April 30, 2021

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, N.E. Room 1A
Washington, D.C. 20426

Re:  
*PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER21-1802-000*

*Rate Component of Enhancements to Stability Limits Process*

Dear Secretary Bose,

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”),\(^1\) and Part 35 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC” or the “Commission”) regulations,\(^2\) PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) hereby submits for filing proposed revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”), Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f), and to the identical corresponding provision in the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“Operating Agreement”), Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f).\(^3\)

As discussed herein, the proposed revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement effectuate the single rate component of a reform package jointly sponsored by PJM and the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (“IMM”), and overwhelmingly approved by PJM

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\(^1\) 16 U.S.C. § 824d.

\(^2\) 18 C.F.R. part 35.

stakeholders. The reform package is designed to enhance PJM’s current operational processes for generation “stability limits”—the term used to describe temporary limitations on the output of generators that PJM places into effect during certain transmission outage conditions, so as to prevent transient instability on the Bulk Electric System (“BES”) from causing damage to those generators due to the loss of synchronization during an N-1 contingency.

PJM respectfully requests waiver of the Commission’s prior notice requirements to permit an effective date of June 1, 2022, for the proposed revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement.

I. BACKGROUND

A. PJM Is Obligated to Coordinate Transmission Outages and Mitigate Resulting Impacts.

As a North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) -registered Reliability Coordinator (“RC”), PJM is designated as “[t]he entity that is the highest level of authority who is responsible for the Reliable Operation of the BES, has the Wide Area view of the BES, and has the operating tools, processes and procedures, including the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-day analysis and real-time operations.” PJM’s Commission-approved Operating Agreement expressly authorizes PJM to “direct or coordinate corrective action, whether or not specified in the

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4 As discussed herein, the package was approved by a sector-weighted vote of 4.05/5.0 at the January 27, 2021 meeting of the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (“MRC”), and by a sector-weighted vote of 3.952/5.0 at the February 24, 2021 PJM Members Committee (“MC”).

5 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a)(1).

PJM Manuals, as necessary to alleviate unusual conditions that threaten the integrity or reliability of the PJM Region, or the regional power system.”

Similarly, PJM is authorized to take necessary actions to “maintain reliability of service,” including the ability to “[d]irect the operation and coordinate the maintenance of facilities of the PJM Region used for both load and reactive supply.”

In furtherance of these responsibilities, as a NERC-registered Transmission Operator (“TOP”), PJM has the obligation to coordinate and schedule outages of Transmission Facilities within the PJM Region, and take steps to mitigate the impacts of those outages.

B. **PJM’s Current Process for Establishing Generation Stability Limits**

Under certain transmission outage conditions, the output of nearby generating stations may need to be limited to prevent transient instability on the integrated BES from causing damage to those generating facilities due to the loss of synchronization in the event of an N-1 contingency. The term used in the PJM Region for this temporary output limitation is “stability limits.”

PJM’s long-established process for setting generator stability limits is described in PJM Manual 3, section 3.9. Under that process, when a transmission outage condition makes establishment of a stability limit necessary to prevent damage to nearby generating facilities during an N-1 contingency, there are two options. First, the Market Seller may

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7 Operating Agreement, section 1.7.15.
8 Id. at section 10.4(vi).
9 See also Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, Rate Schedule FERC No. 42, section 4.8; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.9.2 (c), 1.9.4, 1.9.4A.
elect to reduce the Economic Maximum output of its resource to conform with the communicated stability limit. Alternatively, if the Market Seller does not elect to reduce its Economic Maximum output, PJM will create a unique interface called a “thermal surrogate” that will reflect the stability limitation in Locational Marginal Prices (“LMPs”). If the constraint binds, it is treated consistent with how PJM treats other constraints on the PJM system, and current market rules regarding lost opportunity cost will apply. As noted in PJM Manual 3, section 3.9.1, if the Market Seller chooses to reduce its Economic Maximum bid below the stability limit, the constraint represented by the thermal surrogate will not bind.

C. Enhancements to the Stability Limits Process

At the August 7, 2019 meeting of the PJM Market Implementation Committee (“MIC”), PJM stakeholders approved a problem statement and issue charge designed to develop enhancements to the existing process for establishing stability limits. After an in-depth stakeholder process stretching into 2021, a package of reforms developed jointly by PJM and the IMM—known as the “Generator Output Constraint” package—was approved by PJM stakeholders at the January and February meetings for the MRC and MC, respectively. Under this package of reforms, PJM will, among other things, establish appropriate stability limits using reliability studies from PJM’s Transient Stability Analysis (“TSA”) tool, and use its Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market clearing engines to

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12 PJM’s TSA Tool can monitor and determine transient stability of the PJM system subject to a select set of Energy Management System (“EMS”) contingencies for balanced and unbalanced faults. More information
enforce the limitation on the MW output of applicable resources relative to the stability limit. Using this method, neither the Day-ahead nor the Real-time Energy Markets will directly reflect the constraint in LMP.¹³

As relevant to this filing, one of the foundational components of the Generator Output Constraint suite of reforms is a memorialization in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f) that a temporary reduction of generator output associated with honoring a stability limit does not entitle the resource to any lost opportunity cost credits.

II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS

To effectuate this singular rate component of the Generator Output Constraint package, PJM proposes to amend Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f) in the following manner:

(f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended (or, for Energy Storage Resource Model Participants, the charging of which is increased) at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher

through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C. A Market Seller of a unit defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), (f-3), (f-4), or (f-5) that is reduced using a generator output constraint to honor a stability limitation is not eligible for credits under this section 3.2.3(f) for the MWh reduction associated with honoring the stability limit.

The proposed amendments to the Tariff and Operating Agreement are just and reasonable for several reasons, each of which is described in seriatim below in subsections II.A-D.

A. The Proposed Tariff and Operating Agreement Revisions Will Enhance PJM’s Compliance with FPA Section 205(c) By Adding Clarity to the Applicable Tariff and Operating Agreement Language.

The proposed revisions to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f) clarify the inapplicability of lost opportunity cost to reductions associated with generation stability limitations under the Generator Output Constraint reforms adopted by PJM and its stakeholders, thereby enhancing PJM’s compliance with FPA section 205(c) and the Commission’s implementing regulations requiring that public utility tariffs “clearly and specifically” set forth jurisdictional rates, terms, and conditions. This clarification will benefit all

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14 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c).

15 18 C.F.R. § 35.1(a) (“Every public utility shall file with the Commission and post, in conformity with the requirements of this part, full and complete rate schedules and tariffs and those service agreements not
stakeholders by removing ambiguity from the Tariff and Operating Agreement.\textsuperscript{16}

As currently drafted, Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f) state that lost opportunity cost is paid when the output of a generation resource is “reduced or suspended . . . at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue.” The broad phrase “or other reliability issue” lacks any additional context or exposition, which may lead some entities to mistakenly believe that payment for lost opportunity cost could be appropriate when output from generation facilities is temporarily reduced due to stability limitations. This mistaken interpretation would be inconsistent with the suite of reforms adopted by PJM and its stakeholders, and could lead to confusion in implementing the filed rate. Accordingly, the Tariff and Operating Agreement revisions will add this additional needed clarity and proactively eliminate the risk of confusion going forward.

\textbf{B. Paying Lost Opportunity Cost for Output Limitations Associated with Generation Stability Limits Is Unnecessary, Because Generators Already Have a Strong Incentive to Operate Within Those Limits.}

Lost opportunity cost payments are designed to compensate Market Sellers for making a choice—namely, the choice to not pursue an “opportunity” to earn revenues in the energy markets. For this reason, the Commission has repeatedly described lost opportunity cost compensation as a mechanism to provide an “incentive” for units to follow dispatch.\textsuperscript{17} Absent this incentive, Market Sellers may elect to instead pursue revenues in meeting the requirements of § 35.1(g), clearly and specifically setting forth all rates and charges for any transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission, the classifications, practices, rules and regulations affecting such rates, charges, classifications, services, rules, regulations or practices, as required by section 205(c) of the Federal Power Act.”).

\textsuperscript{16} This rule will apply to any generation resource subject to a generation stability limitation, regardless of resource type, including, for example, natural-gas fired, wind, and solar resource types.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.}, 173 FERC ¶ 61,244, at P 49 (2020) (“We accept PJM’s proposal
the energy markets rather than follow dispatch; a choice that could create reliability risk external to the Market Seller.

This foundational regulatory paradigm is most vividly illustrated when PJM must reduce the output of generation resources to prevent violations of mandatory reliability standards on transmission facilities. Because in that particular instance the risk of reliability-related damage is to the transmission system, and not to the generator, the generator itself does not have a natural incentive to forego energy market revenues that it could potentially earn by maintaining its normative output. Lost opportunity cost compensation provides this incentive where none otherwise exists.

However, this paradigm does not hold true in the case of generation resources that are subject to stability limitations. This is because the fundamental purpose of PJM’s issuance of stability limitations is to prevent the very real risk of physical damage to the generation facility, in the event of an N-1 contingency resulting in transient instability. This damage to the unit can occur within the three-phase cycle (i.e. microseconds), and can potentially be catastrophic. By extension, the Market Seller whose unit is subject to stability limitations is already strongly incentivized to follow PJM’s dispatch instructions, and the provision of a supplemental incentive via lost opportunity cost payments is unnecessary.

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to provide Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost credits as compliant with the Order on Paper Hearing directive to implement lost opportunity payments to offset the incentive for over-generation of price chasing. PJM’s proposed Tariff revisions ensure that resources do not have an incentive to deviate from PJM’s dispatch instructions.”); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 139 FERC ¶ 61,170, at P 21 (2012) (“[W]e find PJM’s proposed compensation to dispatchable wind generators for lost opportunity costs will provide the proper incentive to wind resources to follow PJM dispatch instructions.”).

As described in detail in PJM Manual 14B, Attachment G,\(^\text{18}\) generating unit stability analysis is performed by PJM as part of the Facilities Study for proposed generation interconnection to the PJM system. PJM also conducts annual system stability analysis covering all existing generation units in the course of a three-year rotating cycle. In addition to the stability analyses of new generation interconnections, the three-year cycle testing of all existing generating units interconnected to the PJM system, and certain “ad hoc” stability testing required by special circumstances that occur from time-to-time, PJM also conducts system stability testing of its most critical stressed system conditions during the annual Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (“RTEP”) study cycle. This process complies with NERC Reliability Standard TPL-001-4\(^\text{19}\) and integrates the requisite N-1-1 contingency analysis mandated by that standard. Lastly, outside of the stability-related interconnection and planning processes described in PJM Manual 14B, Attachment G, specific areas of PJM have been identified by PJM or Transmission Owner analysis as stability-limited areas of the system. These areas are explicitly identified and documented in PJM Manual 3B.


Given these considerations, there are multiple measures that Market Sellers can take to protect against the risk of temporary output limitations as a result of generator stability limits, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over other Market Sellers who choose not to take such measures. These include investing in upgrades to equipment, such as power system stabilizers and automatic voltage regulators (both of which can be modeled in PJM’s TSA tool, referenced above), as well as financial hedging techniques. Yet by using lost opportunity cost to compensate units for temporary output limitations associated with generator stability limits, Market Sellers would have no incentive to take these measures at all.

Moreover, the fact that system conditions may warrant the need for temporary output limitations to protect a specific unit is just one of many operational uncertainties that Market Sellers face and must navigate in an organized wholesale market that is dependent on a networked interstate transmission system. Lost opportunity cost is not, and was never intended to be, a residual “catch-all” mechanism to immunize generators from all risk associated with these operational uncertainties.

D. PJM’s Proposed Tariff and Operating Agreement Revisions Are Narrowly Tailored.

The Tariff and Operating Agreement revisions proposed in this filing are narrowly tailored to specify only that Market Sellers with stability-limited generation resources are ineligible for lost opportunity cost payments. Market Sellers remain eligible for lost opportunity cost compensation when their output is curtailed for the safety and reliability of the transmission system. The sole objective of PJM’s proposed Tariff and Operating Agreement revisions is to clarify that lost opportunity cost is not the appropriate mechanism to compensate units for output curtailments associated with generation stability
limits, as contemplated by the Generator Output Constraint suite of reforms adopted by PJM stakeholders.

III. STAKEHOLDER ENDORSEMENT

The Generator Output Constraint package, inclusive of the Tariff and Operating Agreement revisions proposed herein, was approved by a sector-weighted vote of 4.05/5.0 at the January 27, 2021 meeting of the PJM MRC, and by a sector-weighted vote of 3.952/5.0 at the February 24, 2021 PJM MC.

IV. EFFECTIVE DATE AND REQUEST FOR WAIVER

PJM respectfully requests waiver of the Commission’s prior notice requirements to permit an effective date of June 1, 2022, for the proposed revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement.

Good cause exists to grant waiver, as this effective date will align with the earliest date that PJM anticipates being able to effectuate the other components of the Generator Output Constraint package. As referenced above, the Generator Output Constraint suite of reforms will necessitate changes to PJM’s Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market clearing engines, and the requested effective date of June 1, 2022, will provide sufficient time for PJM to build and test the software modifications necessary to implement the proposed changes in conjunction with PJM’s other ongoing initiatives. The Commission has previously found it appropriate to grant waiver of the 120-day prior notice period to afford Regional Transmission Organizations sufficient time to construct and test necessary software changes.21

20 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a)(1).

21 See, e.g., Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 141 FERC ¶ 61,048, at P 16 (2012) (“We find good cause to grant SPP’s request for waiver of the 120-day notice requirement in section 35.3 of the Commission’s regulations. It is
V. COMMUNICATIONS

PJM requests that all communications regarding this filing be directed to the following persons:

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VI. DOCUMENTS INCLUDED WITH THIS FILING

In accordance with the requirements of Order No. 71422 and the Commission’s eTariff regulations, PJM hereby submits an eTariff XML filing package consisting of the following materials:

1. This transmittal letter;

2. Attachment A – Revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement, in redlined format; and

3. Attachment B – Revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement, in clean format.

VII. SERVICE

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM Members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically. In accordance with the Commission’s regulations,23 PJM will post a copy of this filing to the FERC filings section of its internet site, located at the following link: http://www.pjm.com/documents/ferc-manuals.aspx with a specific link to the newly-filed document, and will send an e-mail on the same date as this filing to all PJM Members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region24 alerting them that this filing has been made by PJM today and is available by following such link.

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23 See 18 C.F.R §§ 35.2(e) and 385.2010(f)(3).

24 PJM already maintains, updates, and regularly uses e-mail lists for all PJM members and affected commissions.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, PJM respectfully requests that the Commission accept the proposed revisions to the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement, and grant waiver to permit an effective date of June 1, 2022, as discussed herein.

Respectfully submitted,

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On behalf of
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C
Attachment A

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff
and PJM Operating Agreement

(Marked / Redline Format)
Section(s) of the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Marked / Redline Format)
3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.


(c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).

(f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region.
3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour (“Regulation Obligation”). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

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\text{Regulation Charge} = \text{Hourly Regulation Obligation Share} \times (\text{sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour})
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(b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) below, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource’s unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource’s Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 below shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(e).

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the
Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource’s capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource’s offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits
factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. Resources following the dynamic Regulation signal which have a unit-specific benefits factor less than 0.1 will not be considered for the purposes of committing resources. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource’s accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function ($r$) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

\[
\text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal}, \text{Response}}(\delta, \delta + 5 \text{ Min}); \\
\delta = 0 \text{ to } 5 \text{ Min}
\]

where $\delta$ is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

\[
\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs}\left(\frac{\delta - 5 \text{ Minutes}}{5 \text{ Minutes}}\right).
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error ($\epsilon$) as a function of the resource’s Regulation capacity using the following equations:

\[
\text{Energy Score} = 1 - \frac{1}{n} \sum \text{Abs}(\text{Error});
\]

\[
\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs}\left(\frac{\text{Response} - \text{Regulation Signal}}{\text{Hourly Average Regulation Signal}}\right); \text{ and}
\]

\[
n = \text{the number of samples in the hour and the energy}.
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

\[
\text{Accuracy Score} = \text{max}\left((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})\right) + (\text{Energy Score}).
\]
The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(e). A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and...
a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Buyer’s pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3A.01 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3A.01 does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.7.17 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.17, and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource’s scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource’s energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(n) below, if the total offered price for Start-up Costs (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to section 3.2.3(p) below, depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or
during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (b) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real-time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT
Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from section 3.2.3(h) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load ((a) net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy), accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day and accepted Up-to Congestion Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for the Operating Day at the sink of the transaction; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-
time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM’s direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation.

Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f); or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment M – Appendix, section II.B. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.
Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource’s Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource’s energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller’s Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended (or, for Energy Storage Resource Model Participants, the charging of which is increased) at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

A Market Seller of a unit defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), (f-3), (f-4), or (f-5) that is reduced using a generator output constraint to honor a stability limitation is not eligible for credits under this section 3.2.3(f) for the MWh reduction associated with honoring the stability limit.
(f-1) With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3 (f).

(ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection’s direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

2) the Real-time Price at the unit’s bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit’s bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall
be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit’s output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(f-5) If a Market Participant of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant believes that the above calculations in this section 3.2.3 do not accurately compensate the Market Participant for opportunity costs associated with following PJM manual dispatch instructions to modify a unit’s charging or discharging due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Participant will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Participant. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval’s withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12 are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the
real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule below, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions, which include the components referenced in section 3.2.3(d) regarding the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market, at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
(iv) Bilateral transactions inside the PJM Region, as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.10, will not be included in the determination of Supply or Demand deviations.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by section 3.2.3(b) or section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix,
section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(b) divided by the
Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum \( \leq 105\% \) of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum \( \geq 95\% \) day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ramp}_{-}\text{Requested}_t &= \frac{(\text{UDS}_{\text{Target}} - \text{AOutput}_t)}{(\text{UDS}_{\text{Look\ Advance\ Time}})}_t \\
\text{RL}_{-}\text{Desired}_t &= \text{AOutput}_t - \left(\text{Ramp}_{-}\text{Requested}_t \times \text{Case\ Eff\ Time}_t\right)
\end{align*}
\]

where:

1. UDSTarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit’s output at case solution time
3. UDSSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.
A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or if its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource’s real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
• For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(h) except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (p) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate
in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource’s bus does not meet or exceeds the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENNLEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional
balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(i) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(q)(i). The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(ii) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

(r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than $1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3, or greater than $2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than $2,000/MWh, and costs greater than $1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).
3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Synchronized Reserve Obligation”), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
Credit for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]
Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

C = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.
(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant’s Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant’s obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant’s aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.
The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l) below, is the difference between the generation resource’s output or the Demand Resource’s consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource’s output or a Demand Resource’s consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the
end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation”). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource’s output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource’s MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource’s MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource’s starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource’s ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the “ending MW usage” (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the “ending MW usage” in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement (“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”)
shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement (“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”) shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

(i) A Market Participant’s Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant’s hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant’s load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant’s total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant’s hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.

(ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispacth for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost for each Real-time Settlement Interval, limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is
above the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, a combined cycle unit, or a combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit in an amount equal to \( (AG - LMPDMW) \times (UB - URTLMP) \) where:

- \( AG \) equals the actual output of the unit;
- \( LMPDMW \) equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;
- \( UB \) equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;
- \( URTLMP \) equals the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus; and

where \( UB - URTLMP \) shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit’s output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of
alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit’s operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit’s cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit’s bus, (C) the generating unit’s startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller’s pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit’s offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to
each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit’s inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element (“contingency flow”) exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility (“post-contingency operation”). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit’s operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided
synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource’s applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource’s start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the
Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant’s energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJM Settlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant’s internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJM Settlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.
Section(s) of the
PJM Operating Agreement

(Marked / Redline Format)
3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.


(c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).

(f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region.
3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour (“Regulation Obligation”). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

\[
\text{Regulation Charge} = \text{Hourly Regulation Obligation Share} \times (\text{sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour})
\]

(b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to section 3.2.2A.1 below, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource’s unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource’s Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 below shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(e).

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the
generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.
(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource’s capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource’s offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their
order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. Resources following the dynamic Regulation signal which have a unit-specific benefits factor less than 0.1 will not be considered for the purposes of committing resources. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource’s accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function \( r \) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

\[
\text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal,Response}(\delta, \delta + 5 \text{ Min})};
\]

where \( \delta \) is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

\[
\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs} \left( \frac{(\delta - 5 \text{ Minutes})}{(5 \text{ Minutes})} \right).
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error \( \epsilon \) as a function of the resource’s Regulation capacity using the following equations:

\[
\text{Energy Score} = 1 - \frac{1}{n} \sum \text{Abs} (\text{Error});
\]

\[
\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs} \left( \frac{(\text{Response} - \text{Regulation Signal})}{(\text{Hourly Average Regulation Signal})} \right); \text{ and}
\]

\[
n = \text{the number of samples in the hour and the energy}.
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

\[
\text{Accuracy Score} = \max ((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})) + (\text{Energy Score}).
\]
The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(e). A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and...
a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller’s pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3A.01 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3A.01 does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.7.17 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.17, and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource’s scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource’s energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(n) below, if the total offered price for Start-up Costs (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to section 3.2.3(p) below, depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or
during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (b) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT
Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from section 3.2.3(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load ((a) net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy), accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day and accepted Up-to Congestion Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for the Operating Day at the sink of the transaction; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-
time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM’s direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation.

Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K–Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f); or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment M–Appendix, section II.B. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.
Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource’s Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource’s energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller’s Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended (or, for Energy Storage Resource Model Participants, the charging of which is increased) at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C. A Market Seller of a unit defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), (f-3), (f-4), or (f-5) that is reduced using a generator output constraint to honor a stability limitation is not eligible for credits under this section 3.2.3(f) for the MWh reduction associated with honoring the stability limit.
With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3(f).

(ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection’s direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

2) the Real-time Price at the unit’s bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit’s bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be
compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit’s output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(f-5) If a Market Participant of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant believes that the above calculations in this section 3.2.3 do not accurately compensate the Market Participant for opportunity costs associated with following PJM manual dispatch instructions to modify a unit’s charging or discharging due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Participant will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Participant. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval’s withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12 are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the
real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in section 3.2.3(q) below, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions, which include the components referenced in section 3.2.3(d) regarding the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market, at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
(iv) Bilateral transactions inside the PJM Region, as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.10, will not be included in the determination of Supply or Demand deviations.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Operating Agreement,
Schedule 1, section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(b) divided by the
Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum $\leq 105\%$ of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum $\geq 95\%$ day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$Ramp_{Request_t} = \frac{(UDStarget_{t-1} - AOoutput_{t-1})}{UDSLAtime_{t-1}}$$

$$RL_{Desired_t} = AOoutput_{t-1} + \left( Ramp_{Request_t} \times Case_{Eff\_time_{t-1}} \right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOoutput = Unit’s output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.
A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource’s real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
• For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(h) except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (p) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate
in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource’s bus does not meet or exceeds the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional
balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(i) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(q)(i). The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(ii) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

(r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than $1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3, or greater than $2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than $2,000/MWh, and costs greater than $1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).
3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Synchronized Reserve Obligation”), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]
Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

C = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.
(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant’s Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant’s obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant’s aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.
The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource’s output or the Demand Resource’s consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource’s output or a Demand Resource’s consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the
end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation”). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:

- \(A\) = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- \(B\) = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and
- \(C\) = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:

- \(A\) = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- \(B\) = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and
- \(C\) = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource’s output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource’s output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource’s MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource’s MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource’s starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource’s ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the “ending MW usage” (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the “ending MW usage” in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement (“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”)
shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement (“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”) shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

(i) A Market Participant’s Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant’s hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant’s load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant’s total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant’s hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.

(ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to re-dispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost for each Real-time Settlement Interval, limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is
above the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, a combined cycle unit, or a combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit in an amount equal to \( (AG - LMPDMW) \times (UB - URTLMP) \) where:

- AG equals the actual output of the unit;
- LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit’s bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;
- UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;
- URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit’s bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit’s output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of
alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit’s operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit’s cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit’s bus, (C) the generating unit’s startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller’s pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit’s offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to
each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (a) net of operating
Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission
zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating
Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the
Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the
Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable.
Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said
instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested
amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the
Interconnection dispatcher of the unit’s inability, or expected inability, to provide the required
reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance
Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has
altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the
actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the
Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive
performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may
withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of
the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to
control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent
element (“contingency flow”) exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically
a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM
does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the
contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility (“post-
contingency operation”). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on
such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in
the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater
certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the
flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers
associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying
the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be
notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit’s operator indicates that the
generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same
requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve.
At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-
contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for
providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request
of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized
Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided
synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource’s applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource’s start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the
Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant’s energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant’s internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.
Attachment B

PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff
and PJM Operating Agreement

(Clean Format)
Section(s) of the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Clean Format)
3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.


(c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).

(f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region.
3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour (“Regulation Obligation”). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

\[ \text{Regulation Charge} = \text{Hourly Regulation Obligation Share} \times (\text{sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour}) \]

(b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) below, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource’s unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource’s Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 below shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(e).

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the
Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource’s capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource’s offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits
factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. Resources following the dynamic Regulation signal which have a unit-specific benefits factor less than 0.1 will not be considered for the purposes of committing resources. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource’s accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

\[
\text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal}, \text{Response}}(\delta, \delta+5 \text{ Min});
\]

where \( \delta \) is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

\[
\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs} ((\delta - 5 \text{ Minutes}) / (5 \text{ Minutes})).
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (\( \varepsilon \)) as a function of the resource’s Regulation capacity using the following equations:

\[
\text{Energy Score} = 1 - 1/n \sum \text{Abs} (\text{Error});
\]

\[
\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs} ((\text{Response} - \text{Regulation Signal}) / (\text{Hourly Average Regulation Signal})); \text{ and}
\]

\[n = \text{the number of samples in the hour and the energy.}\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

\[
\text{Accuracy Score} = \max ((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})) + (\text{Energy Score}).
\]
The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(e). A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and
a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the
remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier
test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller’s pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating
Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of
such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer
Data for such resource. To the extent that Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3A.01
and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3A.01 does not meet
the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall
schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section
1.7.17 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.17, and Tariff,
Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement,
Schedule 1, section 1.10. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating
Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements
that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. PJMSettlement shall
be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange
Energy Market.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that
is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and No-
load Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource’s scheduled output, shall be
compared to the total value of that resource’s energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy
Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead
Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-
ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface
control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain
system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of
Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate
possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources
would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii)
report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-
ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(n) below, if the total offered price for Start-up Costs
(shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-
ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement
Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated
pursuant to this section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports,
pursuant to section 3.2.3(p) below, depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve
credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or
during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (b) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

   (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

   (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

   (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

   (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT
Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from section 3.2.3(h) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (a) net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy); accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day and accepted Up-to Congestion Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for the Operating Day at the sink of the transaction; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-
time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM’s direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation.

Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f); or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment M – Appendix, section II.B. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.
Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource’s Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource’s energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller’s Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended (or, for Energy Storage Resource Model Participants, the charging of which is increased) at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C. A Market Seller of a unit defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), (f-3), (f-4), or (f-5) that is reduced using a generator output constraint to honor a stability limitation is not eligible for credits under this section 3.2.3(f) for the MWh reduction associated with honoring the stability limit.
(f-1) With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3 (f).

(ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection’s direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

2) the Real-time Price at the unit’s bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit’s bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall
be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit’s output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(f-5) If a Market Participant of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant believes that the above calculations in this section 3.2.3 do not accurately compensate the Market Participant for opportunity costs associated with following PJM manual dispatch instructions to modify a unit’s charging or discharging due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Participant will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Participant. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval’s withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12 are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the
real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule below, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

2. Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions, which include the components referenced in section 3.2.3(d) regarding the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market, at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

3. Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
(iv) Bilateral transactions inside the PJM Region, as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.10, will not be included in the determination of Supply or Demand deviations.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by section 3.2.3.(b) or section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix,
section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(b) divided by the
Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

\[
\text{Ramp Request}_t = \frac{\text{UDS Target}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1}}{\text{UDSLookAhead Time}_{t-1}}
\]

\[
\text{RL Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} \left( \text{Ramp Request}_t \times \text{Case Eff Time}_{t-1} \right)
\]

where:

1. UDSTarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit’s output at case solution time
3. UDSLookAheadTime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case Eff Time = Time between base point changes
5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.
A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource’s real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
• For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(h) except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (p) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate
in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource’s bus does not meet or exceeds the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENNLEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional
Balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(i) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(q)(i). The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(ii) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

(r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than $1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3, or greater than $2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than $2,000/MWh, and costs greater than $1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).
3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Synchronized Reserve Obligation”), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]
Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

C = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.
(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant’s Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant’s obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis. The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant’s aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.
The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(1) below, is the difference between the generation resource’s output or the Demand Resource’s consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource’s output or a Demand Resource’s consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the
end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation”). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronozed Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource’s output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shutdown time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource’s MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource’s MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource’s starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource’s ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the “ending MW usage” (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the “ending MW usage” in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement (“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”)
shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement (“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”) shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

(i) A Market Participant’s Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant’s hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant’s load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant’s total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant’s hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.

(ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispach for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost for each Real-time Settlement Interval, limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is
above the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, a combined cycle unit, or a combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit in an amount equal to {\((AG - LMPDMW) \times (UB - URTLMP)\)} where:

\( AG \) equals the actual output of the unit;

\( LMPDMW \) equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit’s bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

\( UB \) equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;

\( URTLMP \) equals the real time LMP at the unit’s bus; and

where \( UB - URTLMP \) shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit’s output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of
alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit’s operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit’s cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit’s bus, (C) the generating unit’s startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller’s pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit’s offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to
each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit’s inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element (“contingency flow”) exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility (“post-contingency operation”). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit’s operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided
synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource’s applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource’s start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the
Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant’s energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant’s internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.
Section(s) of the
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3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.


(c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).

(f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region.
3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour (“Regulation Obligation”). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

Regulation Charge = Hourly Regulation Obligation Share * (sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour)

(b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to section 3.2.2A.1 below, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource’s unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource’s Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 below shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(e).

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the
generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating, is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource.

Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.
In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource’s expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource’s capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource’s accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource’s offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their
order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. Resources following the dynamic Regulation signal which have a unit-specific benefits factor less than 0.1 will not be considered for the purposes of committing resources. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource’s accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

\[
\text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal,Response}(\delta,\delta+5\text{ Min})}; \\
\delta=0 \text{ to } 5 \text{ Min}
\]

where \( \delta \) is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

\[
\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs } ((\delta - 5 \text{ Minutes}) / (5 \text{ Minutes})�).
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (\( \varepsilon \)) as a function of the resource’s Regulation capacity using the following equations:

\[
\text{Energy Score} = 1 - 1/n \sum \text{Abs (Error)};
\]

\[
\text{Error} = \text{Average of } \text{Abs } ((\text{Response - Regulation Signal}) / (\text{Hourly Average Regulation Signal}));\text{ and}
\]

\[
n = \text{the number of samples in the hour and the energy.}
\]

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

\[
\text{Accuracy Score} = \text{max } ((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})) + (\text{Energy Score}).
\]
The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

### 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

#### 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(e). A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and...
a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

### 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller’s pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3A.01 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3A.01 does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.7.17 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.17, and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10 and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource’s scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource’s energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(n) below, if the total offered price for Start-up Costs (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to section 3.2.3(p) below, depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or
during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (b) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT
Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from section 3.2.3(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load ((a) net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy), accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day and accepted Up-to Congestion Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for the Operating Day at the sink of the transaction; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-
time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM’s direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller’s request for compensation.

Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(f) and the parallel provision of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(f); or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment M – Appendix, section II.B. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.
Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource’s Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource’s energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller’s Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource’s opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended (or, for Energy Storage Resource Model Participants, the charging of which is increased) at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C. A Market Seller of a unit defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), (f-3), (f-4), or (f-5) that is reduced using a generator output constraint to honor a stability limitation is not eligible for credits under this section 3.2.3(f) for the MWh reduction associated with honoring the stability limit.
(f-1) With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3(f).

(ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection’s direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

2) the Real-time Price at the unit’s bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit’s bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource’s Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be
compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit’s output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the unit’s offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as (A*B) - C.

(f-5) If a Market Participant of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant believes that the above calculations in this section 3.2.3 do not accurately compensate the Market Participant for opportunity costs associated with following PJM manual dispatch instructions to modify a unit’s charging or discharging due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Participant will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Participant. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[
\sum_h (A + B + C)
\]

Where:

- \( h \) = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

- \( A \) = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval’s withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12 are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

- \( B \) = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

- \( C \) = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant’s energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant’s total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.1A shall be used in determining the
real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Tariff, Schedule 6A.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in section 3.2.3(q) below, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions, which include the components referenced in section 3.2.3(d) regarding the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market, at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
(iv) Bilateral transactions inside the PJM Region, as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.10, will not be included in the determination of Supply or Demand deviations.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Operating Agreement,
Schedule 1, section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller’s lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to section 3.2.3(b) divided by the
Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

\[
\text{Ramp Request}_t = \frac{(\text{UDS Target}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})}{(\text{UDS Look Ahead Time}_{t-1})}
\]

\[
\text{RL Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \text{Ramp Request}_t \times \text{Case Eff Time}_{t-1}
\]

where:

1. UDS Target = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit’s output at case solution time
3. UDS Look Ahead Time = UDS look ahead time
4. Case Eff Time = Time between base point changes
5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit’s MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.
A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource’s real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(h) except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day. Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (p) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate
in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real-time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource’s bus does not meet or exceeds the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional
balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(i) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Tariff, Schedule 6A, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3(q)(i). The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with section 3.2.3(p). Allocation to real-time load share under this subsection (q)(ii) shall not apply to Direct Charging Energy.

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

(r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than $1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3, or greater than $2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than $2,000/MWh, and costs greater than $1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).
3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Synchronized Reserve Obligation”), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh. The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) + (C \times D)\]
Where

\[ A = \text{The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;} \]
\[ B = \text{The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;} \]
\[ C = \text{The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;} \] and
\[ D = \text{The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.} \]

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[ (A \times B) + (C \times D) \]

Where:

\[ A = \text{The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer;} \]
\[ B = \text{The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;} \]
\[ C = \text{The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;} \] and
\[ D = \text{The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.} \]

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.
(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant’s Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant’s obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant’s aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.
The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource’s output or the Demand Resource’s consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource’s output or a Demand Resource’s consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the
end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant’s total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour (“Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation”). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be $850/MWh.
The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be $300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants’ response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

\[(A \times B) - C\]

Where:
A = The deviation of the generation resource’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and instructions from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource’s output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource’s Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shutdown time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource’s MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource’s MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource’s starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource’s ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the “ending MW usage” (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the “ending MW usage” in which the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement (“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”)
shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement (“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits”) shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

(i) A Market Participant’s Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant’s hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant’s load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant’s total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant’s hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.

(ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit’s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection’s signals and the generating unit’s expected output level (or the level of Energy Storage Resource Model Participant charging withdrawals) if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than $0.00. This equation is represented as \((A \times B) - C\).

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost for each Real-time Settlement Interval, limited to the lesser of the unit’s Economic Maximum or the unit’s Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit’s bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller’s unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is
above the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a steam-electric generating unit, an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant, a combined cycle unit, or a combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM’s unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit in an amount equal to \((\text{AG} - \text{LMPDMW}) \times (\text{UB} - \text{URTLMP})\) where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;

URTLMP equals the real-time LMP at the unit’s bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.3(c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit’s output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of
alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit’s operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit’s cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit’s bus, (C) the generating unit’s startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller’s pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit’s offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to
each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating
Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission
zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating
Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the
Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the
Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable.
Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said
instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested
amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the
Interconnection dispatcher of the unit’s inability, or expected inability, to provide the required
reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance
Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has
altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the
actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the
Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive
performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may
withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of
the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to
control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent
element (“contingency flow”) exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically
a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM
does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the
contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility (“post-
contingency operation”). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on
such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in
the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater
certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the
flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers
associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying
the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be
notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit’s operator indicates that the
generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same
requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve.
At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-
contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for
providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request
of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized
Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided
synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource’s applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource’s start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load ((a) net of operating Behind The Meter Generation; and (b) excluding Direct Charging Energy) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the
Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant’s energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant’s real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant’s spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJM Settlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant’s internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJM Settlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.