market Structure Test

(a) [Reserved for Future Use]

(b) Market Structure Test.

A constrained LDA or the PJM Region shall fail the Market Structure Test, and mitigation shall be applied to all jointly pivotal suppliers (including all Affiliates of such suppliers, and all third-party supply in the relevant LDA controlled by such suppliers by contract), if, as to the Sell Offers that comprise the incremental supply determined pursuant to section 6.3(c) below that are based on Generation Capacity Resources, there are not more than three jointly pivotal suppliers. The Office
of the Interconnection shall apply the Market Structure Test. The Office of the Interconnection shall confirm the results of the Market Structure Test with the Market Monitoring Unit.

(c) Determination of Incremental Supply

In applying the Market Structure Test, the Office of the Interconnection shall consider all (i) incremental supply (provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall consider only such supply available from Generation Capacity Resources) available to solve the constraint applicable to a constrained LDA offered at less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price; or (ii) supply for the PJM Region, offered at less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price, provided that supply in this section includes only the lower of cost-based or market-based offers from Generation Capacity Resources. Cost-based clearing prices are the prices resulting from the RPM auction algorithm using the lower of cost-based or price-based offers for all Capacity Resources.

6.4 Market Seller Offer Caps

(a) The Market Seller Offer Cap, stated in dollars per MW/day of unforced capacity, applicable to price-quantity offers within the Base Offer Segment for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Avoidable Cost Rate for such resource, less the Projected PJM Market Revenues for such resource, stated in dollars per MW/day of unforced capacity, provided, however, that the default Market Seller Offer Cap for any Capacity Performance Resource shall be the product of (the Net Cost of New Entry applicable for the Delivery Year and Locational Deliverability Area for which such Capacity Performance Resource is offered times the average of the Balancing Ratios in the three consecutive calendar years (during the Performance Assessment Intervals in such calendar years) that precede the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year), however, for the Base Residual Auction for the 2021/2022 Delivery Year, the Balancing Ratio used in the determination of the default Market Seller Offer Cap shall be 78.5 percent, and provided further that the submission of a Sell Offer with an Offer Price at or below the revised Market Seller Offer Cap permitted under this proviso shall not, in and of itself, be deemed an exercise of market power in the RPM market. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, a Capacity Market Seller may seek and obtain a Market Seller Offer Cap for a Capacity Performance Resource that exceeds the revised Market Seller Offer Cap permitted under the prior sentence, if it supports and obtains approval of such alternative offer cap pursuant to the procedures and standards of subsection (b) of this section 6.4. A Capacity Market Seller may not use the Capacity Performance default Market Seller Offer Cap, and also seek to include any one or more categories of the Avoidable Cost Rate defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8 below. The Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Opportunity Cost for such resource, if applicable, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.7. Nothing herein shall preclude any Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit from agreeing to, nor require either such entity to agree to, an alternative market seller offer cap determined on a mutually agreeable basis. Any such alternative offer cap shall be filed with the Commission for its approval. This provision is duplicated in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.3.

(b) For each Existing Generation Capacity Resource, a potential Capacity Market Seller must provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection data and
documentation required under section 6.7 below to establish the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to each resource by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Capacity Market Seller must promptly address any concerns identified by the Market Monitoring Unit regarding the data and documentation provided, review the Market Seller Offer Cap proposed by the Market Monitoring Unit, and attempt to reach agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit on the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit in writing, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, whether an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit has been reached or, if no agreement has been reached, specifying the level of Market Seller Offer Cap to which it commits by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall review the data submitted by the Capacity Market Seller, make a determination whether to accept or reject the requested unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit of its determination in writing, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If the Market Monitoring Unit does not provide its determination to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by the specified deadline, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, the Office of the Interconnection will make the determination of the level of the Market Seller Offer Cap, which shall be deemed to be final. If the Capacity Market Seller does not notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of the Market Seller Offer Cap it desires to utilize by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, it shall be required to utilize a Market Seller Offer Cap determined using the applicable default Avoidable Cost Rate specified in section 6.7(c) below.

(c) Nothing in this section precludes the Capacity Market Seller from filing a petition with FERC seeking a determination of whether the Sell Offer complies with the requirements of the Tariff.

(d) For any Third Incremental Auction for Delivery Years through the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year. For any Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 or 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource offering as a Base Capacity resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year. For any Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year or any subsequent Delivery Year, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an Existing Generation Capacity Resource offering as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to the greater of the Net Cost of New Entry times the Balancing Ratio for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year or 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year.
6.5 Mitigation

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply market power mitigation measures in any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for any LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or the PJM Region that fails the Market Structure Test.

(a) Mitigation for Generation Capacity Resources.

i) Existing Generation Capacity Resource

Mitigation will be applied on a unit-specific basis and only if the Sell Offer of Unforced Capacity from an Existing Generation Capacity Resource: (1) is greater than the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to such resource; and (2) would, absent mitigation, increase the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the relevant auction. If such conditions are met, such Sell Offer shall be set equal to the Market Seller Offer Cap.

ii) Planned Generation Capacity Resources

(A) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including External Planned Generation Capacity Resources) shall be presumed to be competitive and shall not be subject to market power mitigation in any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for which such resource qualifies as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, but any such Sell Offer shall be rejected if it meets the criteria set forth in subsection (C) below, unless the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from FERC for use of such offer prior to the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

(B) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including Planned External Generation Capacity Resources) shall be deemed competitive and not be subject to mitigation if: (1) collectively all such Sell Offers provide Unforced Capacity in an amount equal to or greater than two times the incremental quantity of new entry required to meet the LDA Reliability Requirement; and (2) at least two unaffiliated suppliers have submitted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in such LDA. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Capacity Market Seller, together with Affiliates, whose Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources in that modeled LDA are pivotal, shall be subject to mitigation.

(C) Where the two conditions stated in subsection (B) above are not met, or the Sell Offer is pivotal, the Sell Offer shall be rejected if it exceeds 140 percent of: 1) the average of location-adjusted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources from the same asset class as such Sell Offer, submitted (and not rejected) (Asset-Class New Plant Offers) for such Delivery Year; or 2) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for such
Delivery Year, the average of Asset-Class New Plant Offers for all prior Delivery Years; or 3) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for any prior Delivery Year, the Net CONE applicable for such Delivery Year in the LDA for which such Sell Offer was submitted. For purposes of this section, asset classes shall be as stated in section 6.7(c) below as effective for such Delivery Year, and Asset-Class New Plant Offers shall be location-adjusted by the ratio between the Net CONE effective for such Delivery Year for the LDA in which the Sell Offer subject to this section was submitted and the average, weighted by installed capacity, of the Net CONEs for all LDAs in which the units underlying such Asset Class New Plant Offers are located. Following the conduct of the applicable auction and before the final determination of clearing prices, in accordance with Section 6.2(b) above, each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer is so rejected shall be notified in writing by the Office of the Interconnection by no later than one (1) Business Day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction and allowed an opportunity to submit a revised Sell Offer that does not exceed such threshold within one (1) Business Day of the Office of the Interconnection’s rejection of such Sell Offer. If such revised Sell Offer is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection then shall clear the auction with such revised Sell Offer in place. Pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, Section II.F, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify in writing each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer has been determined to be non-competitive and subject to mitigation, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, by no later than one (1) Business Day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

(b) Mitigation for Demand Resources

The Market Seller Offer Cap shall not be applied to Sell Offers of Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources.

6.6 Offer Requirement for Capacity Resources

(a) To avoid application of subsection (h) below, all of the installed capacity of all Existing Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region shall be offered by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to this RPM must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6. The Unforced Capacity of such resources is determined using the EFORd value that is submitted by the Capacity Market Seller in its Sell Offer, which shall not exceed the maximum EFORd for that resource as defined in section 6.6(b). If a resource should be included on the list of Existing Generation Capacity Resources subject to the RPM must-offer requirement that is maintained by the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C.1, but is omitted therefrom whether by mistake of the Market Monitoring Unit or failure of the Capacity
Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource to provide information about the resource to the Market Monitoring Unit, this shall not excuse such resource from the RPM must-offer requirement.

(b) For each Existing Generation Capacity Resource, a potential Capacity Market Seller must timely provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection all data and documentation required under this section 6.6 to establish the maximum EFORd applicable to each resource in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. The maximum EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM Auctions held prior to the date on which the final EFORds used for a Delivery Year are posted, is the greater of (i) the average EFORd for the five consecutive years ending on the September 30 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction, or (ii) the EFORd for the 12 months ending on the September 30 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller may request an alternate maximum EFORd for Sell Offers submitted in such auctions if it has a documented, known reason that would result in an increase in its EFORd, by submitting a written request to the Market Monitoring Unit and Office of the Interconnection, along with data and documentation required to support the request for an alternate maximum EFORd, by no later one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. The Capacity Market Seller must address any concerns identified by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection regarding the data and documentation provided and attempt to reach agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit on the level of the alternate maximum EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. As further described in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination of the requested alternate maximum EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. By no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing whether it agrees with the Market Monitoring Unit on the alternate maximum EFORd or, if no agreement has been reached, specifying the level of alternate maximum EFORd to which it commits. If a Capacity Market Seller fails to request an alternate maximum EFORd prior to the specified deadlines, the maximum EFORd for the applicable RPM Auction shall be deemed to be the default EFORd calculated pursuant to this section.

The maximum EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for Third Incremental Auction, and for Conditional Incremental Auctions held after the date on which the final EFORd used for a Delivery Year is posted, is the EFORd for the 12 months ending on the September 30 that last precedes the submission of such offers.

(c) [Reserved for Future Use]

(d) In the event that a Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit cannot agree on the maximum level of the alternate EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM
(e) Nothing in this section precludes the Capacity Market Seller from filing a petition with FERC seeking a determination of whether the EFORd complies with the requirements of the Tariff.

(f) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller may submit an EFORd that it chooses for an RPM Auction held prior to the date on which the final EFORd used for a Delivery Year is posted, provided that (i) it has participated in good faith with the process described in this section 6.6 and in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C, (ii) the offer is no higher than the level defined in any agreement reached by the Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit that resulted from the foregoing process, and (iii) the offer is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection subject to the criteria set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Manuals.

(g) A Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls an existing generation resource in the PJM Region that is capable of qualifying as an Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for an RPM Auction may not avoid the rule in subsection (a) or be removed from Capacity Resource status by failing to qualify as a Generation Capacity Resource, or by attempting to remove a unit previously qualified as a Generation Capacity Resource from classification as a Capacity Resource for that RPM Auction. However, generation resource may qualify for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, as shown by appropriate documentation, if the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resource demonstrates that it: (i) is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant Delivery Year; (ii) has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity, or (iii) was interconnected to the Transmission System as an Energy Resource and not subsequently converted to a Capacity Resource.

In order to establish that a resource is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction as set forth in (i) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that:

A. It has a documented plan in place to retire the resource prior to or during the Delivery Year, and has submitted a notice of Deactivation to the Office of the Interconnection consistent with Tariff, Part V, section 113.1, without regard to whether the Office of the Interconnection has requested the Capacity Market Seller to continue to operate the resource beyond its desired deactivation date in accordance with Tariff, Part V, section 113.2 for the purpose of maintaining the reliability of the PJM Transmission System and the Capacity Market Seller has agreed to do so;

B. Significant physical operational restrictions cause long term or permanent changes to the installed capacity value of the resource, or the resource is under major repair that will
extend into the applicable Delivery Year, that will result in the imposition of RPM performance penalties pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD;

C. The Capacity Market Seller is involved in an ongoing regulatory proceeding (e.g. – regarding potential environmental restrictions) specific to the resource and has received an order, decision, final rule, opinion or other final directive from the regulatory authority that will result in the retirement of the resource; or

D. A resource considered an Existing Generating Capacity Resource because it cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction, but which is not yet in service, is unable to achieve full commercial operation prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction. The Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer certifying that the resource will not be in full commercial operation prior to the referenced Delivery Year.

In order to establish that a resource has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity as set forth in (ii) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has entered into a unit-specific bilateral transaction for service to load located outside the PJM Region, by a demonstration that such resource is identified on a unit-specific basis as a network resource under the transmission tariff for the control area applicable to such external load, or by an equivalent demonstration of a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale. The Capacity Market Seller additionally shall identify the megawatt amount, export zone, and time period (in days) of the export.

A Capacity Market Seller that seeks approval for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, for any reason other than the reason specified in Paragraph A above, shall first submit such request in writing, along with all supporting data and documentation, to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

In order to obtain an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement for the reason specified in Paragraph A above, a Capacity Market Seller shall first submit a preliminary exception request in writing, along with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions upon which the Capacity Market Seller is relying in its analysis of whether to retire such resource, to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than (a) November 1, 2013 for the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, (b) the September 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the 2018/2019 and subsequent Delivery Years, and (c) two hundred forty (240) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of any such preliminary exception requests, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received notification of preliminary exception requests, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
Thereafter, as applicable, such Capacity Market Seller shall by no later than (a) the December 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, or (b) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction, either (a) notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing that it is withdrawing its preliminary exception request and explaining the changes to its analysis of whether to retire such resource that support its decision to withdraw, or (b) demonstrate that it has met the requirements specified under Paragraph A above. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of such notification, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a revised summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received requests for exceptions to the RPM must-offer requirement for the reason specified in Paragraph A above, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

A Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit a preliminary request in writing, along with supporting data and documentation indicating the reasons and conditions upon which the Capacity Market Seller is relying in its analysis of whether to remove the Capacity Resource status of such resource to the Market Monitoring Unit for evaluation, notifying the Office of the Interconnection by copy of the same, by no later than (a) the September 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction, and (b) two hundred forty (240) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction. For the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status shall first submit such preliminary request by no later than November 1, 2019. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of any such preliminary requests, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received notification of preliminary requests, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Thereafter, as applicable, such Capacity Market Seller shall, by no later than (a) the December 1 that last precedes the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, or (b) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable Incremental Auction, notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing that it is either (a) withdrawing its preliminary request and explaining the changes to its analysis that support its decision to withdraw, or (b) confirming its preliminary decision to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status. By no later than five (5) Business Days after receipt of such notification, the Office of the Interconnection will post on its website a revised summary of the number of megawatts of Generation Capacity Resources for which it has received requests to remove its Capacity Resource status, on an aggregate basis by Zone and Locational Deliverability Area that comprises a subset of a Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall analyze the effects of the proposed removal of a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status with regard to potential market power issues and shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination of the request to remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status, and whether a market power issue has been identified, by no later than
ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. Such notice shall include the specific market power impact resulting from the proposed removal of the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status, as well as an initial assessment of any steps that could be taken to mitigate the market power impact.

A Capacity Market Seller may only remove the Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status if (i) the Market Monitoring Unit has determined that the Generation Capacity Resource meets the applicable criteria set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.6.6 and this section 6.6 and the Office of the Interconnection agrees with this determination, or (ii) the Commission has issued an order terminating the Capacity Resource status of the resource, or (iii) it is required as set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6A(c). Nothing herein shall require a Market Seller to offer its resource into an RPM Auction prior to seeking to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status, subject to satisfaction of this section 6.6. A Generation Capacity Resource that is removed from Capacity Resource status shall no longer qualify as an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, and the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall be subject to termination in accordance with the rules described in Tariff, Part VI, section 230.3.3. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g., FERC filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement.

If the Capacity Market Seller disagrees with the Market Monitoring Unit’s determination of its request to remove a resource from Capacity Resource status or its request for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, it must notify the Market Monitoring Unit in writing, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, of the same by no later than eighty (80) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. After the Market Monitoring Unit has made its determination of whether a resource may be removed from Capacity Resource status, or whether the resource meets one of the exceptions thereto, and has notified the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of the same pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.C.4, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve or deny the request. The request shall be deemed to be approved by the Office of the Interconnection, consistent with the determination of the Market Monitoring Unit, unless the Office of the Interconnection notifies the Capacity Market Seller and Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences, that the request is denied.

If the Market Monitoring Unit does not timely notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination of the request to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status or for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall make the determination whether the request shall be approved or denied, and will notify the Capacity Market Seller of its determination in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences.
After the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection have made their determinations of whether a resource meets the criteria to qualify for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Capacity Market Seller must notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection whether it intends to exclude from its Sell Offer some or all of the subject capacity on the basis of an identified exception by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the date on which the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction commences. PJM does not make determinations of whether withholding of capacity constitutes market power. A Generation Capacity Resource that does not qualify for submission into an RPM Auction because it is not owned or controlled by the Capacity Market Seller for a full Delivery Year is not subject to the offer requirement hereunder; provided, however, that a Capacity Market Seller planning to transfer ownership or control of a Generation Capacity Resource during a Delivery Year pursuant to a sale or transfer agreement entered into after March 26, 2009 shall be required to satisfy the offer requirement hereunder for the entirety of such Delivery Year and may satisfy such requirement by providing for the assumption of this requirement by the transferee of ownership or control under such agreement.

If a Capacity Market Seller doesn’t timely seek to remove a Generation Capacity Resource from Capacity Resource status or timely submit a request for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, the Generation Capacity Resource shall only be removed from Capacity Resource status, and may only be approved for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, upon the Capacity Market Seller requesting and receiving an order from FERC, prior to the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, directing the Office of the Interconnection to remove the resource from Capacity Resource status and/or granting an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement or a waiver of the RPM must-offer requirement as to such resource.

(h) Any existing generation resource located in the PJM Region that satisfies the criteria in the definition of Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, that is not offered into such Base Residual Auction, and that does not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any subsequent Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.

All generation resources located in the PJM Region that satisfy the criteria in the definition of Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the date on which bidding commences for an Incremental Auction for a particular Delivery Year, but that did not satisfy such criteria as of the date that on which bidding commenced in the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, that is not offered into that Incremental Auction, and that does not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any subsequent Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.
All Existing Generation Capacity Resources that are offered into a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for a particular Delivery Year but do not clear in such auction, that are not offered into each subsequent Incremental Auction, and that do not meet any of the exceptions stated in the prior subsection (g): (i) may not participate in any Incremental Auctions conducted for such Delivery Year subsequent to such failure to offer; (ii) shall not receive any payments under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year for the capacity of such Generation Capacity Resources; and (iii) shall not be permitted to satisfy any LSE’s Unforced Capacity Obligation, or any entity’s obligation to obtain the commitment of Capacity Resources, for such Delivery Year.

Any such Existing Generation Capacity Resources may also be subject to further action by the Market Monitoring Unit under the terms of Tariff, Attachment M and Tariff, Attachment M – Appendix.

(i) In addition to the remedies set forth in subsections (g) and (h) above, if the Market Monitoring Unit determines that one or more Capacity Market Sellers’ failure to offer part or all of one or more existing generation resources, for which the Office of the Interconnection has not approved an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement, into an RPM Auction as required by this Section 6.6 would result in an increase of greater than five percent in any Zonal Capacity Price determined through such auction, and the Office of the Interconnection agrees with that determination, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply to FERC for an order, on an expedited basis, directing such Capacity Market Seller to participate in the relevant RPM Auction, or for other appropriate relief, and PJM will postpone clearing the auction pending FERC’s decision on the matter. If the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the Market Monitoring Unit’s determination and does not apply to FERC for an order directing the Capacity Market Seller to participate in the auction or for other appropriate relief, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and to seek appropriate relief.

6.6A Offer Requirement for Capacity Performance Resources

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the installed capacity of every Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is capable (or that reasonably can become capable) of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be offered as a Capacity Performance Resource by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each such Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to the Capacity Performance Resource must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6.

(b) Determinations of EFORd and Unforced Capacity made under this section 6.6 as to a Generation Capacity Resource shall govern the offers required under this section as to the same Generation Capacity Resource.

(c) Exceptions to the requirement in subsection (a) shall be permitted only for a resource which the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates is reasonably expected to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Intermittent
Resources, Capacity Storage Resources, Demand Resources, and Energy Efficiency Resources shall not be required to offer as a Capacity Performance Resource, but shall not be precluded from being offered as a Capacity Performance Resource at a level that demonstrably satisfies such requirements. Exceptions shall be determined using the same timeline and procedures as specified in section 6.6.

Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception for a Base Residual Auction shall include a documented plan with the submission of their request showing the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for the resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Such plan shall include (i) a timeline for design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, as applicable, where such timeline shall not exceed one Base Residual Auction exception, and (ii) evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment). Periodic updates on the progress, shall be provided by the Capacity Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit for their review by no later than (i) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for subsequent Incremental Auctions for the applicable Delivery Years, and (ii) the December 1 that last precedes subsequent Base Residual Auctions. The Capacity Market Seller shall also immediately notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit of any material changes to the plan that may occur. Upon request by a Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline shall be permissible only for delays not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, and that could not have been remedied through the exercise of due diligence by the Capacity Market Seller. In no event may an exception be requested by the Capacity Market Seller for more than two Base Residual Auctions.

Failure to submit a documented plan, or lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource in accordance with a documented plan, shall result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status effective with the first future Delivery Year for which the resource was granted an exception, no earlier than the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g. FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. The required change in Capacity Resource status shall only apply to those Generation Capacity Resources that are shown to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.

(d) A resource not exempted or excepted under subsection (c) hereof that is capable of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource and does not offer into an RPM Auction as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be subject to the same restrictions on subsequent offers, and other possible remedies, as specified in section 6.6.

6.7 Data Submission
(a) Potential participants in any PJM Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall submit, together with supporting documentation for each item, to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the posted date for the conduct of such auction, a list of owned or controlled generation resources by PJM transmission zone for the specified Delivery Year, including the amount of gross capacity, the EFORd and the net (unforced) capacity. A potential participant intending to offer any Capacity Performance Resource at or below the default Market Seller Offer Cap described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.4(a) must provide the associated offer cap and the MW to which the offer cap applies.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) below, potential participants in any PJM Reliability Pricing Model Auction in any LDA or Unconstrained LDA Group that request a unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate shall, in addition, submit the following data, together with supporting documentation for each item, to the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction:

i. If the Capacity Market Seller intends to submit a non-zero price in its Sell Offer in any such auction, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a calculation of the Avoidable Cost Rate and Projected PJM Market Revenues, as defined in subsection (d) below, together with detailed supporting documentation.

ii. If the Capacity Market Seller intends to submit a Sell Offer based on opportunity cost, the Capacity Market Seller shall also submit a calculation of Opportunity Cost, as defined in subsection (d), with detailed supporting documentation.

(c) Potential auction participants identified in subsection (b) above need not submit the data specified in that subsection for any Generation Capacity Resource:

i. that is in an Unconstrained LDA Group or, if this is the relevant market, the entire PJM Region, and is in a resource class identified in the table below as not likely to include the marginal price-setting resources in such auction; or

ii. for which the potential participant commits that any Sell Offer it submits as to such resource shall not include any price above: (1) the applicable default level identified below for the relevant resource class, less (2) the Projected PJM Market Revenues for such resource, as determined in accordance with this Tariff.

Nothing herein precludes the Market Monitoring Unit from requesting additional information from any potential auction participant as deemed necessary by the Market Monitoring Unit, including, without limitation, additional cost data on resources in a class that is not otherwise expected to include the marginal price setting resource as outlined in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.G. Any Sell Offer submitted in any auction that is inconsistent with any agreement or commitment made pursuant to this subsection shall be rejected, and the Capacity Market Seller shall be required to resubmit a Sell Offer that complies with such agreement or commitment within one (1) Business Day of the Office of the Interconnection’s rejection of such Sell Offer. If the Capacity Market Seller does not timely resubmit its Sell Offer, fails to request a unit-specific
Avoidable Cost Rate by the specified deadline, or if the Office of the Interconnection determines that the information provided by the Capacity Market Seller in support of the requested unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate or Sell Offer is incomplete, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have submitted a Sell Offer that complies with the commitments made under this subsection, with a default offer for the applicable class of resource or nearest comparable class of resource determined under this subsection (c)(ii). The obligation imposed under section 6.6(a) above shall not be satisfied unless and until the Capacity Market Seller submits (or is deemed to have submitted) a Sell Offer that conforms to its commitments made pursuant to this subsection or subject to the procedures set forth in section 6.4 above and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.H.

The default retirement and mothball Avoidable Cost Rates (“ACR”) referenced in this subsection (c)(ii) are as set forth in the tables below for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year through the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Capacity Market Sellers shall use the one-year mothball Avoidable Cost Rate shown below, unless such Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria set forth in section 6.7(e) below, in which case the Capacity Market Seller may use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate. PJM shall also publish on its Web site the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rates. A Capacity Market Seller may not use the default Market Seller Offer Cap contained in the ACR tables in this subsection, and also seek to include any one or more categories of the Avoidable Cost Rate defined section 6.8 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maximum Avoidable Cost Rates by Technology Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumped Storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Critical Coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Critical Coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Coal - Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Coal – Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-2 on 1 Frame F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-3 on 1 Frame E/Siemens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-3 or More on 1 or More Frame F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-NUG Cogen. Frame B or E Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 1st &amp; 2nd Gen. Aero (P&amp;W FT 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 1st &amp; Gen. Frame B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 2nd Gen. Frame E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 3rd Gen. Aero (GE LM 6000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 3rd Gen. Aero (P&amp;W FT - 8 TwinPak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - 3rd Gen. Frame F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Steam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commencing with the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the default retirement and mothball Avoidable Cost Rates referenced in section (c)(ii) above, and post them on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction.

To determine the applicable ACR rates, the Office of the Interconnection shall use the actual rate of change in the historical values from the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs or a comparable index approved by the Commission (“Handy-Whitman Index”) to the extent they are available to update the base values for the Delivery Year, and for future Delivery Years for which the updated Handy-Whitman Index values are not yet available the Office of the Interconnection shall update the base values for the Delivery Year using the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change. The ACR rates shall be expressed in dollar values for the applicable Delivery Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>Mothball ACR ($/MW-Day)</th>
<th>Retirement ACR ($/MW-Day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine - Industrial Frame</td>
<td>$24.13</td>
<td>$33.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Fired</td>
<td>$136.91</td>
<td>$157.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$29.58</td>
<td>$40.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine - Aero Derivative</td>
<td>$26.13</td>
<td>$37.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>$25.46</td>
<td>$32.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>$68.78</td>
<td>$89.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Steam</td>
<td>$63.16</td>
<td>$76.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumped Storage</td>
<td>$20.12</td>
<td>$28.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To determine the default retirement and mothball ACR values for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall multiply the base default retirement and mothball ACR values in the table above by a factor equal to one plus the most recent annual average rate of change in the July Handy-Whitman Indices for the 2011 to 2013 calendar years to determine updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values. The updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values shall then be multiplied by a factor equal to one plus the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change in the applicable Handy-Whitman Index, taken to the fourth power, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website.

To determine the default retirement and mothball ACR values for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall multiply the updated base default retirement and mothball ACR values from the immediately preceding Delivery Year by a factor equal to one plus the most recent annual average rate of change in the July Handy-Whitman Index. These values become the new adjusted base default retirement and mothball ACR values, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website. These resulting adjusted base values for the Delivery Year shall be multiplied by a factor equal to one plus the most recent ten-calendar-year annual average rate of change in the
applicable Handy-Whitman Index, taken to the fourth power, as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection and posted to its website.

PJM shall also publish on its website the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement Avoidable Cost Rates.

After the Market Monitoring Unit conducts its annual review of the table of default Avoidable Cost Rates included in section 6.7(c) above in accordance with the procedure specified in Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.H, it will provide updated values or notice of its determination that updated values are not needed to Office of the Interconnection. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that the values should be updated, the Office of the Interconnection shall file its proposed values with the Commission by no later than October 30th prior to the commencement of the offer period for the first RPM Auction for which it proposes to apply the updated values.

(d) In order for costs to qualify for inclusion in the Market Seller Offer Cap, the Capacity Market Seller must provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection relevant unit-specific cost data concerning each data item specified as set forth in section 6 by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If cost data is not available at the time of submission for the time periods specified in section 6.8 below, costs may be estimated for such period based on the most recent data available, with an explanation of and basis for the estimate used, as may be further specified in the PJM Manuals. Based on the data and calculations submitted by the Capacity Market Sellers for each existing generation resource and the formulas specified below, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Market Seller Offer Cap for each such resource, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing of its determination pursuant to Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

i. Avoidable Cost Rate: The Avoidable Cost Rate for an existing generation resource shall be determined using the formula below and applied to the unit’s Base Offer Segment.

ii. Opportunity Cost: Opportunity Cost shall be the documented price available to an existing generation resource in a market external to PJM. In the event that the total MW of existing generation resources submitting opportunity cost offers in any auction for a Delivery Year exceeds the firm export capability of the PJM system for such Delivery Year, or the capability of external markets to import capacity in such year, the Office of the Interconnection will accept such offers on a competitive basis. PJM will construct a supply curve of opportunity cost offers, ordered by opportunity cost, and accept such offers to export starting with the highest opportunity cost, until the maximum level of such exports is reached. The maximum level of such exports is the lesser of the Office of the Interconnection’s ability to permit firm exports or the ability of the importing area(s) to accept firm imports or imports of capacity, taking account of relevant export limitations by location. If, as a result, an opportunity cost offer is not accepted from an existing generation resource, the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to Sell Offers relying on such generation resource shall be the Avoidable Cost Rate less the Projected Market Revenues for such resource (as defined in section 6.4 above). The default Avoidable Cost Rate shall be the one year mothball Avoidable Cost Rate set forth in the
tables in section 6.7(c) above unless Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria delineated in section 6.7(e) below.

iii. Projected PJM Market Revenues: Projected PJM Market Revenues are defined by section 6.8(d) below, for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied.

(e) In order for the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate set forth in the table in section 6.7(c) to apply, by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, a Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer representing that the Capacity Market Seller will retire the Generation Capacity Resource if it does not receive during the relevant Delivery Year at least the applicable retirement Avoidable Cost Rate because it would be uneconomic to continue to operate the Generation Capacity Resource in the Delivery Year without the retirement Avoidable Cost Rate, and specifying the date the Generation Capacity Resource would otherwise be retired.

6.8 Avoidable Cost Definition

(a) Avoidable Cost Rate:

The Avoidable Cost Rate for a Generation Capacity Resource that is the subject of a Sell Offer shall be determined using the following formula, expressed in dollars per MW-year:

\[
\text{Avoidable Cost Rate} = \left[ \text{Adjustment Factor} \times (\text{AOML} + \text{AAE} + \text{AFAE} + \text{AME} + \text{AVE} + \text{ATFI} + \text{ACC} + \text{ACLE}) + \text{ARPIR} + \text{APIR} + \text{CPQR} \right]
\]

Where:

- **Adjustment Factor** equals 1.10 (to provide a margin of error for understatement of costs) plus an additional adjustment referencing the 10-year average Handy-Whitman Index in order to account for expected inflation from the time interval between the submission of the Sell Offer and the commencement of the Delivery Year.

- **AOML (Avoidable Operations and Maintenance Labor)** consists of the avoidable labor expenses related directly to operations and maintenance of the generating unit for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AOML are those incurred for: (a) on-site based labor engaged in operations and maintenance activities; (b) off-site based labor engaged in on-site operations and maintenance activities directly related to the generating unit; and (c) off-site based labor engaged in off-site operations and maintenance activities directly related to generating unit equipment removed from the generating unit site.

- **AAE (Avoidable Administrative Expenses)** consists of the avoidable administrative expenses related directly to employees at the generating unit for twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be
provided. The categories of expenses included in AAE are those incurred for: (a) employee expenses (except employee expenses included in AOML); (b) environmental fees; (c) safety and operator training; (d) office supplies; (e) communications; and (f) annual plant test, inspection and analysis.

- **AAE (Avoidable Fuel Availability Expenses)** consists of avoidable operating expenses related directly to fuel availability and delivery for the generating unit that can be demonstrated by the Capacity Market Seller based on data for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided, or on reasonable projections for the Delivery Year supported by executed contracts, published tariffs, or other data sufficient to demonstrate with reasonable certainty the level of costs that have been or shall be incurred for such purpose. The categories of expenses included in AAE are those incurred for: (a) firm gas pipeline transportation; (b) natural gas storage costs; (c) costs of gas balancing agreements; and (d) costs of gas park and loan services. AFAE expenses are for firm fuel supply and apply solely for offers for a Capacity Performance Resource.

- **AME (Avoidable Maintenance Expenses)** consists of avoidable maintenance expenses (other than expenses included in AOML) related directly to the generating unit for the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AME are those incurred for: (a) chemical and materials consumed during maintenance of the generating unit; and (b) rented maintenance equipment used to maintain the generating unit.

- **AVE (Avoidable Variable Expenses)** consists of avoidable variable expenses related directly to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in AVE are those incurred for: (a) water treatment chemicals and lubricants; (b) water, gas, and electric service (not for power generation); and (c) waste water treatment.

- **ATFI (Avoidable Taxes, Fees and Insurance)** consists of avoidable expenses related directly to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. The categories of expenses included in ATFI are those incurred for: (a) insurance, (b) permits and licensing fees, (c) site security and utilities for maintaining security at the site; and (d) property taxes.

- **ACC (Avoidable Carrying Charges)** consists of avoidable short-term carrying charges related directly to the generating unit in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. Avoidable short-term carrying charges shall include short term carrying charges for maintaining reasonable levels of inventories of fuel and spare parts that result from short-term operational unit decisions as measured by industry best practice standards. For the purpose of determining ACC,
short term is the time period in which a reasonable replacement of inventory for normal, expected operations can occur.

- **ACLE (Avoidable Corporate Level Expenses)** consists of avoidable corporate level expenses directly related to the generating unit incurred in the twelve months preceding the month in which the data must be provided. Avoidable corporate level expenses shall include only such expenses that are directly linked to providing tangible services required for the operation of the generating unit proposed for Deactivation. The categories of avoidable expenses included in ACLE are those incurred for: (a) legal services, (b) environmental reporting; and (c) procurement expenses.

- **CPQR (Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk)** consists of the quantifiable and reasonably-supported costs of mitigating the risks of non-performance associated with submission of a Capacity Performance Resource offer (or of a Base Capacity Resource offer for the 2018/19 or 2019/20 Delivery Years), such as insurance expenses associated with resource non-performance risks. CPQR shall be considered reasonably supported if it is based on actuarial practices generally used by the industry to model or value risk and if it is based on actuarial practices used by the Capacity Market Seller to model or value risk in other aspects of the Capacity Market Seller’s business. Such reasonable support shall also include an officer certification that the modeling and valuation of the CPQR was developed in accord with such practices. Provision of such reasonable support shall be sufficient to establish the CPQR. A Capacity Market Seller may use other methods or forms of support for its proposed CPQR that shows the CPQR is limited to risks the seller faces from committing a Capacity Resource hereunder, that quantifies the costs of mitigating such risks, and that includes supporting documentation (which may include an officer certification) for the identification of such risks and quantification of such costs. Such showing shall establish the proposed CPQR upon acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection.

- **APIR (Avoidable Project Investment Recovery Rate)**

  $$APIR = PI \times CRF$$

  Where:

  - **PI** is the amount of project investment completed prior to June 1 of the Delivery Year, except for Mandatory Capital Expenditures (“CapEx”) for which the project investment must be completed during the Delivery Year, that is reasonably required to enable a Generation Capacity Resource that is the subject of a Sell Offer to continue operating or improve availability during Peak-Hour Periods during the Delivery Year.
- CRF is the annual capital recovery factor from the following table, applied in accordance with the terms specified below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Units (Years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life of Plant (Years)</th>
<th>Levelized CRF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory CapEx</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Plus Alternative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unless otherwise stated, Age of Existing Unit shall be equal to the number of years since the Unit commenced commercial operation, up to and through the relevant Delivery Year.

Remaining Life of Plant defines the amortization schedule (i.e., the maximum number of years over which the Project Investment may be included in the Avoidable Cost Rate.)

**Capital Expenditures and Project Investment**

For any given Project Investment, a Capacity Market Seller may make a one-time election to recover such investment using: (i) the highest CRF and associated recovery schedule to which it is entitled; or (ii) the next highest CRF and associated recovery schedule. For these purposes, the CRF and recovery schedule for the 25 Plus category is the next highest CRF and recovery schedule for both the Mandatory CapEx and the 40 Plus Alternative categories. The Capacity Market Seller using the above table must provide the Market Monitoring Unit with information, identifying and supporting such election, including but not limited to the age of the unit, the amount of the Project Investment, the purpose of the investment, evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment), and detailed information concerning the governmental requirement (if applicable). Absent other written notification, such election shall be deemed based on the CRF such Seller employs for the first Sell Offer reflecting recovery of any portion of such Project Investment.

For any resource using the CRF and associated recovery schedule from the CRF table that set the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in any Delivery Year, such Capacity Market Seller must also provide to the Market Monitoring Unit, for informational purposes only, evidence of the actual expenditure of the Project Investment, when such information becomes available.

If the project associated with a Project Investment that was included in a Sell Offer using a CRF and associated recovery schedule from the above table has not entered into commercial operation prior to the end of the relevant Delivery Year, and the resource’s Sell Offer sets the clearing price for the relevant LDA, the Capacity Market Seller shall be required to elect to either (i) pay a charge that is equal to the difference between the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for such LDA for the relevant Delivery Year and what the clearing price would have been absent the
APIR component of the Avoidable Cost Rate, this difference to be multiplied by the cleared MW volume from such Resource (“rebate payment”); (ii) hold such rebate payment in escrow, to be released to the Capacity Market Seller in the event that the project enters into commercial operation during the subsequent Delivery Year or rebated to LSEs in the relevant LDA if the project has not entered into commercial operation during the subsequent Delivery Year; or (iii) make a reasonable investment in the amount of the PI in other Existing Generation Capacity Resources owned or controlled by the Capacity Market Seller or its Affiliates in the relevant LDA. The revenue from such rebate payments shall be allocated pro rata to LSEs in the relevant LDA(s) that were charged a Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year, based on their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in the relevant LDA(s). If the Sell Offer from the Generation Capacity Resource did not set the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the relevant LDA, no alternative investment or rebate payment is required. If the difference between the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for such LDA for the relevant Delivery Year and what the clearing price would have been absent the APIR amount does not exceed the greater of $10 per MW-day or a 10% increase in the clearing price, no alternative investment or rebate payment is required.

**Mandatory CapEx Option**

The Mandatory CapEx CRF and recovery schedule is an option available, beginning in the third BRA (Delivery Year 2009-10), to a resource that must make a Project Investment to comply with a governmental requirement that would otherwise materially impact operating levels during the Delivery Year, where: (i) such resource is a coal, oil or gas-fired resource that began commercial operation no fewer than fifteen years prior to the start of the first Delivery Year for which such recovery is sought, and such Project Investment is equal to or exceeds $200/kW of capitalized project cost; or (ii) such resource is a coal-fired resource located in an LDA for which a separate VRR Curve has been established for the relevant Delivery Years, and began commercial operation at least 50 years prior to the conduct of the relevant BRA.

A Capacity Market Seller that wishes to elect the Mandatory CapEx option for a Project Investment must do so beginning with the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year in which such project is expected to enter commercial operation. A Sell Offer submitted in any Base Residual Auction for which the Mandatory CapEx option is selected may not exceed an offer price equivalent to 0.90 times the then-current Net CONE (on an unforced-equivalent basis).

**40 Plus Alternative Option**

The 40 Plus Alternative CRF and recovery schedule is an option available, beginning in the third BRA (Delivery Year 2009-10), for a resource that is a gas- or oil-fired resource that began commercial operation no less than 40 years prior to the conduct of the relevant BRA (excluding, however, any resource in any Delivery Year for which the resource is receiving a payment under Tariff, Part V. Generation Capacity Resources electing this 40 Plus Alternative CRF shall be treated as At Risk Generation for purposes of the sensitivity runs in the RTEP process). Resources electing the 40 Plus Alternative option will be modeled in the RTEP process as “at-risk” at the end of the one-year amortization period.

A Capacity Market Seller that wishes to elect the 40 Plus Alternative option for a Project Investment must provide written notice of such election to the Office of the Interconnection no
later than six months prior to the Base Residual Auction for which such election is sought; provided however that shorter notice may be provided if unforeseen circumstances give rise to the need to make such election and such seller gives notice as soon as practicable.

The Office of the Interconnection shall give market participants reasonable notice of such election, subject to satisfaction of requirements under the PJM Operating Agreement for protection of confidential and commercially sensitive information. A Sell Offer submitted in any Base Residual Auction for which the 40 Plus Alternative option is selected may not exceed an offer price equivalent to the then-current Net CONE (on an unforced-equivalent basis).

**Multi-Year Pricing Option**

A Seller submitting a Sell Offer with an APIR component that is based on a Project Investment of at least $450/kW may elect this Multi-Year Pricing Option by providing written notice to such effect the first time it submits a Sell Offer that includes an APIR component for such Project Investment. Such option shall be available on the same terms, and under the same conditions, as are available to Planned Generation Capacity Resources under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(c).

- **ARPIR (Avoidable Refunds of Project Investment Reimbursements)** consists of avoidable refund amounts of Project Investment Reimbursements payable by a Generation Owner to PJM under Tariff, Part V, section 118 or avoidable refund amounts of project investment reimbursements payable by a Generation Owner to PJM under a Cost of Service Recovery Rate filed under Tariff, Part V, section 119 and approved by the Commission.

  (b) For the purpose of determining an Avoidable Cost Rate, avoidable expenses are incremental expenses directly required to operate a Generation Capacity Resource that a Generation Owner would not incur if such generating unit did not operate in the Delivery Year or meet Availability criteria during Peak-Hour Periods during the Delivery Year.

  (c) Variable costs that are directly attributable to the production of energy shall be excluded from a Market Seller’s generation resource Avoidable Cost Rate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Seller that included variable costs attributable to the production of energy in a generation resource’s Avoidable Cost Rate prior to April 15, 2019 shall not include such costs in such generation resource’s Maintenance Adders or Operating Costs for any Delivery Year for which it has already included such costs in the generation resource’s Avoidable Cost Rate. A Market Seller implicated by this paragraph may continue including such variable costs attributable to the production of energy in its Avoidable Cost Rate for each generation resource for any Delivery Year for which it already did so prior to April 15, 2019.

  (d) Projected PJM Market Revenues for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied shall include all actual unit-specific revenues from PJM energy markets, ancillary services, and unit-specific bilateral contracts from such Generation Capacity Resource, net of energy and ancillary services market offers for such resource. Net energy market revenues shall be based on the non-zero market-based offers of the Capacity
Market Seller of such Generation Capacity Resource unless one of the following conditions is met, in which case the cost-based offer shall be used: (x) the market-based offer for the resource is zero, (y) the market-based offer for the resource is higher than its cost-based offer and such offer has been mitigated, or (z) the market-based offer for the resource is less than such Capacity Market Seller’s fuel and environmental costs for the resource which shall be determined either by directly summing the fuel and environmental costs if they are available, or by subtracting from the cost-based offer for the resource all costs developed pursuant to the Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals that are not fuel or environmental costs.

The calculation of Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be equal to the rolling simple average of such net revenues as described above from the three most recent whole calendar years prior to the year in which the BRA is conducted.

If a Generation Capacity Resource did not receive PJM market revenues during the entire relevant time period because the Generation Capacity Resource was not integrated into PJM during the full period, then the Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years within the full period in which such Resource received PJM market revenues.

If a Generation Capacity Resource did not receive PJM market revenues during the entire relevant time period because it was not in commercial operation during the entire period, or if data is not available to the Capacity Market Seller for the entire period, despite the good faith efforts of such seller to obtain such data, then the Projected PJM Market Revenues shall be calculated based upon net revenues received over the entire period by comparable units, to be developed by the MMU and the Capacity Market Seller.